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STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Thus the central function, and it is at the same time the central
problem, of judicial review: a body that is not elected or
otherwise politically responsible in any significant way is
telling the people's elected representatives that they cannot
govern as they'd like.
John Hart Ely'
Judicial review2 is a fundamental concept of the American
political system, while public land use regulation is a central feature
of American property, land development, and environmental law.
The combination of judicial review and state and local land use
controls produces a variegated mixture of jurisprudential areas. The
resulting mosaic encompasses many approaches and some sharp
disagreements about constitutional doctrine, historical precedent, and
social policy. This is particularly true in an increasingly conservative
domestic political climate that generates demands for deregulation
which are directed at both legislatures and courts. Economic
conservatives, who a generation ago were associated in the popular
mind with judicial restraint, now encourage the United States
Supreme Court to subject land use regulations to intensive and
vigorous scrutiny.3 Conversely, liberals, land use planners, and
environmentalists who previously advocated active judicial review of
certain varieties of land use regulations, such as exclusionary zoning
controls, today support restraintist approaches to land use laws. In
light of these "flips," and in light of the competing demands placed
on legislators, regulators, and judges, we should not be surprised that
"no set formula" has emerged with regard to standards of judicial
I. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST4-5 (1980).
2. Judicial review is the Supreme Court's power to strike down and invalidate, on
constitutional grounds, legislative and executive action whether its origin be federal, state, or
local. See ALEXANDER BICKEL. THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1 (1962) (noting the Court's
power of constitutional review).
3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 29-30 (1985).
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review, just as "no set formula" has yet emerged on the takings
issue.4 All of this leads, however, to an interesting, yet problematic
picture of standards of judicial review in Supreme Court land use
jurisprudence.
Not only have some ironic "flips" occurred in the highly charged
areas of judicial review and land use jurisprudence, but, not
surprisingly, most writing on these topics in the professional
literature has become ideological, not analytical.5 As a result,
discussion and debate becomes contradictory and intense.6 Frequently
what purports to be scholarly analysis is instead at its core politicized
and polemical.7 This makes it all the more difficult to achieve a clear
4. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978),
Justice William Brennan remarked, in a phrase that has become an often used description of
Supreme Court treatment of the takings issue, that, "[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable
to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require ...
compensat[ion] ... " For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
5. With regard to constitutional theory and judicial review, see, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE (1991); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980);
SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT (Stephen C. Halpem & Charles M. Lamb eds.,
1982); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985); Michael L. Benedict, To
Secure These Rights: Rights, Democracy and Judicial Review in the Anglo-American
Constitutional Heritage, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 69 (1981); Raoul Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial
Review, " 42 OHIO ST. L.L 87 (1981); Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and
Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986); Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional
Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383 (1985); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063
(1981); Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J 131 (1981); Joseph D. Grano,
Ely's Theory of Judicial Review: Preserving the Significance of the Political Process, 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 167 (1981); Earl M. Maltz, Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment on
Democracy and Distrust, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 209 (1981); James E. Meeks, Foreword, Symposium:
Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J 1 (1981); Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1986); Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory - And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J.
223 (1981); Michael 3. Perry, Interpretivisim, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 261 (1981); Michael J. Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A
Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (1981); Richard A. Posner, Democracy and
Distrust Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 641 (1991).
6. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon, A Framework For Analysis of Judicial Activism, in
SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT, supra note 5, at 385-419 (1982); see generally
SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT, supra note 5.
7. Canon, supra note 6, at 385.
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portrayal of the debate.
To address the confused picture that has emerged in land use
litigation, this Article offers (1) a taxonomy, i.e. a classification
system; (2) an analytical framework; and (3) a synthesis of the
standards of judicial review utilized in Supreme Court land use cases
since Mugler v. Kansas' was decided in 1887. 9 Unlike some previous
efforts, it focuses on a dimension-standards of judicial review"-
that has not previously received detailed and systematic attention."
The unit of analysis utilized in this Article is the Supreme Court
opinion-be it a majority, a concurring, or a dissenting opinion. Over
120 opinions 2 in more than four dozen Supreme Court land use
decisions 3 are classified, put into an analytical framework, and then
analyzed. 4 The explicit, or often implicit, policy bases in these
8. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
9. Professor Canon's essay, supra note 6, provided the original idea for this Article.
10. "Standards of judicial review" are the standards that the Court has created and used
"to guide [its] review and disposition of particular issues on the merits." WILLIAM A. KAPLIN,
THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 (1992). In this sense standards of
judicial review are what has been called adjective, as opposed to substantive law, i.e. the level
of deference or the level of judicial scrutiny the court uses in reviewing a challenge to
legislative or administrative action. 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING,
§ 3.14, at 113 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 4th ed. 1996) (discussing the adjective nature of
presumption and burden of proof). To the extent possible, I attempt to: (1) extract this adjective
law dimension from each opinion and examine it separately from the substantive, constitutional
law aspects of the opinion; (2) classify it; and (3) synthesize it into a four-part structure. See
infra Parts IV, V, VI, and VII.
11. Nine other dimensions of judicial review that are not analyzed in detail in this Article
include: (1) judicial treatment of the non-judicial decision, for example, validation or
invalidation; (2) judicial attitude toward the non-judicial decisionmaker, (3) judicial treatment
of prudential doctrines such as: justiciability, ripeness, and standing; (4) judicial treatment of
relevant precedent; (5) judicial treatment of constitutional provisions; (6) judicial policy
making/social engineering; (7) specificity of policy making, i.e., positive, negative, or
permissive; (8) judicial identification of alternative policy-makers; and (9) judicial treatment of
remedial issues. Dimensions 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are discussed by Professor Canon, supra note 6,
at 386-87.
12. For a list of the land use opinions categorized and analyzed for this article, see
Appendix B.
13. See Appendix B for a list of decisions.
14. Typically law review articles fully or almost fully digest the judicial opinions or
statutes being analyzed. I depart somewhat from this approach. As I sort out, categorize, and
analyze the over 120 key land use opinions of the Court, I also include, in footnotes, many
1997]
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opinions are examined and discussed as well. 5 My purpose is to
facilitate further analysis and understanding of Supreme Court land
use jurisprudence and to shed light, not heat, on that body of
jurisprudence. In addition, I propose a preliminary suggestion that is
designed to improve and strengthen the Court's performance, the
practicing bar's comprehension, and the public's understanding of
this important area.'
6
Currently there is significant disarray, if not anarchy, in both the
areas of constitutional theory (judicial review) and land development
planning and control. The scholarly writing in both areas, beginning
in the late 1950s and continuing to the present, is diverse, centrifugal,
and, in sheer volume, overwhelming. 7 Unity and consensus are not
emerging; fragmentation and polarity are discernible. Some see
creative tension while others perceive "deep problems."'
S
With this confused picture of robust disagreements, 9 it is hoped
that a taxonomy and an analytical framework along with some
lengthy quotes from these opinions. I do this for two reasons: (1) to provide the reader with a
first-hand flavor of the opinion's approach to judicial review; and (2) to allow the reader to
make his or her own assessments and compare them to the ones I make.
Appendix A to this Article provides detailed synopses of the over four dozen land use
decisions analyzed in the Article. This is also done for two reasons. First, the synopses provide
useful background and discussion and are included as a service to readers who may not be
familiar with many of the decisions and cases discussed. Second, by providing the synopses in
Appendix A, I reduce the amount of discussion in the text that has to be devoted to informing
the reader about the factual, procedural, and substantive background of the cases.
Thirty-nine of the fifty-three synopses in Appendix A appear in LAND USE AND THE
CONSTITUTION: PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING PRACTICE 210-71 (Brian W. Blaesser & Alan C.
Weinstein eds., 1989) [hereinafter BLAESSER, LAND USE]. These synopses are reprinted with
permission from the American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave,
Chicago, IL 60603-6107.
15. For a summary and synthesis of the policy bases articulated as justifications for the
various standards ofjudicial review, see infra Part VIII, Figure VIfl-2.
16. See infra Part IX The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty: A Modest Suggestion for
Improvement.
17. Seesupra note 5.
18. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5, at 641.
19. See, e.g., William W. Fisher I, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393
(1993); Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, The Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 147 (1995).
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helpful illustrations will provide a useful, practicable, and generally
applicable starting point for later discussions that can share a more
common analytical structure. The taxonomy and the framework can
be applied to any particular Supreme Court opinion or decision, a line
of opinions or decisions, an individual Justice's opinions, a specific
substantive land use issue such as takings or equal protection, or
various judicial periods like the Euclid era, the Warren Court era, or
the Rehnquist/Scalia era.2°
II. THE TAXONOMY
This Article describes, discusses, and applies four standards of
judicial review to Supreme Court land use opinions. The first three
standards are familiar to students of judicial review and land use
jurisprudence: deferential standards of judicial review, heightened
standards of judicial review, and activist standards of judicial
review.2 This Article also recognizes a fourth variety of judicial
review, categorical judicial review. Categorical judicial review
involves per se rules or categories which, if found to be applicable to
a governmental land use regulation, will result in automatic
constitutional invalidation. Categorical judicial review, unlike the
other varieties, rejects legislative purpose inquiries and means-ends
tests. Furthermore, it rejects any considerations of comity and
propriety of relationships between coordinate branches of
government. It is, in short, the most assertive and intrusive form of
judicial review; it is uncompromisingly deadly to legislative action.22
20. Canon, supra note 6, at 413-14.
21. See KAPLIN, supra note 10, at 55-56. See also DAVID K GODSCHALK Er AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 82-83 (1979) (noting the standards used
to evaluate equal protection violations).
22. See infra Part Vll.
1997]
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III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The four standards of judicial review outlined in Part II comprise
the Y axis of my framework. Substantive constitutional law issues
that consistently arise in Supreme Court land use cases comprise the
X axis.
FIGURE III-1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Standards of
Judicial
Review
Y Axis
Substantive Constitutional Issues - X Axis
Substantive Eminent Takings Delegation Equal Freedom of Freedom of
Due Domain of Protection Speech Religion
Process Power
Deferential
Judicial
Review -
Minimal
Scrutiny
Heightened
Judicial
Review -
Intermediate
Scrutiny
Active Judicial
Review - Strict
Scrutiny
Categorical
Judicial
Review -
Perse Rules
This framework is used to analyze and discuss over 120 Supreme
Court land use opinions in over four dozen important land use
decisions. This Article focuses on the discussion of the standards of
judicial review, explicit or implicit, used to guide each Justice's
analysis and disposition of the particular substantive issues on the
merits. As the reader progresses through this Article, she will see
fascinating interplays; between the Justices,' between the various
23. Compare, for example, the majority opinions of Justice Scalia in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
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standards of judicial review, between the policy bases of each
standard,24 and between certain Justices' attitudes toward the pros and
cons of governmental regulation on one hand and the strengths and
weaknesses of the coordinate, non-judicial branches of government
on the other."
IV. SYNTHESIS: DEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIW/MNIMAL
SCRUTINY
As the history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason
for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention
become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of this Court. That history counsels caution and
restraint.
Justice Lewis Powell26
Deferential judicial review is an attitude or approach adopted by
courts that recognizes comity among the coordinate branches of
government. This approach assumes that policy decisions by
legislative and administrative bodies under usual circumstances
override judicial policy judgments. Deferential judicial review allows
for the exercise of police power for the public welfare and it denies
private property owners' interests a predominant position in our
constitutional system. Deferential judicial review respects the factual
realities as determined by non-judicial branches of government.27
U.S. 1003 (1992) and Chief Justice Rehnquist in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994), with the respective dissenting opinions of Justice Brennan (Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842),
Justice Blackmun (Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036), and Justice Stevens (Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322).
For perhaps the best example ofjudicial interplay, see the majority opinion of Justice White and
the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985). For synopses of these cases, see Appendix A.
24. See infra Parts IV, V, VI, and VII and Part VIII, Figure VII-B.
25. Id
26. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502, 503 (1977) (footnote omitted).
For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
27. For an account of Chief Justice Morrison Waite's contribution to the development of
deferential judicial review, see C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF
CHARACTER 173-203 (1963).
1997]
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Further, deferential judicial review is an attitude of modesty and
propriety adopted by courts in reviewing, on constitutional grounds,
the actions of the other coordinate branches of government.28
Deferential judicial review is neither a matter of absolute obligation
nor mere courtesy or good will, but the recognition that a court most
often accords to legislative and executive actions consistent with the
28. For an early and influential scholarly treatment of deferential judicial review, see
JAMES B. THAYER, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law in
LEGAL ESSAYS 20-22 (1908):
I have accumulated these citations and run them back to the beginning, in order that it
may be clear that the rule in question is something more than a mere form of language,
a mere expression of courtesy and deference. It means far more than that. The courts
have perceived with more or less distinctness that this exercise of the judicial function
does in truth go far beyond the simple business which judges sometimes describe. If
their duty were in truth merely and nakedly to ascertain the meaning of the text of the
constitution and of the impeached Act of the legislature, and to determine, as an
academic question, whether in the court's judgment the two were in conflict, it would,
to be sure, be an elevated and important office, one dealing with great matters,
involving large public considerations, but yet a function far simpler than it really is.
Having ascertained all this, yet there remains a question-the really momentous
question-whether, after all, the court can disregard the Act. It cannot do this as a
mere matter of course,-merely because it is concluded that upon a just and true
construction the law is unconstitutional. That is precisely the significance of the rule of
administration that the courts lay down. It can only disregard the Act when those who
have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very
clear one,--so clear that it is not open to rational question. That is the standard of duty
to which the courts bring legislative Acts; that is the test which they apply,--not
merely their own judgment as to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to what
judgment is permissible to another department which the constitution has charged with
the duty of making it. This rule recognizes that, having regard to the great, complex,
ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much which will seem unconstitutional to
one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to another, that the constitution
often admits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and
judgment; that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the legislature any
one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of choice; and that whatever choice is
rational is constitutional. This is the principle which the rule that I have been
illustrating affirms and supports. The meaning and effect of it are shortly and very
strikingly intimated by a remark of Judge Cooley, to the effect that one who is a
member of a legislature may vote against a measure as being, in his judgment,
unconstitutional; and, being subsequently placed on the bench, when this measure,
having been passed by the legislature in spite of his opposition, comes before him
judicially, may there find it his duty, although he has in no degree changed his opinion,
to declare it constitutional.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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central constitutional concept of separation of powers. Deferential
judicial review is an attitude of judicial self-restraint, an approach
that "the least dangerous branch" adopts in its review of the actions
of non-judicial branches of government.29
Deferential judicial review, the "normal" approach taken by the
Supreme Court as it reviews land use regulations," typically has three
components: (1) a presumption of constitutional validity which
attaches to the challenged governmental action under review, (2) the
assignment of the burden of proof to the challenging party (usually a
land owner alleging over-regulation), and (3) an exacting standard of
proof. For instance, in the landmark 1926 zoning case of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,31 the Supreme Court held that "[i]f the
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly
debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control. 32
Thus, the Court explicitly gave the Village of Euclid's zoning
ordinance a presumption of validity, implicitly placed the burden of
proof on Ambler Realty, and explicitly established a very high
standard of proof, i.e. beyond fair debate.33 This restraintist approach
became the "normal"3" judicial approach in the years since 1926 as
courts reviewed an ever-increasing number and variety of land use
regulations.
Judicial review would be a fairly meaningless power and would
not be as controversial a topic as it is if courts invariably utilized a
restraintist, "Euclidean" approach. However, as Parts V, VI, and VII
of this Article demonstrate, the Supreme Court has departed from the
restraintist approach once before35 and many times since Euclid, and
29. See generally BICKEL, supra note 2.
30. See 1 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, WILLIAMS AMERICAN LAND
PLANNING LAW § 5A.04-40, at 139 (1988 rev.).
31. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
32, Id. at 388.
33. Id. at 395.
34. See supra note 30.
35. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922). For a synopsis of
this case, see Appendix A.
1997]
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has been, in a variety of ways, at various times, interventionist in its
review of governmental land use actions. It is these interventionist
varieties of judicial review that have led, in land use jurisprudence as
in other areas of law, to a general "distrust" of the "least dangerous
branch.
36
The distinctive feature of restraintist, deferential judicial review is
the presumption of validity,37 a presumption usually found in land use
cases that involve substantive due process and takings issues.3' The
Court has developed an analogous restraintist approach in equal
protection and First Amendment cases-minimal scrutiny.39 Minimal
scrutiny is the restraintist component of what has been called two-
tiered or three-tiered equal protection judicial review.4" Also, minimal
scrutiny is a standard of judicial review that gives the utmost respect
to legislative and administrative decisions. Minimal scrutiny and the
presumption of validity are the two principal forms of deferential
judicial review.
The analysis of deferential judicial review that follows discusses
the varieties of deferential judicial review according to substantive
area, i.e. substantive due process, eminent domain, takings,
delegation of power, equal protection, First Amendment-freedom of
speech, and First Amendment-freedom of religion, and identifies the
key case or cases in each. This discussion gives the content and
36. See BICKEL, supra note 2; ELY, supra note 1, at 1-72.
37. For a critique of the presumption of validity as a tool of judicial review, see Robert J.
Hopperton, The Presumption of Validity in American Land-Use Law: A Substitute For Analysis,
A Source of Significant Confusion, 23 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 301 (1996).
For an interesting and excellent article on the shifting of the presumption, see Daniel R.
Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law,
24 URB. LAW. 1 (1992). See also Robert J. Hopperton, Majoritarian and Counter-Majoritarian
Difficulties: Democracy, Distrust, and Disclosure in American Land-Use Jurispruduce-A
Response to Professors Mandelker and Tarlock's Reply, 24 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 541
(1997); Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Two Cheers for Shifting the Presumption of
Validity: A Reply to Professor Hopperton, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 103 (1997).
38. See ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 116-17 (noting that zoning ordinances are presumed
constitutional).
39. See infra Part IV.E-F.
40. See infra Part VIII, Figure VIII-3.
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texture of the restraintist standards of judicial review; illustrations are
provided to depict relationships and the sequence of the inquiry. Parts
V, VI, and VII follow the same pattern.
A. Substantive Due Process
The presumption of validity can be traced to the early case of
Fletcher v. Peck." As Justice Powell pointed out in his opinion in
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.2 in 1977, the "Court has recognized ever since Fletcher v.
Peck, that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation
represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches
of government."'43 Deferential judicial review was articulated as a
presumption of validity by Chief Justice Morrison Waite in 1878 in
the Sinking Fund Cases." Chief Justice Waite's articulation of the
presumption of validity also provided the first suggestion of policy
bases for the presumption-separation of powers and the integrity of
the functions of the coordinate, non-judicial branches of
government.45
41. I0U.S.(6Cranch)87(1810).
42. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
43. Id. at 268 n. 18 (citations omitted). In Fletcher, Chief Justice Marshall remarked that:
The question, whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the constitution, is, at all
times, a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the
affirmative, in a doubtful case. The court, when impelled by duty to render such a
judgment, would be unworthy of its station, could it be unmindful of the solemn
obligations which that station imposes. But it is not on slight implication and vague
conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and
its acts to be considered as void. The opposition between the constitution and the law
should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their
incompatibility with each other.
Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 128.
44. 99 U.S. 700 (1878).
Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues
until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt. One branch of the govemment
cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger. The safety of our
institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule.
Id. at 718.
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
14 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
The first "land use" case in which the presumption of validity
appeared was Mugler v. Kansas in 1887, in which Justice John
Marshall Harlan's opinion identified and articulated separation of
powers and the recognition of appropriate roles for the various
branches of government as policy bases of the presumption of
validity.47 The presumption of validity also is articulated by various
Justices in several early twentieth century, pre-Euclid land use cases
such as Welch v. Swasey (Justice Rufus Peckham),4' Reinman v. City
of Little Rock (Justice Mahlon Pitney),49 Hadacheck v. Sebastian
(Justice Joseph McKenna),"0 and Block v. Hirsh (Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes). '
The most significant articulation of the presumption of validity
and its companion components appeared in Justice George
Sutherland's opinion in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty. 2 In one
sentence, Justice Sutherland put in place the cornerstone of the arch
of deferential judicial review. Legislative action, even legislative
action by a local legislative body like the Village of Euclid, Ohio,
received a presumption of constitutional validity. 3 That presumption
45. See KAPLIN, supra note 10, at 49-112 (discussing federalism and the separation of
powers).
46. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
47. Id. at 661-62.
[E]very possible presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute
... [T]he courts cannot, without usurping legislative functions, override the will
of the people as thus expressed by their chosen representatives. They have nothing to
do with the mere policy of legislation. Indeed, it is a fundamental principle in our
institutions, indispensable to the preservation of public liberty, that one of the separate
departments of government shall not usurp powers committed by the Constitution to
another department.
Id. (citations omitted).
48. 214 U.S. 91, 105-06 (1909). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
49. 237 U.S. 171, 177 (1915). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
50. 239 U.S. 394,413-14 (1915). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
51. 256 U.S. 135, 154-55 (1921). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
52. 272 U.S. 365.
53. Id. at 388.
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was strengthened by placing the burden of proof on the party
challenging the legislative action.54 The presumption was further
reinforced by requiring the challenging party to prove its substantive
issues beyond fair debate, a very high standard of proof similar to the
degree of proof required of the state in a criminal prosecution.55 In
other words, land use regulations would survive constitutional attack,
as they did in Euclid, unless the challenging party could prove
beyond fair, reasonable debate that the regulation being attacked
violated the Constitution.
When deferential judicial review is adopted by a court,
challengers' attacks almost always will fail and the non-judicial
decisionmaker's action will be sustained. This standard of judicial
review is a passive, deferential, and highly protective approach that
effectively immunizes legislative and executive action against most
allegations of constitutional invalidity.
The Euclidean standard of deferential judicial review received
significant support in the two years after it was articulated in 1926. In
1927, Justice Sutherland reiterated his Euclidean approach in Zahn v.
Board of Public Works 6 and in Gorieb v. Fox.57 In Gorieb, Justice
Sutherland asserted additional policy bases for deference to state and
local legislatures-the expertise and competence of those non-
judicial decisionmakers. This deferential approach was also apparent,
if implicit, in Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's 1928 opinion in Miller v.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927). "Mhe settled rule of this court is that it will not substitute
its judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the primary duty and responsibility of
determining the question." Id For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
57. 274 U.S. 603 (1927). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
All [zoning regulations] rest for their justification upon the same reasons which have
arisen in recent times as a result of the great increase and concentration of population
in urban communities and the vast changes in the extent and complexity of the
problems of modem city life. State legislatures and city councils, who deal with the
situation from a practical standpoint, are better qualified than the courts to determine
the necessity, character and degree of regulation which these new and perplexing
conditions require; and their conclusions should not be disturbed by the courts unless
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.
Id. at 608 (citations omitted).
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Schoene."8 Thus, the pattern of deferential judicial review was firmly,
but not irrevocably, established in the early days of zoning. Land use
regulations would apparently receive great respect from the highest
court in the land.
Although the Supreme Court refrained from granting certiorari in
land use cases for many years after 1928, the Euclidean approach
would be embraced in cases such as Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead9 in 1962, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas 61 in 1974, as
well as in Justice Stevens' concurring opinion and Justice White's
and Justice Stewart's dissenting opinions in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland"l in 1977. Following the Supreme Court's lead, the
Euclidean presumption of validity, burden of proof, and beyond fair
debate standard of proof, in other words deferential judicial review,
became the norm in most state courts around the country in the years
after Euclid.
B. Eminent Domain
Deferential judicial review is not confined to substantive due
process cases such as Euclid. In Berman v. Parker,' a 1954 Fifth
Amendment eminent domain case, the plaintiffs challenged a
compensated appropriation of their property for urban renewal
purposes.6 They contended that the action taken by the District of
Columbia was an unconstitutional exercise of the power of eminent
domain because their property would be conveyed to private parties
for private, not public, uses.' Justice William 0. Douglas, writing for
58. 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
59. 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (discussing a substantive due process and takings claim). For a
synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
60. 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (discussing equal protection and First Amendment-right of
association and privacy issues). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
61. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (discussing substantive due process issues). For a synopsis of this
case, see Appendix A.
62. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
63. Id. at 28-31.
64. Id. at31.
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a unanimous Court, provided what is perhaps the strongest statement
of deferential judicial review in Supreme Court land use
jurisprudence, discussing at some length the proper roles of
legislative bodies and courts.'s Douglas also spoke expansively on the
idea of public welfare and the legislature's role in promoting it.66
Consequently, Douglas stated that once a legitimate public purpose
for the project has been established, there is little room for judicial
discretion.67
65. Id. at 32.
We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as the police power.
An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must
turn on its own facts. The definition is essentially the product of legislative
determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly
nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject to specific constitutional
limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in
terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, whether it be Congress
legislating concerning the District of Columbia or the States legislating concerning
local affairs. This principle admits of no exception merely because the power of
eminent domain is involved. The role of the judiciary in determining whether that
power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.
Id. (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 33.
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within
the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations
that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If
those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the
way.
Id. (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 35-36.
It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in
review on the size of a particular project area. Once the question of the public purpose
has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the
need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the
legislative branch.
... If the Agency considers it necessary in carrying out the redevelopment project
to take full title to the real property involved, it may do so. It is not for the courts to
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In Berman, both the legislative and administrative decisions were
treated with great deference by the Court. While Justice Douglas did
not speak in terms of presumptions, burdens of proof, or standards of
proof, he provided what became a landmark statement of deferential
judicial review.
More recently, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff68 a 1984
eminent domain case, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor quoted
extensively and approvingly from Berman regarding the narrow
scope of deferential judicial review.69 Justice O'Connor concluded
that the deference given to a state legislature was no less than the
deference to be given Congress because state legislatures were
equally capable of assessing legitimate public purposes.70 Justice
O'Connor's opinion reiterates an important policy basis for
determine whether it is necessary for successful consummation of the project that
unsafe, unsightly, or insanitary buildings alone be taken or whether title to the land be
included, any more than it is the function of the courts to sort and choose among the
various parcels selected for condemnation.
Id. (citations omitted).
68. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
69. Id.at239-41.
The starting point for our analysis of the Act's constitutionality is the Court's
decision in Berman v. Parker....
There is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment
of what constitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is equated with
the police power. But the Court in Berman made clear that it is "an extremely narrow"
one.... In short, the Court has made clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a
legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a public use "unless the use be palpably
without reasonable foundation."
Id. (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 244.
Similarly, the fact that a state legislature, and not the Congress, made the public
use determination does not mean that judicial deference is less appropriate. Judicial
deference is required because, in our system of government, legislatures are better able
to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power.
State legislatures are as capable as Congress of making such determinations within
their respective spheres of authority. Thus, if a legislature, state or federal, determines
there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to
its determination that the taking will serve a public use.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
[Vol. 51:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol51/iss1/2
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
deferential judicial review; the expertise of the legislature makes it
more qualified than courts to speak to the public purposes to be
pursued in the exercise of eminent domain.
C. Regulatory Takings
Some of the most articulate and thoughtful statements of
deferential judicial review and its policy bases appear in dissenting
opinions. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Supreme Court
regulatory takings cases. In Pennsylvania Coal, the first modem
regulatory takings case, Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion is a pre-
Euclid example of a strong inclination to give deferential treatment to
the legislative determination.7' Similarly, Justice Blackmun, in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,72 was highly critical
of the majority opinion's categorical judicial review which overrode
a legislative approach designed to deal with rapidly changing
technological developments." Justice Blackmun also criticized the
Court's rigid, inflexible use of an archaic rule that not only decided
the substantive issue of the case in a way inimicable to his own
thinking, but, as will be shown in Part VII, is an example of the
categorical approach to the issue of judicial review.74 Justice
71. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416-22.
72. 458 US. 419 (1982). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
73. Id. at 455.
In the end, what troubles me most about today's decision is that is represents an
archaic judicial response to a modem social problem.... The New York Legislature
not only recognized, but also responded to, this technological advance by enacting a
statute that sought carefully to balance the interests of all private parties. New York's
courts in this litigation, with only one jurist in dissent, unanimously upheld the
constitutionality of that considered legislative judgment.
Id. (citations omitted).
74. Id.at446-47.
The Court argues that a per se rule based on "permanent physical occupation" is
both historically rooted and jurisprudentially sound. I disagree in both respects. The
19th-century precedents relied on by the Court lack any vitality outside the agrarian
context in which they were decided. But if, by chance, they have any lingering vitality,
then, in my view, those cases stand for a constitutional rule that is uniquely unsuited to
the modem urban age.
Id (footnotes and citations omitted).
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Blackmun's dissent in Loretto is a precursor to the dissents he,
Justice William Brennan, and Justice John Paul Stevens would author
in response to later majority opinions written by Justice Antonin
Scalia and Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
Before discussing the vigorous Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens
dissents in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission," Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,76 and Dolan v. City of Tigard'
respectively, it should be pointed out that there are several other
opinions in the late 1970s and in the 1980s takings cases that are
representative of deferential judicial review. Justice Lewis Powell's
majority opinion in Agins v. City of Tiburon7' dealt with the standards
of judicial review only implicitly, but it remains a solid example of
the deferential approach.79 Similarly, Justice William Brennan's
majority opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. Neiv York
City,"0 gave obvious deference to New York City's legislative and
administrative decisions although there was no explicit discussion of
the standards of judicial review.8' Justice William Rehnquist's 1980
majority opinion in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 2 a takings
and equal protection case, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's 1992
majority opinion in Yee v. City of Escondido,3 and Justice Harry
Blackmun's 1979 dissenting opinion in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States' are also representative of deferential judicial review. Finally,
75. 483 U.S. 825, 842-64 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a synopsis of this case, see
Appendix A.
76. 505 U.S. 1003, 1036-61 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a synopsis of this case,
see Appendix A.
77. 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2322-30 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a synopsis of this case,
see Appendix A.
78. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
79. Id. at260-63.
80. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
81. Id. at 132-36.
82. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
83. 503 U.S. 519 (1992). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
84. 444 U.S. 164, 180-92 (1979) (Blackmnun, J., dissenting). For a synopsis of this case,
see Appendix A.
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in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,85 Justice John
Paul Stevens touched briefly on deference to legislative judgments,
burdens of proof, and his refusal to second guess the Pennsylvania
legislature's solutions to land use problems.86
Some of the most spirited defenses of deferential judicial review
appear in recent Supreme Court dissents written by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens."7 These three Justices emphatically asserted
their support of deferential judicial review because they were
troubled by the rigid, narrow standards of the activist and categorical
approaches. Those standards were perceived as hostile to legislative
judgments and a positioning of the Court as a super-legislature.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,"8 Justice William
Brennan, alluding to Lochnerian"9 activist judicial review, criticized
Justice Scalia's creation of a new, more exacting substantive standard
for reviewing takings challenges, the "essential nexus" test. This
new standard, unlike deferential judicial review, was, according to
Brennan, highly problematic and flawed because it placed too great a
burden on state legislatures.9 Justice Brennan also suggested that
85. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
86. Id. at 502-05. The Court also exercised a variety of deferential judicial review by
declining to decide, for prudential reasons, four other cases in the 1970's and 1980's including
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (declining to decide an exclusionary zoning case due to
lack of standing), Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985) (declining to decide a takings case due to lack of ripeness), San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (declining to decide a takings case due
to lack of ripeness), and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986)
(declining to decide a takings case due to lack of ripeness). For synopses of these cases, see
Appendix A.
87. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
88. 483 U.S. 825.
89. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner is representative of an era when
the Supreme Court typically struck down social and economic reform legislation on substantive
due process grounds. See, e.g., supra note 26 and accompanying text.
90. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842.
91. According to Justice Brennan:
The first problem with this conclusion is that the Court imposes a standard of precision
for the exercise of a State's police power that has been discredited for the better part of
this century. Furthermore, even under the Court's cramped standard, the permit
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Justice Scalia's majority opinion placed courts in inappropriate roles
with respect to legislatures.92 Brennan further believed that Scalia not
only improperly adopted a new substantive standard but then
misapplied it as well.9 Brennan concluded that courts should respect
the expertise of state agencies and not create "aberrational 94
approaches to judicial review that substitute judicial policy judgments
for those made by the legislature.9
condition imposed in this case directly responds to the specific type of burden on
access created by appellants' development. Finally, a review of those factors deemed
most significant in takings analysis makes clear that the Commission's action
implicates none of the concerns underlying the Takings Clause. The Court has thus
struck down the Commission's reasonable effort to respond to intensified development
along the California coast, on behalf of landowners who can make no claim that their
reasonable expectations have been disrupted. The Court has, in short, given appellants
a windfall at the expense of the public.
Id.
92. Id. at 843 n.1.
Our recent decisions make it plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the
wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the
public welfare.... [S]tate legislatures have constitutional authority to experiment with
new techniques; they are entitled to their own standard of the public welfare.
Id. (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,423 (1952)).
93. "'Even this rule is not applied with strict precision, for this Court has often said that
debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature.... ."' Id.
at 844 n.1 (quoting Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594-95).
94. Id. at 864.
95. Id. at 846, 848, 850 n.4 & 864.
Such a narrow conception of rationality, however, has long since been discredited as a
judicial arrogation of legislative authority. "To make scientific precision a criterion of
constitutional power would be to subject the State to an intolerable supervision hostile
to the basic principles of our Government."
... The State's exercise of its police power for this purpose deserves no less
deference than any other measure designed to further the welfare of state citizens....
... The State's position no doubt reflected the reasonable assumption that the
Court would evaluate the rationality of its exercise of the police power in accordance
with the traditional standard of review, and that the Court would not attempt to
substitute its judgment about the best way to preserve overall public access to the
ocean at the Faria Family Beach Tract.
... [State agencies] should be encouraged to regulate development in the context
of the overall balance of competing uses of the shoreline. The Court today does
precisely the opposite, overruling an eminently reasonable exercise of an expert state
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In the 1992 case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council6
Justice Blackmun found Justice Scalia's majority opinion even more
anathetical to his own views of appropriate standards of judicial
review in regulatory takings cases. Citing Euclid,97 Berman,98
Goldblatt,9  and KeystoneI°o  for the "usual presumption of
constitutionality that applies to statutes attacked as takings,"'01
Blackmun noted that standards of judicial review were being turned
upside down. He argued that Scalia had no policy rationale for
diminishing the State's police power and presumption of
constitutionality by overturning the South Carolina Supreme Court's
finding of no taking. °2 According to Blackmun the evidence
agency's judgment, substituting its own narrow view of how this balance should be
struck. Its reasoning is hardly suited to the complex reality of natural resource
protection in the 20th century. I can only hope that today's decision is an aberration,
and that a broader vision ultimately prevails.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun's dissent in Nollan echoed both Justice Brennan's
dissent in that case as well as his own dissent in Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442:
I disagree with the Court's rigid interpretation of the necessary correlation
between a burden created by development and a condition imposed pursuant to the
State's police power to mitigate that burden. The land-use problems this country faces
require creative solutions. These are not advanced by an "eye for an eye" mentality.
The close nexus between benefits and burdens that the Court now imposes on permit
conditions creates an anomaly in the ordinary requirement that a State's exercise of its
police power need be no more than rationally based.
483 U.S. 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent seemed to imply that
Justice Scalia's new, more exacting approach was punitive and that under traditional analysis
there was no taking.
96. 505 U.S. 1003.
97. 272 U.S. 365.
98. 348 U.S. 26.
99. 369 U.S. 590.
100. 480 U.S. 470.
101. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1046 (citing Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594).
102. Id. at 1039.
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the Beachfront Management Act
did not take petitioner's property without compensation. The decision rested on two
premises that until today were unassailable-that the State has the power to prevent
any use of property it finds to be harmful to its citizens, and that a state statute is
entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.
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indicated that the South Carolina Supreme Court had properly relied
on the legislature's assertion of the police power."3 Justice Blackmun
also criticized Justice Scalia's new per se rule of regulatory takings,
in which total diminution of value automatically and categorically
triggered a taking, regardless of either the public interest involved or
the legislative findings."°
Justice Blackmun reviewed, in detail, what the Court referred to as
"long-settled rules"'1 5 of judicial review in land use litigation and
concluded that the majority had shifted the burden of proof without
providing a rationale except distrust of the legislature.0 6 Blackmun
also expressed concern about the Court's new substantive per se rule
that focused on diminution of economic value.'0 7 Justice Blackmun
103. Id. at 1040-41.
The court considered itself"bound by these uncontested legislative findings... [in the
absence of] any attack whatsoever on the statutory scheme."
Nothing in the record undermines the General Assembly's assessment that
prohibitions on building in front of the setback line are necessary to protect people and
property from storms, high tides, and beach erosion. Because that legislative
determination cannot be disregarded in the absence of such evidence, and because its
determination of harm to life and property from building is sufficient to prohibit that
use under this Court's cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court correctly found no
taking.
Id. (quoting Lucas, 404 S.E.2d 895, 901 (S.C. 1991)) (citations omitted).
104. See, e.g., id. at 1060.
105. Id. at 1045.
106. Id. at 1046.
Rather than invoking these traditional rules, the Court decides the State has the
burden to convince the courts that its legislative judgments are correct. Despite Lucas'
complete failure to contest the legislature's findings of serious harm to life and
property ifa permanent structure is built, the Court decides that the legislative findings
are not sufficient to justify the use prohibition. Instead, the Court "emphasize(s]" the
State must do more than merely proffer its legislative judgments to avoid invalidating
its law. In this case, apparently, the State now has the burden of showing the regulation
is not a taking. The Court offers no justification for its sudden hostility toward state
legislators, and I doubt that it could.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
107. 505 U.S. at 1046-47.
The Court does not reject the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision simply on
the basis of its disbelief and distrust of the legislature's findings. It also takes the
opportunity to create a new scheme for regulations that eliminate all economic value.
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was further troubled by the highly subjective nature of the Court's
decisionmaking approach and its "reliance on common law principles
of nuisance" to achieve what Justice Scalia perceived as neutral,
"value-free takings jurisprudence."' 8 Finally, noting that the Court
was "eager to decide this case," Justice Blackmun implicitly
questioned whether it was legislators or judges who were to be
distrusted. 9
The 1994 case of Dolan v. City of Tigard"0 illustrates Justice
Stevens' strenuous opposition to the interventionist approach taken
by the majority in regulatory takings cases. 1 ' Justice Stevens noted at
From now on, there is a categorical rule finding these regulations to be a taking unless
the use they prohibit is a background common-nuisance or property principle.
Id. (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 1054-55.
Even more perplexing, however, is the Court's reliance on common-law principles
of nuisance in its quest for a value-free taking jurisprudence. In determining what is a
nuisance at common law, state courts make exactly the decision that the Court finds so
troubling when made by the South Carolina General Assembly today: They determine
whether the use is harmful. Common-law public and private nuisance law is simply a
determination whether a particular use causes harm.
Id. at 1054-55 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 1053.
The Court rejects the notion that the State always can prohibit uses it deems a
harm to the public without granting compensation because "the distinction between
'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the
beholder." Since the characterization will depend "primarily upon one's evaluation of
the worth of competing uses of real estate," the Court decides a legislative judgment of
this kind no longer can provide the desired "objective, value-free basis" for upholding
a regulation. The Court, however, fails to explain how its proposed common-law
alternative escapes the same trap.
Id. (citations omitted).
Justice John Paul Stevens, although having less to say in Lucas than Justice Blackmun,
worried about the court casually abandoning a doctrine of judicial restraint by ignoring certain
prudential rules. "Cavalierly dismissing the doctrine ofjudicial restraint, the Court today tersely
announces that 'we do not think it prudent to apply that prudential requirement here.' I
respectfully disagree and would save consideration of the merits for another day." Id. at 1062-
63 (citation omitted).
110. 114 S. Ct 2309.
111. Id. at 2322. Stevens was joined in his Dolan dissent by Justices Blackmun and
Ginsberg. Justice Stevens also dissented in an important 1987 takings case, First English
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the outset of his dissent that in addition to the "essential nexus"
between public purpose and the conditions imposed on a developer
by a state or local land use regulatory body, the majority also held
that a regulatory body must "demonstrate 'rough proportionality'
between the harm caused by the new land use and the benefit
obtained [by the regulatory] condition.""'  The burden of
demonstrating this now constitutionally required rough
proportionality test is on the state or local entity, not the challenging
party."' Justice Stevens suggested that the majority had stretched
significantly to find any state judicial authority for the new rough
proportionality requirement it constitutionalized, and he expressed
concern about judicial micro-management of a new class of land use
cases.114
Unlike Justice Blackmun's general allusion to and concerns
regarding Lochnerian judicial review, Justice Stevens noted what he
saw as the "obvious kinship with the line of substantive due process
cases that Lochner exemplified.""' 5 He feared that the majority
opinion resulted in "the Court's resurrection of a species of
substantive due process analysis that it firmly rejected decades
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County ofLos Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987). While Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion focused on the question of the appropriate remedy, Justice
Stevens, in his dissent, articulated and endorsed a strong presumption of constitutionality. For a
synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
112. Id at 2323.
113. Id
114. Id.at2326.
If the Court proposes to have the federal judiciary micro-manage state decisions of this
kind, it is indeed extending its welcome mat to a significant new class of litigants.
Although there is no reason to believe that state courts have failed to rise to the task,
property owners have surely found a new friend today.
The Court has made a serious error by abandoning the traditional presumption of
constitutionality and imposing a novel burden of proof on a city implementing an
admittedly valid comprehensive land use plan.
Id.
115. Id.at2327.
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ago."" 6 However, Stevens seemed most concerned with two aspects
of the standard of judicial review adopted by the majority: the impact
that the Courts' "almost insurmountable burden""' 7 activist standard
would have on land use regulations in a rapidly changing world"
8
and the potentially vast expansion of activist judicial review." 9
Justice David Souter also dissented in Dolan, apparently believing
that Dolan's argument and the Court's new position were
questionable. Justice Souter noted that the city, not the petitioner, had
supported its argument with solid evidence. 2 ' Souter also raised
116. Id. at 2326. Justice Stevens pointed out the similarity between the Lochner results and
the disposition of Dolan:
The Lochner Court refused to presume that there was a reasonable connection between
the regulation and the state interest in protecting the public health. A similar refusal to
identify a sufficient nexus between an enlarged building with a newly paved parking
lot and the state interests in minimizing the risks of flooding and traffic congestion
proves fatal to the city's permit conditions in this case under the Court's novel
approach.
Id. at 2327 n.9 (citation omitted).
117. ld.at2329.
118. Id.at2328-29.
The city's conditions are by no means immune from constitutional scrutiny. The level
of scrutiny, however, does not approximate the kind of review that would apply if the
city had insisted on a surrender of Dolan's First Amendment rights in exchange for a
building permit. One can only hope that the Court's reliance today on First
Amendment cases, and its candid disavowal of the term "rational basis" to describe its
new standard of review, do not signify a reassertion of the kind of superlegislative
power the Court exercised during the Lochner era.
Id. (citations omitted).
119. Id.at2327.
The so-called "regulatory takings" doctrine that the Holmes dictum kindled has an
obvious kinship with the line of substantive due process cases that Lochner
exemplified. Besides having similar ancestry, both doctrines are potentially open-
ended sources ofjudicial power to invalidate state economic regulations that Members
of this Court view as unwise or unfair.
Id. (footnote omitted).
120. Id.at2331.
I cannot agree that the application of Nollan is a sound one here, since it appears that
the Court has placed the burden of producing evidence of relationship on the city,
despite the usual rule in cases involving the police power that the government is
presumed to have acted constitutionally. Having thus assigned the burden, the Court
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questions about what the majority was really trying to accomplish
and suggested that neither Dolan nor Lucas were appropriate cases
for enunciating a new takings doctrine.'
In summary, there are several notable points articulated by the
dissenters in Loretto, Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan including the
concerns: (1) that activist (Nollan and Dolan) and categorical (Lucas)
standards of judicial review will seriously damage existing land use
and environmental regulations; (2) that these highly interventionist
varieties of judicial review will chill new, much-needed land use and
environmental regulation; (3) that substantively these interventionist
standards of judicial review are vague and subjective and therefore
allow courts to make conclusory decisions; (4) that in their
application the Nollan and Dolan standards impose rigid and narrow
tests that will force the Court to micro-manage state and local land
use regulations; (5) that the new standards of judicial review are
based on questionable interpretations of precedent; (6) that the new
standards of judicial review have no policy bases except hostility to
legislatures and to legislation that restricts land owners' rights; (7)
that the majority in Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan misapplied its own new
standards; (8) that the new standards of judicial review will lead to
unrestricted judicial discretion of the sort represented by Lochner;
concludes that the City loses based on one word ("could" instead of "would"), and
despite the fact that this record shows the connection the Court looks for. Dolan has
put forward no evidence that the burden of granting a dedication for the bicycle path is
unrelated in kind to the anticipated increase in traffic congestion, nor, if there exists a
requirement that the relationship be related in degree, has Dolan shown that the
exaction fails any such test. The city, by contrast, calculated the increased traffic flow
that would result from Dolan's proposed development to be 435 trips per day, and its
Comprehensive Plan, applied here, relied on studies showing the link between
alternative modes of transportation, including bicycle paths, and reduced street traffic
congestion.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
121. Id.
In any event, on my reading, the Court's conclusions about the city's vulnerability
carry the Court no further than Nollan has gone already, and I do not view this case as
a suitable vehicle for taking the law beyond that point. The right case for the
enunciation of takings doctrine seems hard to spot.
Id. (citation omitted).
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and (9) that the new per se rule in Lucas is particularly objectionable
because of its outright hostility to legislative judgments and its
replacement of not just deferential judicial review, but activist
judicial review as well, with aper se rule which usurps the power and
authority of the non-judicial decisionmaker
D. Delegation of Power
The Supreme Court has held that:
[state and 1local legislative bodies may not delegate their
legislative or policy making power to administrative agencies.
However, legislatures may delegate substantial discretion to
such agencies, so long as this delegation is accompanied by
clear-cut policy guidelines to control the exercise of the
delegated authority, particularly when the regulation
potentially affects fundamental rights such as those protected
by the First Amendment.'"
In Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,123 the Supreme Court
upheld a Chicago ordinance prohibiting billboards in residential
areas. 24 The Court held that this regulation was not invalidated by a
provision that removed the prohibition against billboards when
owners of a majority of nearby lots consented.'" Justice Clarke cited
Reinman v. City of Little Rock126 for the proposition that such an
ordinance was valid unless the record clearly showed that the
regulation was unreasonable and arbitrary." The majority opinion
also noted the Court's inclination to give deference to laws relating to
matters completely under the supervision of the state enacting
122. BLAESSER, LAND USE, supra note 14, at 17.
123. 242 U.S. 526 (1917). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
124. Id. at 527.
125. Id. at 530.
126. 237U.S. 171.
127. Cusak, 242 U.S. at 529.
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them.
28
The issue of delegation of legislative power also arose in City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,29 where a majority of the
Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, upheld a city
charter provision requiring the ratification of proposed land use
changes by fifty-five percent of the votes cast in a zoning change
referendum. In contrast to Justices Powell, Stevens, and Brennan in
their dissents, 30 Justice Burger was highly sympathetic to the city of
Eastlake's charter requirement.' Without discussing standards of
judicial review, Chief Justice Burger reviewed with deference the
charter provision in question and concluded that decisionmaking by
the electorate through the referendum process did not involve a
delegation of power.'
128. Id.at530-31.
We therefore content ourselves with saying that while this court has refrained from any
attempt to define with precision the limits of the police power, yet its disposition is to
favor the validity of laws relating to matters completely within the territory of the State
enacting them and it so reluctantly disagrees with the local legislative authority,
primarily the judge of the public welfare, especially when its action is approved by the
highest court of the State whose people are directly concerned, that it will interfere
with the action of such authority only when it is plain and palpable that it has no real or
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or to the general welfare. And
this, for the reasons stated, cannot be said of the ordinance which we have here.
Id. (citation omitted).
129. 426 U.S. 668 (1976). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
130. Id. at 680-95.
131. Id.at 678.
132. Id. at 672.
The conclusion that Eastlake's procedure violates federal constitutional guarantees
rests upon the proposition that a zoning referendum involves a delegation of legislative
power. A referendum cannot, however, be characterized as a delegation of power.
Under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who can
delegate it to representative instruments which they create. In establishing legislative
bodies, the people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which
might otherwise be assigned to the legislature.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
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E. Equal Protection
Equal protection standards of judicial review have had a different
historical development pattern than the standards of judicial review
associated with substantive due process, eminent domain, and
regulatory takings issues. The equal protection standards evolved out
of the emergence of a doctrine based on concerns about governmental
restrictions that established suspect classifications or that impinged
upon fundamental constitutional rights. In the area of the equal
protection doctrine, there exists a merging of standards of judicial
review with substantive law to a degree not present in substantive due
process and takings cases. To illustrate, an equal protection challenge
to a governmental classification asks or should ask and answer the
following questions:
1. Does the governmental classification treat citizens
differently?
2. Does the governmental classification involve state action?
If either question is answered negatively, then there can be no
equal protection violation. If both questions are answered
affirmatively, then one of three equal protection tests may be chosen.
3. Does the governmental classification impact fundamental
rights?
4. Does the governmental classification involve a suspect
classification?
If either 3 or 4 (or both) is answered affirmatively, then strict
judicial scrutiny is deployed, and questions 5 and 6 must both be
answered affirmatively for the governmental classification to
withstand strict scrutiny and be constitutionally valid;
5. Is there a compelling governmental interest that justifies the
classification?
6. Is the classification necessary to accomplish the compelling
governmental interest?
If both questions 3 and 4 are answered negatively, then
intermediate judicial scrutiny is applied. Intermediate scrutiny asks
both questions 7 and 8.
7. Does the governmental classification impact a quasi-
fundamental right?
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8. Does the governmental classification involve a quasi-suspect
classification?
If either 7 or 8 (or both) is answered affirmatively, then
intermediate judicial scrutiny is deployed, and questions 9 and 10
must both be answered affirmatively for the governmental
classification to withstand intermediate scrutiny and be
constitutionally valid;
9. Is there an important governmental interest that justifies the
classification?
10. Is the classification directly related to the important
governmental interest?
If both questions 7 and 8 (as well as 3 and 4) are answered
negatively, then minimal judicial scrutiny is deployed, and questions
11, 12, and 13 must all be answered affirmatively to withstand
minimal scrutiny and be constitutionally valid;
11. Is there a legitimate governmental interest that justifies the
classification?
12. Is the classification rationally-related to the legitimate
governmental interest?
13. Is the classification applied in a non-discriminatory way?'
(Note: The minimal judicial scrutiny identified in questions eleven,
twelve, and thirteen is the equal protection variety of deferential
judicial review and is analogous to the presumption of validity in
substantive due process cases.)
As with other areas of substantive law, certain Supreme Court
equal protection opinions effectively demonstrate deferential judicial
review and minimal scrutiny. For instance, in Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas,'34 Justice Douglas used the Euclid presumption of validity
and beyond fair debate standards as a starting point. 35 Justice
Douglas also cited his own opinion in Berman regarding the Court's
broad concept of the public welfare and then shifted to an equal
133. For a two-tiered version of the equal protection inquiry, see GODSCHALK, supra note
21, at 82-83. See also KAPLIN, supra note 10, at 147-51.
134. 416 U.S. 1.
135. Id. at3-4.
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protection analysis." 6 Noting that the Belle Terre definition of
family'37 had been challenged on, inter alia, right to travel and right
of privacy grounds as well as equal protection grounds, Justice
Douglas concluded that the local legislature had not violated any
fundamental constitutional rights.'38 The Village of Belle Terre
ordinance then easily survived the minimal, rational-basis scrutiny to
which economic and social legislation is subjected.'39 Justice Douglas
noted in conclusion that "every line drawn by a legislature leaves
some out that might well have been included. That exercise of
discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function."' 40
The Belle Terre majority opinion is echoed by the per curiam
opinion in the 1976 case of City of New Orleans v. Dukes,14 1 which
involved an equal protection challenge to a New Orleans pushcart-
vendor permit ordinance that was designed to protect the vital role
that the French Quarter had in New Orleans' economy. 42 Regarding
136. Id. at 5-9.
137. Id. at 2.
The word "family" is defined in the ordinance as, "[o]ne or more persons related by
blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping
unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2)
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood,
adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family."
Id.
138. Id. at 7.
We find none of these reasons in the record before us. [The ordinance] is not
aimed at transients. It involves no procedural disparity inflicted on some but not on
others .... It involves no "fundamental" right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as
voting, the right of association, the right of access to the courts, or any rights of
privacy.
Id. (citations omitted).
139. "We deal with economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically
drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection Clause if
the law be 'reasonable, not arbitrary' and bears 'a rational relationship to a [permissible] state
objective."' Id. at 8 (quoting Royster Givano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) and
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
140. Id.
141. 427 U.S. 297 (1976). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
142. Id. at 298-300.
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
34 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND, CONTEMPORARY LAW
standards of judicial review, the Court concluded that unless a
legislated ordinance intrudes on fundamental personal rights or
makes suspect distinctions, deference to the legislature is appropriate
and the classification used must only be rationally related to the state
interest. 43 Also notable is the Court's conclusion that a municipal
ordinance is a "State statute" for purposes of jurisdiction (and judicial
review) under Title 28 of the United States Code, section 1254
subsection 2.'" In effect, for purposes of judicial review, local
ordinances stand on the same basis as state statutes and acts of
Congress. The Dukes Court then used minimal scrutiny to review the
New Orleans ordinance and concluded that the judiciary could not
"judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations
made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed
along suspect lines."'45
Justice Byron White's and Chief Justice Burger's dissenting
opinions in Moore v. City of East Cleveland'46 and the Court's per
curiam opinion in County Board of Arlington County v. Richards4 '
are also examples of deferential judicial review in the area of equal
protection.
143. Id. at 303.
When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the Equal
Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the
desirability of particular statutory discriminations. Unless a classification trammels
fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as
race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory
discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related
to a legitimate state interest. States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their
local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with
substantially less than mathematical exactitude.
Id. (citation omitted).
144. Id. at 301. In Hawaii Housing Authority the Court concluded that the deference given
to a state legislature was equal to the deference given to Congress. See supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
145. 427 U.S. at 303 (citation omitted).
146. 431 U.S. at 521-52.
147. 434 U.S. 5 (1977). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
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In the 1977 case Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.,' 4 the Court examined the issue of
whether proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to show a violation of equal protection.'49 The respondent's allegation
of racial prejudice raised the specter of strict scrutiny and activist
judicial review. 5' The Court concluded, however, that the
"[r]espondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving that
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor" in the local
decision.' This determination ended the possibility of activist
judicial review and dictated the constitutional inquiry.'52 Minimal
scrutiny meant deferential judicial review and deferential judicial
review meant that the Village of Arlington Heights' action would
survive constitutional inquiry.'53
An especially interesting Supreme Court decision and
accompanying set of opinions occurred in the 1985 case of City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.'54 Justice Byron White's
majority opinion, which held that the city's "zoning ordinance insofar
as it require[d] a special use permit for homes for the mentally
retarded"'55 was invalid, represents what Justice White described as
148. 429 U.S. 252.
149. Id at 264-65.
150. Id. at 265-66.
But racial discrimination is not just another competing consideration. When there is a
proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this
judicial deference is no longer justified.
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor
demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available.
Id. (footnote omitted).
151. Id. at270.
152. Id. at271.
153. Id. at270-71.
154. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
155. Id at447.
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minimal equal protection scrutiny.'56 Justice White also identified a
policy basis for deferential judicial review and minimal scrutiny not
previously articulated in a land use case: "[T]he Constitution
presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified
by the democratic processes."
157
Justice White discussed, in some detail, both heightened and strict
equal protection scrutiny but declined to employ either standard for
the following reasons: (1) the "predicate for such judicial oversight is
[not] present where the classification deals with mental
retardation"; 5 1 (2) in view of the "wide variation in the abilities and
needs of the retarded themselves, governmental bodies must have a
certain amount of flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in
shaping and limiting their remedial efforts";'59 (3) the legislative
responses of Congress and state legislatures belie "any claim that the
mentally retarded are politically powerless ... to attract the attention
of the lawmakers"; 60 and (4) "if the large and amorphous class of the
mentally retarded were deemed [a] quasi-suspect [class] ... it would
be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other
groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities."''
156. Id. at439-40.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no
State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"
which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike. Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to enforce this mandate, but
absent controlling congressional direction, the courts have themselves devised
standards for determining the validity of state legislation or other official action that is
challenged as denying equal protection. The general rule is that legislation is presumed
to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. When social or economic legislation is at issue, the
Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude ....
Id. (citations omitted).
157. Id at 440.
158. Id. at443.
159. Id. at 445.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Instead, Justice White (using minimal scrutiny) reached an
unusual, perhaps unique, result; the City's special permit provision
was invalid because it was based upon what appeared to be "irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded."' 62 Remarkably, in no other
Supreme Court land use opinion that employed deferential judicial
review has a governmental classification been found unconstitutional.
The Cleburne holding disproves the sometimes asserted proposition
that validation of legislation invariably occurs under the deferential
approach to judicial review.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also deployed deferential judicial
review/minimal scrutiny in his 1988 opinion in Pennell v. City of San
Jose.63 Justice Rehnquist noted that under the Equal Protection
Clause, a statute's classification scheme need only be 'rationally
related to a legitimate state interest."" '  Thus, the approach in
Pennell is substantially different from the activist judicial review that
Chief Justice Rehnquist employed in Dolan.'65
F. Freedom of Speech
In the last 25 years, standards of judicial review in the area of
freedom of speech have developed in a fashion similar to those in the
area of equal protection. Some cases demonstrate deferential judicial
review, some heightened judicial review, and some activist judicial
review. The standard of judicial review selected by a given Justice
depends on how significantly the Justice believes freedom of speech
is implicated in each case. For instance, three opinions by Chief
Justice Burger provide examples of deferential judicial review in First
162. Id. at 450.
163. 485 U.S. 1 (1988). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
164. Id. at 14 (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)). '[W]e
will not overturn [a statute that does not burden a suspect class or a fundamental interest] unless
the varying treatment of diffemnt groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any
combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's actions were
irrational.' Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)) (alteration in original).
165. See infra notes 323-30 and accompanying text
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Amendment cases. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,'66 Justice
Burger dissented from the majority's invalidation of Jacksonville's
restriction on drive-in movie theaters.'67 Chief Justice Burger would
have sustained the Jacksonville ordinance, believing that "[t]he First
Amendment interests involved in this case are trivial at best,"' 68 and
therefore that rational basis review was appropriate. Six years later, in
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,69 Chief Justice Burger, joined
by Justice Rehnquist, again dissented because he saw "minimal
intrusion on genuine rights of expression" imposed by the Mount
Ephraim total ban on nude dancing. 7 ' Justice Burger, citing Belle
Terre, advocated deference to the local legislative judgment
"[b]ecause I believe that a community of people are-within limits-
masters of their own environment."17' Finally, in a decision the same
year as Schad, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,'72 Chief Justice
Burger decried the plurality's willingness to substitute its judgment
for that of city officials in invalidating a ban on offensive and
intrusive means of communication. Burger concluded that it was
not the Court's role to make policy decisions but rather to ensure that
the legislative approach to achieve those decisions was neutral. 74
166. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
167. Id. at 218.
168. Id. at223.
169. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
170. li at 87.
171. Id. at 85.
172. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). For a synopsis in this case, see Appendix A.
173. Id at561.
174. Id. at 561.
The means chosen to effectuate legitimate governmental interests are not for this
Court to select "These are matters for the legislative judgment controlled by public
opinion." The plurality ignores this Court's seminal opinions in Kovacs by substituting
its judgment for that of city officials and disallowing a ban on one offensive and
intrusive means of communication when other means are available. Although we must
ensure that any regulation of speech "further[s] a sufficiently substantial government
interest," given a reasonable approach to a perceived problem, this Court's duty is not
to make the primary policy decisions but instead is to determine whether the legislative
approach is essentially neutral to the messages conveyed and leaves open other
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Because of his unwillingness to second guess the legislature,
Justice Rehnquist also supported use of deferential judicial review in
the Metromedia case.'75 Likewise, in the 1980 case of Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 76 Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
majority 177 and applied the deferential standard of judicial review he
had advocated in Metromedia17 In his dissent in Erznoznik, Justice
White indicated that he was not ready to take the step toward activist
judicial review represented by Justice Powell's majority opinion. 7 9
Similarly, Justice John Paul Stevens' dissenting opinion in
Metromedia is another example of deferential judicial review. 180
In First Amendment cases, Justice Antonin Scalia has shown no
inclination toward the activist or categorical varieties of judicial
review that are pervasive in his takings opinions.' For instance, in
adequate means of conveying those messages. This is the essence of both democracy
and federalism, and we gravely damage both when we undertake to throttle legislative
discretion and judgment at the "grass roots" of our system.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Burger concluded that "[t]he plurality today confuses the degree
of constitutional protection-i.e., the strictness of the test applied-with the outcome of
legislative judgment." Id. at 567.
175. Id. at 570.
Unlike Justice Brennan, I do not think a city should be put to the task of
convincing a local judge that the elimination of billboards would have more than a
negligible impact on aesthetics. Nothing in my experience on the bench has led me to
believe that a judge is in any better position than a city or county commission to make
decisions in an area such as aesthetics. Therefore, little can be gained in the area of
constitutional law, and much lost in the process of democratic decisionmaking, by
allowing individual judges in city after city to second-guess such legislative or
administrative determinations.
Id.
176. 447 U.S. 74.
177. In Pruneyard the concurring opinions of Justices Marshall, White, and Powell also are
examples of deferential judicial review. Id. at 89-101.
178. Justice Rehnquist held that the "First Amendment rights [of the Appellants] have [not]
been infringed by the California Supreme Court's decision recognizing a right of appellees to
exercise state-protected rights of expression and petition on appellants' property." Id. at 88.
179. 422 U.S. at 224.
180. 453 U.S. at 540.
181. See infra Parts VI.B, VII.A.
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FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,'8 2 Justice Scalia concluded that an
ordinance in which "no substantial quantity of First Amendment
activity is anticipatorily 'chilled"" 83 was constitutional and that no
"strong [judicial] medicine""' should be prescribed by the court. In
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,'85 Justice Scalia concluded that a
general law not specifically targeted at expressive conduct "does not.
. . implicate the First Amendment ''8 6 and therefore "is not subject to
First Amendment scrutiny."' 87 Although Justice Scalia agreed with
the plurality's result, he voiced reservations about the heightened
standard ofjudiciary scrutiny."88 The Barnes opinion is one of Justice
Scalia's few explicit discussions of standards of judicial review.
Instead, he usually announces his conclusions regarding the merits of
a case without providing a rationale or justification for his approach
to judicial review.'89
182. 493 U.S. 215, 250 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a
synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
183. Id. at262.
184. Id. at261.
185. 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). For a synopsis of this case, see
Appendix A.
186. Id. at 576. The law prohibited public nudity, and was challenged because respondents
claimed the law interfered with their First Amendment right to freedom of expression. Id. at
563.
187. Id at572.
188. Id. at 579-80.
While I do not think the plurality's conclusions differ greatly from my own, I
cannot entirely endorse its reasoning. The plurality purports to apply to this general
law, insofar as it regulates this allegedly expressive conduct, an intermediate level of
First Amendment scrutiny: The government interest in the regulation must be
.'important or substantial."' As I have indicated, I do not believe such a heightened
standard exists. I think we should avoid wherever possible, moreover, a method of
analysis that requires judicial assessment of the "importance" of government
interests-and especially of government interests in various aspects of morality.
Id (citation omitted).
189. See infra Part V.G (discussing Scalia's objections to heightened scrutiny).
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G. Freedom of Religion
In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,' 9 the Supreme Court invalidated
a Massachusetts licensing statute that provided that a city could not
issue a liquor license if a religious or educational institution located
within 500 feet of the premises objected.'' The invalidation was
based on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Justice
Rehnquist's dissent, although it did not explicitly mention standards
of judicial review,"9 nevertheless is an example of deferential judicial
review, because it discussed the statute's legislative purposes and
suggested that the "heavy First Amendment artillery that the Court
fires at this sensible and unobjectionable Massachusetts statute is
both unnecessary and unavailing."'93 As with Justice Scalia, Justice
Rehnquist is only occasionally explicit in discussing standards of
judicial review.'
H. Illustration: Deferential Judicial Review/Minimal Scrutiny
Figure IV-1 depicts the key components of deferential judicial
review in the areas of substantive due process, takings/eminent
domain, equal protection, and the First Amendment. For a composite
illustration of the four types of judicial review see Figure VIII-1.
190, 459 U.S. 116 (1982). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
191. Id. at 117-18.
192. Id. at 127.
193. Id. at 130.
194. But see infra Part VI.B (discussing Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Dolan).
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FIGURE IV-1 STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
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. Conclusion
Figure VIII-2 in Part VIII summarizes the various policy-based
justifications the Court has advanced for deferential judicial review
and minimal scrutiny over the years. Those justifications that appear
to be the most important and weighty are: (1) separation of powers
concerns, i.e., a recognition of appropriate constitutional roles; (2)
recognition of the policymaking expertise of legislative bodies
regarding social and economic issues; (3) recognition of the
competence of legislative bodies, as compared to the courts, to gather
facts regarding social and economic problems; (4) recognition of
legislative bodies' familiarity with local problems; and (5) the
impracticality of courts making day-to-day administrative decisions.
These factors all weigh heavily in favor of judicial restraint and non-
arrogation to courts of powers exercised by non-judicial
decisionmakers. In short, the factors amount to prudential
considerations of courtesy, constitutional propriety, and comity
between coordinate branches of government. Deferential judicial
review lets legislators legislate and courts adjudicate. As other
commentators have suggested, in deciding what our fundamental law
is, the role of nine life-tenured judges should be one of restraint
because, the "Court is so small, so insulated, and so narrow in its
knowledge, expertise, and experience that it cannot effectively decide
broad questions of public policy."'95 Additionally, it has been
suggested that the Court lacks the competence to act effectively as a
deliberative body because it does not have the staff, the procedures,
or the institutional capacity to resolve social and economic issues.196
195. JAMEs E. BOND, THE ART oF JUDGING 59 (1987).
196. Id. at 60.
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Of course, other facets of deferential judicial review appear when
contrasted with the dangers of interventionist varieties of review. As
Justice Felix Frankfurter noted more than half a century ago:
As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my
private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how
deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem
their disregard ....
Of course patriotism can not [sic] be enforced by the flag
salute. But neither can the liberal spirit be enforced by judicial
invalidation of illiberal legislation.'97
Frankfurter was suggesting two considerations: First, the danger
of activist judges trying to impose their personal predilections,
whether in the area of land use, criminal rights, or freedom of speech;
and second, the likelihood of failure if judges did try more activist
approaches to judicial review.
While some have criticized the Court for timidity and cowardice
in its traditional deferential approach to land use regulations,198 the
restraintist approach is historic, based on constitutional concepts and
the recognition that both courts and judges have significant
limitations.9 9 However, while the Court is traditionally cautious and
restraintist, it does on numerous occasions abandon this deferential
approach in favor of a more activist role.
197. West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,647, 670 (1943).
198. See Kmiec, supra note 19, at 148-49. However, Kmiec also praised the
Rehnquist/Scalia Court for boldly and brilliantly solving the "takings puzzle." Id. at 152.
199. However, it should be noted that the complete quote of Justice Powell from his
opinion in Moore (provided at the beginning of this Part) is:
As the history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the
only limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen
at the time to be Members of this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint.
But it does not counsel abandonment, nor does it require what the city urges here:
cutting off any protection of family rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary
boundary-the boundary of the nuclear family.
431 U.S. at 502 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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V. SYNTHESIS: HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL REVIEW/INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY
[I]t is hard to resist the temptation to label anything we do not
like as unconstitutional.
Justice Robert H. Jackson2°
The deferential approach at one end of the continuum of standards
of judicial review and the categorical approach at the other, are types
of judicial review that are fairly clear and easy to identify.
Presumptions of validity and minimal scrutiny are most often
explicitly articulated by the Justices using them.2"' Per se, categorical
approaches that result in automatic invalidation are usually explicit as
well.202
However, standards of judicial review that fall between these
polar extremes of the judicial review continuum often are more
implicit than explicit. The reviewing Justice may obviously depart
from passive, deferential judicial review but exactly how far he or she
enters into the realm of more intensive judicial review is sometimes
difficult to identify.
The opinions considered in this section dealing with substantive
due process, takings, and delegation of power do not discuss
standards of judicial review explicitly, and therefore require some
guessing and estimation.2"3 This is also true of the First Amendment
opinions, which sometimes validate and other times invalidate
challenged land use regulations. These First Amendment opinions
necessarily involve "guesstimates" of the precise standard of judicial
review adopted by the opinion's author.2' As previously indicated,
the Cleburne set of opinions-Justice White's opinion for the Court,
200. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA.
L. REV. 747, 825 (1991) (quoting an unpublished concurring opinion of Justice Jackson).
201. Seesupra PartlV.
202. See infra Part VII.
203. See infra Part V.A-C.
204. See infra Part V.D-E.
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Justice Marshall's concurrence and dissent, and Justice Stevens'
concurrence--constitute an especially interesting, valuable, and
informative combination of opinions in Supreme Court land use
jurisprudence.0 5 In Cleburne, Justice Marshall explicitly articulates
the heightened judicial review level of scrutiny that emerges between
deferential judicial review at one extreme and categorical judicial
review at the other extreme." 6 Justice Marshall adopts this
intermediate level of scrutiny in the context of an equal protection
challenge to a City of Cleburne ordinance that required a special
permit for homes serving the mentally retarded.0 7 His extensive
discussion directly challenges the use of minimal scrutiny by Justice
White and the majority.0 '
A. Substantive Due Process
In Euclid, Justice Sutherland outlined deferential judicial review,
its presumption of validity, burden of proof, and beyond fair debate
components, and related it to policy bases that he had discussed
earlier in Radice v. New York.20 9 Sutherland reaffirmed his Euclidean
approach to judicial review in the 1927 cases of Zahn and Gorieb.21°
In 1928, Sutherland, while paying lip service to Euclidean
deferential judicial review, deviated from his earlier pattern with
profound consequences. This deviation occurred in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge,21' a case in which the Court considered the
reasonableness of a multi-family residential zoning classification as
applied to a portion of plaintiff's property.1 2 Nectow's land was
located between single-family residences and other land zoned for
205. 473 U.S. at 432-78. See supra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
206. Id. at 455-60.
207. Id. at 455-56.
208. Id. at 455-78.
209. 264 U.S. 292,294 (1924); Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
210. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
211. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
212. Id. at 185-86.
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industrial purposes.213 In other words, the city had created a buffer
zone" 4 between two incompatible zones-a common zoning
technique to which the plaintiff objected. Even though the Court was
dealing with a legislative classification, Justice Sutherland indicated
that a "court should not set aside the determination of public officers
in such a matter unless it is clear that their action [is
unreasonable]., 215  However, the Court invalidated the City's
regulation because the "invasion of the property of plaintiff in error
was serious and highly injurious." 216 Justice Sutherland's opinion
only briefly mentions Euclid, and provides no discussion of the
Euclid presumption of validity, burden of proof, or the "fairly
debatable" standard of proof.217 Justice Sutherland's avoidance of
these factors is particularly interesting in view of the lower court's
adherence to the Euclid factors in upholding the reasonableness of the
Cambridge buffer zone.218 While the lower court may have had
213. Id. at 186.
214. Buffer zones are:
[S]trips of land, identified in the zoning ordinance, established to protect one type of
land use from another with which it is incompatible. Buffer zones may either be shown
on the zoning map or described in the ordinance with reference to neighboring
districts. Where a commercial district abuts a residential district, for example,
additional use, yard, or height restrictions may be imposed to protect residential
properties.
MICHAEL J. MESHENBERG, THE LANGUAGE OF ZONING: A GLOSSARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES
6(1976).
215. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187-88 (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395).
216. Id. at 188.
217. Seei. at 187-88.
218. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 157 N.E. 618, 620 (Mass. 1927), rev'd, 277 U.S.
183 (1928).
If there is to be zoning at all, the dividing line must be drawn somewhere. There
cannot be a twilight zone. If residence districts are to exist, they must be bounded. In
the nature of things, the location of the precise limits of the several districts demands
the exercise of judgment and sagacity. There can be no standard susceptible of
mathematical exactness in its application. Opinions of the wise and good well may
differ as to the place to put the separation between different districts. Seemingly there
would be great difficulty in pronouncing a scheme for zoning unreasonable and
capricious because it embraced land on both sides of the same street in one district
instead of making the center of the street the dividing line.... No physical features of
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doubts about the legislative judgment, under deferential judicial
review, that judgment was not clearly unfounded."9 Justice
Sutherland's Nectow opinion engaged in a less deferential,
heightened scrutiny that invalidated the legislative judgment even
though the reasonableness of that judgment was fairly debatable.220
As a result, the Nectow decision generated confusion because the
Euclid approach was not explicitly overruled, yet Nectow implicitly
called deferential judicial review into question and introduced a new,
unarticulated, heightened standard of review.22'
The Supreme Court's unexplained move to a more exacting
scrutiny of legislative decisionmaking "muddied the waters"
regarding the appropriate standard of judicial review in zoning cases.
This uncertainty of judicial review standards and the presumption of
validity remained unclarified, as the Court did not take another
zoning case for almost fifty years. 2 Justice Sutherland, whether he
realized it or not, lowered the standard of proof required under the
Euclidean variety of deferential judicial review. In Nectow, he did not
the locus stamp it as land improper for residence. Indeed, its accessibility to means of
transportation, to centers of business, and to seats of learning, as well as its proximity
to land given over to residence purposes, give to it many of the attributes desirable for
land to be used for residence.
Courts cannot set aside the decision of public officers in such a matter unless
compelled to the conclusion that it has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary
or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the
public morals, the public safety, or the public welfare in its proper sense. These
considerations cannot be waived with exactness. That they demand the placing of the
boundary of a zone one hundred feet one way or the other in land having similar
material features would be hard to say as matter of law....
The case at bar is close to the line. But we do not feel justified in holding that the
zoning line established is whimsical, without foundation in reason.
Id.
219. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (noting that for an ordinance to be unconstitutional, it
must be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable).
220. See Nectow, 157 N.E. at 620 (noting the lower court's analysis of the ordinance's
reasonableness).
221. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187-88.
222. The next zoning case decided by the United States Supreme Court was Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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require the challenger to establish his substantive due process
argument beyond fair debate. Sutherland became convinced that
invalidation was appropriate because he saw evidence that questioned
the legislative judgment. He undoubtedly was influenced by the
findings of the special master that the city's regulation would not
promote health, safety, convenience, and general welfare in the zoned
district.223 In effect, Justice Sutherland introduced a heightened
judicial review by lowering the standard of proof from beyond fair
debate to one closer to clear and convincing. Whatever his thought
process was, Sutherland created, more implicitly than explicitly, a
variety of judicial review less deferential than the Euclidean standard.
A more recent substantive due process opinion by Justice Lewis
Powell offers a more explicit analysis of standards of judicial review.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,224 Justice Powell, joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, argued that when a
governmental action intrudes upon family living arrangements, the
usual deference accorded legislative judgments is inappropriate.2' In
invalidating the East Cleveland provision, Justice Powell neither
imposed an activist standard of judicial review, accompanied by strict
scrutiny, nor relied on Euclid's restraintist standard of review. Thus,
Justice Powell seemed to start with a presumption of validity, perhaps
with the burden of proof on the challenger, but when the challenger
asserted and demonstrated that certain fundamental family rights
were at issue, Powell deemed more careful judicial scrutiny
appropriate."6 However, Justice Powell cautioned the Court of the
risks involved with a heightened standard of review.2 7 In effect,
223. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187.
224, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
225. At issue in this case was East Cleveland's narrow definition of "family" in a housing
ordinance. Id. at 495-96.
226 Id. at 499.
227. "Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court. There
are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties
without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 502. See also
supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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Powell articulated a quasi-fundamental rights... approach to achieve
heightened, but not activist, judicial review or strict equal protection
scrutiny.
The Nectow and Moore opinions of Sutherland and Powell,
respectively, suggest that in certain substantive due process settings,
when property or family rights are at issue, some members of the
Court are prepared to apply a standard somewhat more rigorous than
Euclidean minimal scrutiny notwithstanding concerns about
unprincipled, Lochnerian, activist judicial review. Some Justices,
however, are far more activist in other settings. For instance, Justices
Brennan and Stevens called for active, fundamental rights judicial
review and strict scrutiny in their concurrences in Moore. 1 9 Brennan
saw the East Cleveland ordinance as burdening the fundamental right
of "personal choice of related members of a family to live
together."" 0 Justice Stevens, on the other hand, called for rigorous
judicial review because East Cleveland's definition of family "cuts so
deeply into a fundamental right normally associated with ownership
of residential property-that of an owner to decide who may reside
on his or her property." 31 Justice Stevens even suggested that this
right was so fundamental that the East Cleveland definition would be
invalid even under a Euclidean deferential standard of judicial
review.
2
The Nectow and Moore majority opinions of Justices Sutherland
and Powell demonstrate two examples of heightened judicial review.
While Justice Sutherland never articulated a policy basis for his
approach, Justice Powell suggested that concerns about fundamental
family rights justify the Court's closer scrutiny.
228. The right protected in this case was the freedom of relatives to live together. Id. at
504-06.
229. 431 U.S. at506-521.
230. Id.at512.
231. Id. at 520.
232. Id. at 520-21.
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B. Regulatory Takings
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 3 involved a challenge to
Pennsylvania's Kohler Act, which prohibited coal mining when
removal of coal would cause subsidence of buildings, streets, or
public facilities. 4 As previously indicated, Justice Brandeis adopted
a deferential approach and would have validated the challenged state
legislation.235 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' majority opinion held
that the Kohler Act was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment
because it authorized a taking of property without due process. 36
Justice Holmes' "flip," from his position of deferential judicial
review in Lochner 7 to a stance of heightened judicial review in
Pennsylvania Coal, has generated comment and conjecture over the
years.23' His opinion in Pennsylvania Coal, however, did not
explicitly discuss the standard of judicial review he used. Clearly it
was not a Euclidean standard, although he indicated some approval of
the police power and the presumption of validity.239 However, that
presumption seems to shift to a presumption of invalidity, or at least
to a placement of the burden of persuasion on the legislature, when
the regulation goes "too far."24°
It is obviously the role of the Court to assess when the regulation
233 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
234. Id. at412-13.
235. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
236. 260 U.S. at 414-15. Notably, Justice Holmes dissented and advocated deferential
judicial review in Lochner v. New York on the ground that "a constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory." 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
237. See supra note 236.
238. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 798-803 (1995). See also SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED
AMERICAN 225-27, 244-45 (1969).
239. 260 U.S. at 413 ("some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to the police power ... [t]he greatest weight is to be given to the judgment of the legislature").
240. Holmes articulated a new, if vague, substantive rule "that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id.
at 415. "It always is open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its
constitutional power." Id. at 413.
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goes "too far." The test suggested is an impact test-the "extent of
the diminution" of value caused by the regulation.24' Justice Holmes
used the language of substantive rules and accompanying tests, but he
did not explain the standard of judicial review he employed.
However, he did suggest a policy basis for his heightened judicial
review; the Court should be careful about legislative exercises of the
police power because "the natural tendency of human nature is to
extend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappears."242 In a gentle, rather avuncular manner, Holmes
expressed skepticism about non-judicial decisionmakers and then
applied something more rigorous than Euclidean deferential judicial
review.
Justice William Rehnquist made his initial foray into takings
jurisprudence in his Penn Central dissent.243 After discussing the
Pennsylvania Coal decision, Justice Rehnquist echoed Justice
Holmes when he called for a "closer scrutiny" of New York City's
legislative and administrative actions." In later opinions, Chief
Justice Rehnquist would become more activist and explicit about
judicial review in takings cases.245
C. Delegation ofPower
The delegation of power doctrine is a corollary to the concept of
246separation of powers. No one branch of government may delegate
its distinctive power to another branch. In particular, the legislature
may not delegate any distinctively legislative power to an
administrative agency. The delegation doctrine is important in land
use regulation because it raises constitutional questions regarding the
241. Id. at 413.
242. Id. at415.
243. 438 U.S. at 138-53.
244. Id. at 142.
245. See infra Part VI.B.
246. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.02, at 223-34 (3d ed. 1993).
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validity of standards for flexible, discretionary zoning devices.247 It is
particularly important when there is a strong presumption of
constitutional validity employed by the reviewing court. Thus, if
power is to be delegated to administrative agencies by the legislature,
as frequently happens in land use regulations, such delegation of
power must provide standards to serve as guidelines for the exercise
of that power.
When the Supreme Court identifies an impermissible, standardless
delegation of power, it will hold it unconstitutional as violative of the
delegation doctrine. In Eubank v. City of Richmond,248 the plaintiff
challenged the validity of a Richmond ordinance that required city
officials to establish building set-back lines at the request of the
owners of two-thirds of the property affected.249 Justice Joseph
McKenna, writing for a unanimous Court, started with a presumption
of validity but shifted the presumption because the ordinance
"create[d] no standard by which the power thus given [was] to be
exercised."25 The Court concluded that the lack of discretionary
guidelines triggered heightened judicial review and that, under this
standard, the ordinance provision was constitutionally
impermissible."'
In Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,"2 Justice
Pierce Butler, writing for a unanimous Court, invalidated a city
ordinance provision that required a property owner to obtain the
consent of two-thirds of the neighboring land owners before the city
could issue a building permit." 3 Again, as in Eubank, the lack of
standards to guide the decisionmaking of the neighboring land
owners shifted the presumption of validity and caused the Court to
247. Id.
248. 226 U.S. 137 (1912). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
249. Id. at 140-41.
250. Id. at 143-44.
251. Id. at 144.
252. 278 U.S. 116 (1928). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
253. Id. at 118-20.
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find the "delegation of power.., repugnant to the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 254
D. Equal Protection
In Cleburne, Justice Thurgood Marshall explained and debated
various standards of judicial review.255 Justice White's majority
opinion held the city's special permit requirement invalid as it
applied to a group home for the mentally retarded. 6 The majority
rejected heightened judicial review and embraced the deferential
approach with its minimal scrutiny, rational-basis test.257 Although
Justice Marshall agreed with the result, he asserted that the majority
was essentially applying a heightened standard and calling it
deferential judicial review.258 Marshall chided the majority for
focusing on the label given to their standard of review rather than
254. Id. at 122.
255. 473 U.S. at 456-51 (concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Mark Tushnet,
Thurgood Marshall in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 307,
308-12 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994) (discussing Marshall's "sliding scale" of equal protection
scrutiny).
256. 473 U.S. at 435.
257. Id. at 442-47.
258. Id. at 456.
With [the majority's] holding and principle I agree. The Equal Protection Clause
requires attention to the capacities and needs of retarded people as individuals.
I cannot agree, however, with the way in which the Court reaches its result or with
the narrow, as-applied remedy it provides for the city of Clebume's equal protection
violation. The Court holds the ordinance invalid on rational-basis grounds and
disclaims that anything special, in the form of heightened scrutiny, is taking place. Yet
Cleburne's ordinance surely would be valid under the traditional rational-basis test
applicable to economic and commercial regulation. In my view, it is important to
articulate, as the Court does not, the facts and principles that justify subjecting this
zoning ordinance to the searching review-the heightened scrutiny-that actually
leads to its invalidation. Moreover, in invalidating Cleburne's exclusion of the
"feebleminded" only as applied to respondents, rather than on its face, the Court
radically departs from our equal protection precedents. Because I dissent from this
novel and truncated remedy, and because I cannot accept the Court's disclaimer that no
"more exacting standard" than ordinary rational-basis review is being applied, I write
separately.
Id. (citation omitted).
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identifying the interests and classifications at stake. 9 Moreover, the
majority's approach baffled Justice Marshall because although it
focused on labels, he believed that ultimately the wrong label was
applied.26°
Justice Marshall also found it unfortunate that the Court did not
provide more guidance to lower courts in the application of the
"new" standard of review. 6' Justice Marshall called for disclosure
259. Id. at 478.
The Court's opinion approaches the task of principled equal protection
adjudication in what I view as precisely the wrong way. The formal label under which
an equal protection claim is reviewed is less important than careful identification of the
interest at stake and the extent to which society recognizes the classification as an
invidious one. Yet in focusing obsessively on the appropriate label to give its standard
of review, the Court fails to identify the interests at stake or to articulate the principle
that classifications based on mental retardation must be carefully examined to assure
they do not rest on impermissible assumptions or false stereotypes regarding individual
ability and need. No guidance is thereby given as to when the Court's freewheeling,
and potentially dangerous, "rational-basis standard" is to be employed, nor is attention
directed to the invidiousness of grouping all retarded individuals together. Moreover,
the Court's narrow, as-applied remedy fails to deal adequately with the overbroad
presumption that lies at the heart of this case.
Id.
260. Id. at 456.458.
At the outset, two curious and paradoxical aspects of the Court's opinion must be
noted. First, because the Court invalidates Cleburne's zoning ordinance on rational-
basis grounds, the Court's wide-ranging discussion of heightened scrutiny is wholly
superfluous to the decision of this case. This "two for the price of one" approach to
constitutional decisionmaking---rendering two constitutional rulings where one is
enough to decide the cas--stands on their head traditional and deeply embedded
principles governing exercise of the Court's Article III power....
Second, the Court's heightened-scrutiny discussion is even more puzzling given
that Cleburne's ordinance is invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort
of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny. To be sure, the Court does not
label its handiwork heightened scrutiny, and perhaps the method employed must
hereafter be called "second order" rational-basis review rather than "heightened
scrutiny." But however labeled, the rational-basis test invoked today is most assuredly
not the rational-basis test [of prior cases].
Id. (citations omitted).
261. Id.at459-60.
The refusal to acknowledge that something more than minimum rationality review
is at work here is, in my view, unfortunate in at least two respects. The suggestion that
the traditional rational-basis test allows this sort of searching inquiry creates precedent
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and forthrightness; "[c]andor requires me to acknowledge the
particular factors that justify invalidating Cleburne's zoning
ordinance under the careful scrutiny it today receives."262 Citing case
precedent for heightened, but not strict, scrutiny, Justice Marshall
concluded that heightened judicial review was appropriate in areas
such as exclusionary zoning.263 Justice Marshall also expounded upon
the virtues of heightened scrutiny as it applied to equal protection
cases and the validity of certain legislative classifications.2"
for this Court and lower courts to subject economic and commercial classifications to
similar and searching "ordinary" rational-basis review-a small and regrettable step
back toward the days of Lochner v. New York. Moreover, by failing to articulate the
factors that justify today's "second order" rational-basis review, the Court provides no
principled foundation for determining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked.
Lower courts are thus left in the dark on this important question, and this Court
remains unaccountable for its decisions employing, or refusing to employ, particularly
searching scrutiny.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
262. 473 U.S. at460.
263. Id.
I have long believed the level of scrutiny employed in an equal protection case
should vary with "the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely
affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn." When a zoning ordinance works to exclude the retarded from
all residential districts in a community, these two considerations require that the
ordinance be convincingly justified as substantially furthering legitimate and important
purposes.
Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973)) (citations
omitted).
264. Id. at 471-72.
That more searching inquiry, be it called heightened scrutiny or "second order"
rational-basis review, is a method of approaching certain classifications skeptically,
with judgment suspended until the facts are in and the evidence considered. The
government must establish that the classification is substantially related to important
and legitimate objectives, so that valid and sufficiently weighty policies actually justify
the departure from equality. Heightened scrutiny does not allow courts to second-guess
reasoned legislative or professional judgments tailored to the unique needs of a group
like the retarded, but it does seek to assure that the hostility or thoughtlessness with
which there is reason to be concerned has not carried the day. By invoking heightened
scrutiny, the Court recognizes, and compels lower courts to recognize, that a group
may well be the target of the sort of prejudiced, thoughtless, or stereotyped action that
offends principles of equality found in the Fourteenth Amendment. Where
classifications based on a particular characteristic have done so in the past, and the
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Justice Marshall outlined a structure for equal protection judicial
review that employed heightened judicial review/intermediate
scrutiny. 65 This intermediate scrutiny put the burden of proof on the
non-judicial decisionmaker to show that the land use regulation was
justified by a legitimate reason not related to discrimination against
the handicapped.2"
Justice Marshall's opinion in Cleburne, and his reaction to Justice
White's majority opinion, caused Justice Stevens to articulate his
own approach-or perhaps non-approach-to standards of judicial
review. 67 In effect, Stevens rejected the Marshall structure of a three-
tiered analysis and asserted that the Court only had (or needed) one
standard of judicial review.' Justice Stevens carved out his own
threat that they may do so remains, heightened scrutiny is appropriate.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
265. See supra Part IV.E, text accompanying note 133, for the equal protection inquiry that
leads to intermediate scrutiny.
266. 473 U.S. at 460-61
267. Id. at 451-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
268. Id. at 451-54.
In fact, our cases have not delineated three--or even one or two-such well-defined
standards. Rather, our cases reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing
classifications which have been explained in opinions by terms ranging from "strict
scrutiny" at one extreme to "rational basis" at the other. I have never been persuaded
that these so-called "standards" adequately explain the decisional process. Cases
involving classifications based on alienage, illegal residency, illegitimacy, gender, age,
or-as in this case-mental retardation, do not fit well into sharply defined
classifications.
"I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the [tiered] analysis of
equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of deciding
cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually
apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion." In my own approach to
these cases, I have always asked myself whether I could find a "rational basis" for the
classification at issue. The term "rational," of course, includes a requirement that an
impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a
legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the
disadvantaged class. Thus, the word "rational"--for me at least-includes elements of
legitimacy and neutrality that must always characterize the performance of the
sovereign's duty to govern impartially.
The rational-basis test, properly understood, adequately explains why a law that
deprives a person of the right to vote because his skin has a different pigmentation than
that of other voters violates the Equal Protection Clause. It would be utterly irrational
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distinctive position on equal protection judicial review. He repudiated
the analyses of both the majority and Justice Marshall, challenged
their assumptions, and suggested his own unique approach. In the
land use jurisprudence of the Court, no other Justice has taken an
approach similar to Justice Stevens.269
If one believes that standards of judicial review are important to
sound, principled decisionmaking by courts, then the trio of opinions
in Cleburne, with their sharp disagreements and their debates on
structure, authority, and policy bases, are refreshing and candid when
compared to the Nectow opinion of Sutherland and the Pennsylvania
Coal opinion of Holmes."' Unlike opinions in which Justices merely
state their substantive conclusions, especially when legislative or
administrative action has been invalidated on constitutional grounds,
the disclosure and debate in Cleburne is informative and constructive
because it allows evaluation and response.
to limit the franchise on the basis of height or weight; it is equally invalid to limit it on
the basis of skin color. None of these attributes has any bearing at all on the citizen's
willingness or ability to exercise that civil right. We do not need to apply a special
standard, or to apply "strict scrutiny," or even "heightened scrutiny," to decide such
cases.
In every equal protection case, we have to ask certain basic questions. What class
is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a "tradition of disfavor" by
our laws? What is the public purpose that is being served by the law? What is the
characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment? In most
cases the answer to these questions will tell us whether the statute has a "rational
basis." The answers will result in the virtually automatic invalidation of racial
classifications and in the validation of most economic classifications, but they will
provide differing results in cases involving classifications based on alienage, gender,
or illegitimacy. But that is not because we apply an "intermediate standard of review"
in these cases; rather it is because the characteristics of these groups are sometimes
relevant and sometimes irrelevant to a valid public purpose, or, more specifically, to
the purpose that the challenged laws purportedly intended to serve.
Id. (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
269. See Sue Davis, John Paul Stevens, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 255,
at 409, 410-12.
270. See supra Part V.A-B.
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If Justices were to engage, on a regular basis, in the "truth-in-
jurisprudence" exercises undertaken by Justices Marshall, Stevens,
and White in Cleburne, the world of constitutional adjudication
would be a better place. If an entrenched understanding or an
established expectation were to develop to the effect that Justices
should disclose their reasoning concerning standards of judicial
review, fewer instances of judicial sloppiness or "personal
predilections" would occur or would be suspected. In a democratic
society in which judicial review is a central concept, distrust of courts
could and would be significantly addressed through the type of
debate and disclosure that emerged in Cleburne. As Justice Brandeis
said in a different context, "Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants."27'
E. Freedom of Speech
Several opinions dealing with First Amendment issues in the
context of land use regulation employ deferential judicial review and
minimal scrutiny.272 The common threads in these opinions are: (1)
their authors' conclusions that the challenged regulation burdens First
Amendment activities in a trivial or non-existent way and (2) a
recognition of local governmental interests in privacy, the
environment, traffic safety, and morals.273
This Part examines a different variety of judicial review; judicial
review with heightened or intermediate (as opposed to strict)
scrutiny. The opinions that demonstrate this variety of judicial review
fall into two categories: (1) cases where the author validates the
challenged regulation and (2) cases where the author invalidates the
challenged regulation on First Amendment grounds.
A typical First Amendment inquiry would first question whether
the land use regulation was content-neutral or content-based. 274 The
271. LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
272. See supra Part W.F.
273. Id.
274. See City ofLadue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct 2038, 2047 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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answer to that question determines the standard of judicial review and
the level of scrutiny that will be applied.275 If the regulation is
deemed content-neutral, then heightened judicial review/intermediate
scrutiny will be used; if the regulation is deemed content-based, then
activist judicial review/strict scrutiny is applied.
Assuming the regulation is content-neutral, then the regulation
must advance a substantial or important governmental interest, not
just a legitimate governmental interest, and be narrowly tailored to
further that interest.276 Validation occurs (or would occur if the
dissenting Justice was writing for a majority of the Court) when the
author of the opinion uses this more demanding test, employs a
traditional presumption of validity, and leaves the burden of proof on
the challenging party.2" This approach to heightened judicial review
accords the non-judicial decisionmaker a more favorable position.27
Thus, validation occurs when content-neutral time, place, and manner
regulations are narrowly drawn and adopted to protect important
governmental interests such as the quality of urban life, the stability
of neighborhoods, aesthetics, safety, public order, and public
morality.279
For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
275. Id.
276. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-80 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring). For a synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
277. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-55 (1986). For a
synopsis of this case, see Appendix A.
278. See, for example, Justice Stevens' majority opinion in City ofLadue v. Gilleo, 114 S.
CL 2038 (1994); Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1521 (1993); Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 581 (1991); Justice White's concurrence and dissent in
FWIPBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215,244 (1990) and his dissent in City ofLakewood v.
Plain Dealer Pub'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988); Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), and Justice White's concurring opinion in that case, 487
U.S. at 488; Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41 (1986); Justice Stevens' majority opinion in City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
that case, 427 U.S. at 73. For synopses of these cases, see Appendix A.
279. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71-73; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55.
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However, invalidation occurs (or would occur if the dissenting
Justice was writing for a majority of the Court) when the author of
the opinion uses the heightened standard of judicial review but shifts
either the presumption to a rebuttable one of invalidity or, more
likely, shifts the burden of persuasion to the non-judicial
decisionmaker."0 This approach puts the governmental defendant in a
less favorable position and usually leads to a finding that the
challenged regulation is unconstitutional.28' So, for example, when
content-neutral regulations that further important state interests are
insufficiently justified by the governmental defendant 82 or when the
governmental entity fails to prove that the regulation is not narrowly
drawn,8 ' then heightened judicial review will find the regulation
unconstitutional.
280. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,512-17 (1981).
281. See, e.g., Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
1505; Justices Brennan's and Stevens' respective dissents in Frisby, 487 U.S. at 491, 496;
Justice White's majority opinion in Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. 490, and Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in that case, 453 U.S. at 521; Justice White's majority opinion in Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), and Justice Powell's concurring opinion in
that case, 452 U.S. at 79.
282. See, e.g., Schad, 452 U.S. at 67-77.
283. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 491-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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F. Illustration: Heightened Judicial Review/Intermediate Scrutiny
FIGURE V-1 HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL REVIEW/INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY
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[Vol. 51:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol51/iss1/2
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
G. Conclusion
In his concurring opinion in Barnes v. Glen Theater Inc.,284 Justice
Scalia suggested that heightened judicial review neither does, nor
should, exist.285 As the discussion in this Part has shown, Justice
Scalia is certainly mistaken as to whether there exists a standard of
judicial review that is less deferential and more rigorous than the
Euclidean approach2" yet more deferential and less rigorous than the
activist standards of review.287  Heightened judicial
review/intermediate scrutiny appears repeatedly in Supreme Court
land use jurisprudence.
With regard to Justice Scalia's second point, that heightened
judicial review should not exist, it would have been helpful if Justice
Scalia had disclosed his reasoning and rationale, instead of merely
stating his negative conclusion. As seen in Cleburne, Justice Marshall
discussed in detail and provided an extensive rationale for his
application of heightened judicial review.288 Interestingly, Justice
Scalia is not unfamiliar with the more intensive varieties of judicial
review; in fact, he created two dramatic new interventionist
variations.29 Accordingly, he should provide a rationale for his
284. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
285. Id. at 579-80.
While I do not think the plurality's conclusions differ greatly from my own, I
cannot entirely endorse its reasoning. The plurality purports to apply to this general
law, insofar as it regulates this allegedly expressive conduct, an intermediate level of
First Amendment scrutiny: The government interest in the regulation must be
"important or substantial.'" As I have indicated, I do not believe such a heightened
standard exists. I think we should avoid wherever possible, moreover, a method of
analysis that requires judicial assessment of the "importance" of government interests
- and especially of government interests in various aspects of morality.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968)).
286. See supra Part IV.
287. SeeinfraPart VI.
288. See supra Part V.D.
289. See Scalia's activist approach to takings in Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, and his categorical
approach to takings in Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003. See also infra Parts VI.B, VII.A (discussing
Nollan and Lucas, respectively).
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conclusion that heightened scrutiny should be avoided.29° This
conclusion cannot, in the context of land use jurisprudence, be
properly and intelligently evaluated until this rationale is provided.
As will be seen in the following Parts of this Article, many
Justices, including Scalia, articulate and practice the even more
vigorous varieties of judicial review.
VI. SYNTHESIS: ACTmST JUDICIAL REVIEW/STRICT SCRUTINY
"Judicial activism" is a slippery term, but perhaps one of its
aspects can be acceptably defined as the Supreme Court's
propensity to intervene in the governing process.
Robert G. McCloskey29'
Activist judicial review comes in various sizes and shapes.
Perhaps the most familiar manifestation is strict equal protection
scrutiny, which is evident in Justice Marshall's dissent in Belle
Terre.292 This equal protection analysis integrates levels of judicial
scrutiny and substantive law and incorporates inquiries about
fundamental rights and suspect classifications.293
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the concurring opinions of
both Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens used a fundamental rights
approach to review substantive due process questions and both
concluded that the East Cleveland definition of family was
constitutionally impermissible.294 In Moore, Justices Stewart and
White rejected strict scrutiny and instead applied a minimal level of
scrutiny to review the city's ordinance because they believed no
fundamental rights were implicated.295 On the other hand, Justice
Powell, who wrote the opinion of the Court, embraced a form of
290. See supra note 285.
291. ROBERT G. MCCLosKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 338 (1972).
292. 416 U.S. at 12-20.
293. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the three-tiered analysis).
294. 431 U.S. at 506-21.
295. Id. at 531-52. See supra Part IV.A.
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heightened judicial review to invalidate the city's ordinance.296
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., also used a fundamental rights approach
to argue that the Eastlake zoning change referendum procedure was
constitutionally defective.297  Chief Justice Burger used the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as the basis for
invalidating a Massachusetts statute in Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc. 2
98
Moreover, at least three variations of activist judicial review can
be identified in First Amendment freedom of speech cases involving
land use regulations. These variations include strict scrutiny for
content-based regulations, strict scrutiny with the presumption of
invalidity for content-based regulations of individuals on private
property, and strict scrutiny involving a heavy presumption of
invalidity with regard to prior restraints.2' But perhaps the most
intriguing recent examples of activist judicial review in Supreme
Court land use jurisprudence are the new tests created by Justice
Antonin Scalia in Nollan3" and Chief Justice William Rehnquist in
Dolan.0 1
A. Substantive Due Process
In Moore, Justice Brennan's concurrence condemned the "cultural
myopia" of East Cleveland and suggested that the zoning power
should not be used "to enact senseless and arbitrary restrictions which
cut deeply into private areas of protected family life."3°2 Brennan's
fundamental rights analysis asserted that East Cleveland was
constitutionally powerless to abridge the freedom of related members
296. Id. at 495-506. See supra Part V.A.
297. 426 U.S. at 680-95.
298. 459 U.S. at 120-27. See infra Part VI.F.
299, See infra Part VI.E.
300. 483 U.S. at 837 (creating the "essential nexus" test). See infra Part VI.B.
301, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (creating the "rough proportionality" test). See infra Part VI.B.
302. 431 U.S. at 507.
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of a family to choose to live together. 3 This basic right triggered
Justice Brennan's activist review and led to his conclusion that the
necessary relationship between ends and means was absent.3"
Justice Stevens, as suggested earlier,3"5 saw the fundamental right
involved in Moore somewhat differently. However, he too embraced
activist judicial review in concluding that the narrow definition of
family adopted by East Cleveland was constitutionally infirm because
it lacked the "'substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare.""'3 6 Justice Stevens believed that property owners
had a basic right to decide who may live on their property and
concluded that the ordinance constituted a taking of property without
due process or just compensation.3"7 Interestingly, this is a rare, if not
unique, instance of a Supreme Court Justice suggesting that property
rights under the Fifth Amendment due process and takings clauses
are fundamental rights in the same sense that freedom of speech,
religion, and voting are fundamental rights under strict equal
protection scrutiny.
B. Regulatory Takings
Common themes in the opinions of Justice Antonin Scalia are his
distrust and disdain for non-judicial governmental decisionmakers,
his dislike and distaste for redistributionalist governmental programs
303. Id.at 511.
"If any freedom not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights enjoys a 'preferred
position' in the law it is most certainly the family." The cited decisions recognized, as
the plurality recognizes today, that the choice of the "extended family" pattern is
within the "freedom of personal choice in matters of... family life [that] is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639.40 (1974)) (citation and
emphasis omitted).
304. 431 U.S. at 512-13.
305. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
306. 431 U.S. at 520 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926)).
307. 431U.S. at520-21.
[Vol. 51:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol51/iss1/2
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
and their effects, and his high regard for private property rights.3"8 All
of these themes are evident in his opinion in Nollan, in which he
created a new variety of activist judicial review." 9 Justice Scalia
noted the opportunity to reaffirm the per se permanent physical
occupation rule of Loretto3"' in order to decide the constitutionality of
the California Coastal Commission's conditioning of a building
permit on a beach access requirement.31' However, Scalia raised a
new issue: "Given, then, that requiring uncompensated conveyance of
the easement outright would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the
question becomes whether requiring it to be conveyed as a condition
for issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome."3 2 Justice Scalia
then cited Agins and Penn Central for the authority that "a use
restriction may constitute a 'taking"' if not reasonably necessary to
effectuate a substantial governmental interest.313 Scalia applied this
308. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
writing for the majority); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987) (Scalia, J., writing for the majority).
309. 483 U.S. at 837.
310. See infra Part VII.A.
311. 483 U.S. at 831-32.
We have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, "the
right to exclude [others is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property."' In Loretto we observed that where
governmental action results in "[a] permanent physical occupation" of the property, by
the government itself or by others, "our cases uniformly have found a taking to the
extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important
public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner." We think a
"permanent physical occupation" has occurred, for purposes of that rule, where
individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the
real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is
permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.
Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982))
(footnote and citations omitted).
312. Id.
313. Id. (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127). Scalia also noted that:
Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a
"legitimate state interest" or what type of connection between the regulation and the
state interest satisfies the requirement that the former "substantially advance" the
latter. They have made clear, however, that a broad range of governmental purposes
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rule to the Coastal Commission's building permit condition and
found that such a condition may amount to extortion if the underlying
state purpose is not valid. 14
Justice Scalia moved from the "substantially advances a legitimate
state interest" test of Agins and "the reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial governmental purpose" test of Penn
Central to a new, more rigorous standard. His new requirement of
takings jurisprudence was that there must be an "essential nexus"
between the governmental interest the California Coastal
Commission pursued and the condition it imposed.3"5 Finding that the
building restriction lacked this essential nexus, Justice Scalia
concluded it was invalid."6 The building restriction was an example
of a non-judicial decisionmaker's bad faith and unscrupulousness and
burdened the rights of private property owners without just
compensation. 17
Scalia's essential nexus test sparked debate as to its origins and
effect on judicial review standards. First, Justice Scalia asserted that t
and regulations satisfies these requirements.
Id. at 834-35 (footnote omitted).
314. Id. at 836-37.
If a prohibition designed to accomplish that [state] purpose would be a legitimate
exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange to conclude that
providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes the same
purpose is not.
The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition
substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the
justification for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation
becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater, but
granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury.... In
short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the
development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but "an
out-and-out plan of extortion."
Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
315. Id. at 837.
316. 483 U.S. at 840-42.
317. Id. at838-42.
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he test originated in Agins and Penn Central.3"' Justice Brennan, in
his Nollan dissent, however, denied that the new test was an
articulation of existing recent precedent and suggested it was a long
discredited standard of judicial review.319 Second, the new essential
nexus test is a substantive law standard that Justice Scalia used to
override the normal presumption of validity, burden of proof, beyond
fair debate variety of deferential judicial review.32 It created a more
exacting form of judicial review than the heightened standard applied
in Nectow or Pennsylvania CoaL32' More accurately, Justice Scalia's
essential nexus test shifted the normal presumption of validity to a
rebuttable presumption of invalidity. It also placed the burden of
proof on the governmental entity to demonstrate an essential nexus
between the ends and means. Accordingly, the essential nexus test is
indeed a new example of activist judicial review, subjecting the non-
judicial decisionmaker to a difficult test. This activist standard is
consistent with Justice Scalia's cynical view of non-judicial
decisionmakers322 and is certainly contrary to the deferential judicial
review obvious in both Penn Central and Agins.
Activist judicial review was taken one step further by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Dolan.3 In Dolan, Rehnquist layered another
318. See supra Part IV.C (discussing Agins and Penn Central in the context of deferential
judicial review).
319. 483 U.S. at 842.
The Court finds this an illegitimate exercise of the police power, because it maintains
that there is no reasonable relationship between the effect of the development and the
condition imposed.
The first problem with this conclusion is that the Court imposes a standard of
precision for the exercise of a State's police power that has been discredited for the
better part of this century.
Id.
320. See supra Part IV.C.
321. In Nectow, Justice Sutherland appeared to have lowered the challengers' standard of
proof from beyond fair debate to clear and convincing. See supra Part V.A. In Pennsylvania
Coal, Justice Holmes started with a presumption of validity but shifted it to a presumption of
invalidity because the legislation went "too far." See supra Part V.B.
322. See infra Part VII.A.
323. 114 S. Ct. 2309.
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substantive test, "rough proportionality," onto Nollan's essential
nexus test.324 He held that a non-judicial decisionmaker that imposed
conditions on its land development permits had to prove both an
essential nexus between ends and means and also a rough
proportionality between the benefits sought and the projected impact
on the proposed development.325 With each test the governmental
entity faced a rebuttable presumption of invalidity and had to
shoulder the burden of proof. Like Justice Scalia, Chief Justice
Rehnquist raised the level of review and created a new variety of
judicial activism. The Court again demonstrated a "propensity to
intervene in the governing process. 326
The Chief Justice also discussed the Euclidean variety of judicial
review and argued for an increased respect of property rights.
327
Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist found no Supreme Court
precedent to anchor his new rough proportionality requirement, and
instead turned to state courts for guidance.32' From his analysis of the
324. Id.at 2317.
In evaluating petitioner's claim, we must first determine whether the "essential
nexus" exists between the "legitimate state interest" and the permit condition exacted
by the city. If we find that a nexus exists, we must then decide the required degree of
connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed
development. We were not required to reach this question in Nollan, because we
concluded that the connection did not meet even the loosest standard. Here, however,
we must decide this question.
Id. (citations omitted).
325. Id. at 2317-20.
326. See supra note 291.
327. 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
Justice Stevens' dissent relies upon a law review article for the proposition that the
city's conditional demands for part of petitioner's property are "a species of business
regulation that heretofore warranted a strong presumption of constitutional validity."
But simply denominating a governmental measure as a "business regulation" does not
immunize it from constitutional challenge on the grounds that it violates a provision of
the Bill of Rights.... We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable
circumstances.
Id. (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
328. Id. at 2318-19.
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state court tests, the Chief Justice selected a variation of the states'
"reasonable relationship" standard because he concluded it was
closest "to the federal constitutional norm." '329 Notwithstanding Chief
Justice Rehnquist's characterization of this new test as one akin to an
"intermediate position," the rough proportionality test is an activist
standard of review because it reverses the presumption of validity and
places the burden of proof on the non-judicial decisionmaker as do
other activist forms such as strict scrutiny.33
C. Delegation of Power
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in City of Eastlake
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., held that the city's zoning change
referendum was constitutional under a deferential standard of judicial
review.33' However, Justices Powell and Stevens joined by Justice
Brennan) dissented. Justice Powell, in a one paragraph opinion,
implicitly suggested that he was inclined to apply an activist standard
Since state courts have been dealing with this question a good deal longer than we
have, we turn to representative decisions made by them.
In some states, very generalized statements as to the necessary connection
between the required dedication and the proposed development seem to suffice....
Other state courts require a very exacting correspondence, described as the
"specifi[c] and uniquely attributable" test....
A number of state courts have taken an intermediate position, requiring the
municipality to show a "reasonable relationship" between the required dedication and
the impact of the proposed development.
... Despite any semantical differences, general agreement exists among the
courts "that the dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the needs
created by the [development]."
Id (quoting Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979)) (citations omitted).
329. Id. at2319.
[We do not adopt [the state test] as such, partly because the term "reasonable
relationship" seems confusingly similar to the term "rational basis" which describes
the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We think a term such as "rough proportionality" best encapsulates what
we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
330. Id. at 2319-20. See infra Part VI.D.
331. 426 U.S. at679-80.
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to the Eastlake referendum procedure because of his concern about
individual rights.332 Justice Stevens' opinion also expressed concern
for individual rights and explicitly approved the lower court's
invalidation of the referendum requirement.3 3 Justice Stevens then
suggested that fundamental fairness required rigorous judicial review
of a local procedure that required a referendum to decide the merits
of a private property owner's claim.334 Consequently, Justice Stevens
believed that the Eastlake charter provision violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
335
Similarly, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 336 a case involving a delegation of power to
private, non-governmental entities such as churches,337 utilized
activist judicial review to determine that the delegation violated the
First Amendment Establishment Clause.338
332. Id. at 680.
There can be no doubt as to the propriety and legality of submitting generally
applicable legislative questions, including zoning provisions, to a popular referendum.
But here the only issue concerned the status of a single small parcel owned by a single
"person." This procedure, affording no realistic opportunity for the affected person to
be heard, even by the electorate, is fundamentally unfair. The "spot" referendum
technique appears to open disquieting opportunities for local government bodies to
bypass normal protective procedures for resolving issues affecting individual rights.
Id.
333. Id. at 690.
"The law recognizes that the use a person makes of his property must inevitably affect
his neighbors and, in some cases, the surrounding community. These real interests are
entitled to be balanced against the rights of a property owner, but a law which requires
a property owner, who proposes a wholly benign use of his property, to obtain the
assent of thousands of persons with no such interest, goes beyond any reasonable
public purpose."
Id. (quoting Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 324 N.E.2d 740, 748.49 (Ohio
1975)).
334. Id at 694-95 n.16.
335. Id. at 694-95.
336. 459 U.S. 116 (U.S. 1982).
337. Id. at 117-18.
338. See infra Part VI.F (discussing Justice Burger's opinion in Larkin).
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D. Equal Protection
Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissenting opinion in Belle Terre is a
classic example of strict equal protection scrutiny applied to a
governmental classification.339 Justice Marshall concluded that Belle
Terre's definition of family in a zoning ordinance burdened certain
fundamental rights of the petitioners, and therefore warranted strict
scrutiny.3" Despite this, Justice Marshall praised deferential judicial
review and supported some of its policy bases.34' However, Justice
Marshall rejected the deferential judicial review employed by the
majority, because he asserted that the First Amendment places limits
on zoning.42 Justice Marshall also advocated an expanded
339, 416 U.S. at 12-20 (applying strict scrutiny to the Village's definition of family). For
the equal protection framework see supra note 133 and accompanying text
340. 416 U.S. at 13.
In my view, the disputed classification burdens the students' fundamental rights of
association and privacy guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Because
the application of strict equal protection scrutiny is therefore required, I am at odds
with my Brethren's conclusion that the ordinance may be sustained on a showing that
it bears a rational relationship to the accomplishment of legitimate governmental
objectives.
Id,
341. Id.
I am in full agreement with the majority that zoning is a complex and important
function of the State. It may indeed be the most essential function performed by local
government, for it is one of the primary means by which we protect that sometimes
difficult to define concept of quality of life. I therefore continue to adhere to the
principle of Euclid ... that deference should be given to governmental judgments
concerning proper land-use allocation. That deference is a principle which has served
this Court well and which is necessary for the continued development of effective
zoning and land-use control mechanisms. Had the owners alone brought this suit
alleging that the restrictive ordinance deprived them of their property or was an
irrational legislative classification, I would agree that the ordinance would have to be
sustained. Our role is not and should not be to sit as a zoning board of appeals.
Id. (citation omitted).
342. Id. at 14.
And, it is appropriate that we afford zoning authorities considerable latitude in
choosing the means by which to implement such purposes. But deference does not
mean abdication. This Court has an obligation to ensure that zoning ordinances, even
when adopted in furtherance of such legitimate aims, do not infringe upon fundamental
constitutional rights.
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fundamental rights rationale.343 Consequently, Justice Marshall
placed the burden of proof on the Village of Belle Terre to show a
compelling governmental interest and lack of alternative.344 Justice
Marshall concluded that the Village's "quality of life"-oriented
justifications for the ordinance were insufficient to sustain it.345 Even
When separate but equal was still accepted constitutional dogma, this Court struck
down a racially restrictive zoning ordinance. I am sure the Court would not be hesitant
to invalidate that ordinance today.... By the same token, I think it clear that the First
Amendment provides some limitation on zoning laws. It is inconceivable to me that we
would allow the exercise of the zoning power to burden First Amendment freedoms, as
by ordinances that restrict occupancy to individuals adhering to particular religious,
political, or scientific beliefs.
Id. (citation omitted).
343. Id. at 15.
My disagreement with the Court today is based upon my view that the ordinance
in this case unnecessarily burdens appellees' First Amendment freedom of association
and their constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. Our decisions establish that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the freedom to choose one's associates.
Constitutional protection is extended, not only to modes of association that are
political in the usual sense, but also to those that pertain to the social and economic
benefit of the members.
Id. (citation omitted).
344. 416 U.S. at 18.
Because I believe that this zoning ordinance creates a classification which
impinges upon fundamental personal rights, it can withstand constitutional scrutiny
only upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a
compelling and substantial governmental interest. And, once it be determined that a
burden has been placed upon a constitutional right, the onus of demonstrating that no
less intrusive means will adequately protect the compelling state interest and that the
challenged statute is sufficiently narrowly drawn, is upon the party seeking to justify
the burden.
Id. (citation omitted).
345. Id.
A variety of justifications have been proffered in support of the village's
ordinance. It is claimed that the ordinance controls population density, prevents noise,
traffic and parking problems, and preserves the rent structure of the community and its
attractiveness to families.... But I think it clear that the means chosen to accomplish
these purposes are both overinclusive and underinclusive, and that the asserted goals
could be as effectively achieved by means of an ordinance that did not discriminate on
the basis of constitutionally protected choices of lifestyle.
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though the Village embarked on a commendable course, it utilized a
"constitutionally faulty vessel." '346 No better example of activist
fundamental rights, strict scrutiny judicial review exists in Supreme
Court land use jurisprudence than Justice Marshall's Belle Terre
dissent.
E. Freedom of Speech
In some ways the Court's use of activist judicial review in First
Amendment cases parallels the use of activist judicial review and
strict scrutiny apparent in Justice Marshall's Belle Terre dissent. This
Article evaluates numerous First Amendment freedom of speech
cases that arose in the land use regulatory setting, starting with
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville in 1975."47 These cases have also
generated a remarkable variety of differing opinions. In the area of
First Amendment law, the Justices have found it difficult to agree on
basic doctrinal approaches as well as on the application of those
doctrines to specific facts. However, six generalizations can be made.
First, as Justice Blackmun stated in Schad, the presumption of
validity that traditionally attaches to a local government's exercise of
its zoning powers carries little, if any, weight where the zoning
regulation trenches on rights of expression protected under the First
Amendment.348 In other words, activist judicial review is a distinct
possibility when First Amendment issues are raised in the land use
regulatory setting. Second, as Justice O'Connor indicated in City of
Ladue, the normal First Amendment inquiry is to initially determine
"whether a regulation is content-based or content-neutral, and then,
based on the answer to that question, to apply the proper level of
[judicial] scrutiny." '349 Third, if the regulation is content-neutral, then
courts do not subject time, place, and manner restrictions to strict
346. Id. at 20.
347. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). See supra Part VI.G (listing other First Amendment cases).
348. 452 U.S. at 77 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
349. City ofLadue, 114 S. Ct at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
76 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
scrutiny, but rather to a variety of heightened judicial review.350 That
is to say that the regulations are sustainable if they are narrowly
tailored to meet an important governmental interest and there is a
direct relationship between the governmental interest and the means
adopted. 5' Fourth, if the regulation is content-based then strict
scrutiny is appropriate and courts will uphold the regulation only if it
is narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental
interest.352 In other words, when the regulations involve fundamental
rights of expression, strict scrutiny is utilized to test both the ends and
the relationship between the ends and means.353 Fifth, if the
regulation is content-based and regulates private citizens on private
property then, according to Justice O'Connor, it should be presumed
invalid.354 The non-judicial decisionmaker then faces a rebuttable
presumption of invalidity and must show that the regulation is
narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.355
Finally, prior restraints require particularly activist judicial review.
Although a prior restraint is not unconstitutional per se, it will face a
"heavy," rebuttable presumption of invalidity and the non-judicial
decisionmaker will have to prove that the restraint is narrowly drawn
to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.356
One example of activist judicial review is Justice Blackmun's
dissenting opinion in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., where
he opined that the court could not approve suppression of speech
without a judicial finding that the regulated speech was obscene.357 In
addition, Justice Brennan concluded in his dissenting opinion in City
350. See supra Part V.E.
351. See, e.g., Young, 427 U.S. at 62-73.
352. See, e.g., FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 223-30.
353. Id.
354. See City ofLadue, 114 S. Ct. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
355. See, e.g., Erznoznik 422 U.S. at 216-17.
356. See FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 225-28.
357. 427 U.S. 50, 96 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. that if a "'regulation is based on
the content of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more
carefully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited
merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's views."'358
Justice Brennan further asserted that time, place, and manner
restrictions are valid only if "'they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest ... and leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.' ' 359 In
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., Justice White's dissenting opinion,
which was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, is an
example of activist judicial review. 6° Justice White noted that the
Indiana statute sustained by the majority was "not a general
prohibition of the type we have upheld in prior cases.""36 As a result,
the majority's "references to the State's general interest in promoting
societal order and morality are not sufficient justification for a statute
which concededly reaches a significant amount of protected
expressive activity." '362
F. Freedom of Religion
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., utilized activist judicial review to invalidate a
Massachusetts statute which granted churches and schools the power
358. 475 U.S. 41, 57 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980)).
359. Id. at 63 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
360. 501 U.S. at 587-96 (White, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 590.
362. Id. For other examples of activist judicial review see Justice Stevens' majority opinion
in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network Inc., 113 S. CL 1505 (1993); Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) as well as Justices
White's and Stevens' respective concurring and dissenting opinions in that case, 493 U.S. at
244, 249; Justices Blackmun's and Stevens' respective concurring opinions in Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 77, 79 (1981); and Justice Powell's majority opinion
in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), as well as Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion in that case, 422 U.S. at 218.
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to veto liquor license applications.363 The Court held that the statute
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.3" The
Chief Justice acknowledged that deference should be paid to zoning
law.365 Burger asserted, however, that the Massachusetts law was an
improper delegation of legislative power to churches, which allowed
them to occupy a prohibited role in government processes.366 Chief
Justice Burger's approach to judicial review in Larkin parallels
Justice Marshall's equal protection approach in Belle Terre367 and the
Supreme Court's general approach to content-based speech
restrictions in First Amendment cases.368
363. 459 U.S. at 117-20.
364. Id.
365. "Given the broad powers of states under the Twenty-first Amendment, judicial
deference to the legislative exercise of zoning powers by a city council or other legislative
zoning body is especially appropriate in the area of liquor regulation." Id. at 121-22.
366. Id. at 127.
The Framers did not set up a system of government in which important, discretionary
governmental powers would be delegated to or shared with religious institutions.
[The statute] substitutes the unilateral and absolute power of a church for the
reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body acting on evidence and guided
by standards, on issues with significant economic and political implications. The
challenged statute thus enmeshes churches in the processes of government and creates
the danger of "[p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines." Ordinary
human experience and a long line of cases teach that few entanglements could be more
offensive to the spirit of the Constitution.
ld (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
367. See supra Part VI.D.
368. See supra Part VI.E.
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G. Illustration: Activist Judicial Review/Strict Scrutiny
FIGURE VI-i ACTIVIST JUDICIAL REVIEW/STRICT SCRUTINY
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Activist Judicial Review
Moore-Brennan and Stevens
Concurrences
TAKINGS
Activist Judicial Review
Nollan
Dolan
EQUAL PROTECTION
Strict Scrutiny
Belle Terre-
Marshall Dissent
FIRST AMENDMENT
Activist Judicial Review-Strict Scrutiny
Erznoznik
Ladue
Lakewood
FW/PBS
Larkin
Rebuttable Presumption of Invalidity-
Burden of Proof-
On the Legislative or Administrative Entity
tandard of Proof-Not articulated
Rebuttable Presumption of Invalidity-
Burden of Proof-
On the Legislative or Administrative Entity
to Prove
- Essential Nexus
- Rough Proportionality
Standard of Proof-
-Not Articulated
Fundamental Right or Suspect Classification
Implicated then Strict Equal Protection Scrutiny
I) Compelling Governmental Interest
2) Is Legislative Classification Necessary to
Achieve Compelling Governmental Interest?
Content-Based Restriction, i.e. Direct Impact on
First Amendment Interests, Must:
I) Advance Compelling State Interest:
2) Be Narrowly Tailored to Reach No
Further Than Necessary To Accomplish
Compelling State Interest
- Rebuttable Presumption of Invalidity
a Strong Presumption Against Restrictions
on Private Speech on Private Property
* Heavy Presumption Against Prior
Restraints
- Burden of Proof/Burden of Persuasion On
Government
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H. Conclusion: Activist Judicial Review/Strict Scrutiny
The opinions examined as examples of activist judicial review
validate Professor McCloskey's proposition concerning judicial
activism; the authors of these opinions are prepared to intervene in
the governing process in bold, dramatic ways. 69 Some of the
opinions are based (or would be based, if the dissent had prevailed)
on fundamental rights.37° Others, such as Nollan and Dolan, are based
on new interpretations of property rights and the protection those
rights can receive under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.37'
These opinions illustrate a cyclical trend between judicial
protection of civil liberties and private property rights, noted by
Professor James W. Ely.3" The concurring opinion of Justice
Brennan in Moore and the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall in
Belle Terre illustrate judicial concern about "civil liberties" and
distrust of exclusionary tendencies of local governments.373 The
opinions of Justice Scalia in Nollan and Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Dolan exemplify judicial concern for "property and economic rights"
and distrust of local governments whose "natural tendency" is to
adopt regulations that go "too far."374
369. MCCLOsKEY, supra note 291.
370. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 506-13 (Brennan, J., concurring); Forest City Enterprises, 426
U.S. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting); Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 12-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
also the various First Amendment opinions discussed supra Part VI.E-F.
371. See supra Part VI.B.
372. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GuARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (1992)
For decades the protection afforded to property and economic rights under the
Constitution has been of scant concern to judges and scholars. The topic, however,
never entirely disappeared from view. In 1955 Justice Felix Frankfurter observed:
"Yesterday the active area in this field was concerned with 'property.' Today it is 'civil
liberties.' Tomorrow it may be 'property' again." As Frankfurter predicted, in recent
years there has been a revival of interest in property issues among courts and
commentators.
Id. (footnote omitted).
373. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 506-13 (Brennan, J., concurring); Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 12-
20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
374. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-42 (Scalia, J.); Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2312-22 (Rehnquist,
[Vol. 51:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol51/iss1/2
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Activist judicial review is not, however, the most aggressive and
interventionist form of judicial review. That distinction belongs to
categorical judicial review, a variety that completely displaces the
judgment of non-judicial decisionmakers.
VII. SYNTHESIS: CATEGORICAL JUDICIAL REVIEW/PER SE RULES
No justice of the Supreme Court and no other judge has ever
had the temerity to suggest that he is authorized to substitute
his views of public policy for those of elected legislators, that
he may reject legislative choices on the ground that he
considers them unwise or unenlightened. The claim invariably
is, instead, that the rejected legislative choice is
unconstitutional, that it is prohibited by some provision of the
Constitution.
Lino A. Graglia375
Some Justices adopt more rigorous forms of judicial review out of
concern for disadvantaged citizens376 or protecting fundamental rights
of citizens.377 Other Justices scrutinize governmental actions more
closely because of concerns about the natural tendencies of non-
judicial decisionmakers378  or distrust of non-judicial
decisionmakers.379
Activist judicial review can be achieved through strict scrutiny of
governmental classifications or through more exacting substantive
law tests such as essential nexus and rough proportionality.380 Under
these activist approaches, non-judicial decisionmakers, although
c.J.).
375. Lino A. Graglia, In Defense of Judicial Restraint, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND
RESTRAINT, supra note 5, at 135, 138.
376. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 455-78 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
377. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 506-13 (Brennan, J., concurring).
378. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
379. See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
380. See supra Part VI.B.
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subjected to more demanding standards, may still constitutionally
prevail. It is possible for the governmental purpose to be compelling
and possess the necessary relationship to the means adopted.
Moreover, the government may be able to demonstrate an essential
nexus between ends and means and a rough proportionality between
the means adopted and the burdens imposed.
However, in Supreme Court land use jurisprudence there is yet a
fourth variety of judicial review, a variety more interventionist than
activist judicial review. This variety uses categorical, per se rules to
decide substantive issues.38' As these categorical rules create sharp,
distinct lines between what is constitutionally permitted and what is
not, the standards of judicial review are dramatically affected. In fact,
categorical rules supersede the three standards of judicial review
already examined. Judicial review itself is by no means displaced, but
once a categorical rule is applied, the other standards of judicial
review are automatically rejected.
In practice, categorical judicial review cannot be described as a
standard of judicial review, for it is standardless in the sense of the
varying degrees of scrutiny discussed by this Article. Therefore,
categorical judicial review is the most potent, aggressive, and
inflexible form of judicial review of non-judicial government action.
It is uncompromisingly lethal to land use legislation.
A. Regulatory Taking/Substantive Due Process
While the most dramatic examples of categorical judicial review
are found in recent Supreme Court takings opinions, there are hints of
such an approach in early cases raising takings and substantive due
process issues. Justice Stephen Fields, in his dissenting opinion in
Mugler v. Kansas,82 argued that it "is plain that [a] great wrong will
often be done ... [when legislation] crosse[s] the line which
separates regulation from confiscation."383 Similarly, Justice Joseph
381. See MANDELKER, supra note 246, §§ 2.03,2.17.
382. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
383. Id. at 678.
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McKenna, in a rambling, somewhat emotional dissent in Block v.
Hirsh,3' discussed the "absolute" axioms of Fifth Amendment
protection of property, 85 the exercise of "unbounded or irresponsible
[legislative] power, ' " and the "doom of judicial judgment on
legislative action" that would result from the majority's validation of
the District of Columbia rent control legislation at issue.38 Justice
McKenna thought a bright line had been crossed that should have
resulted instead in the constitutional invalidation of the legislation.388
A more recent takings opinion that exemplifies categorical
judicial review is Justice Thurgood Marshall's majority opinion in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.3" 9 In that case, a
New York City law provided that landlords had to allow cable
television companies to install cable facilities on the landlords'
property.3 Justice Marshall and the Court, with Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, and White dissenting, concluded that the law amounted to a
permanent physical occupation of appellant's property, and that such
an occupation was always a taking.391 Marshall traced this per se
physical occupation rule, which invariably and automatically results
in a taking, back to Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.392
For Justice Marshall the result in Loretto was clear and definitive;
if a permanent physical occupation exists, a taking has occurred.393
This test is the beginning and the end of the constitutional inquiry. In
384. 256U.S. 135(1921).
385. Id at 163.
386. Id. at 167.
387. Id. at 168.
388. Id. at 168-70.
389. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
390. Id. at 423-24.
391. Id. at438-41.
392. Id. at 427. "[ln Pumpelley v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871), this
Court held that the defendant's construction, pursuant to state authority, of a dam which
permanently flooded plaintiff's property constituted a taking." Id.
393. Id. at 426.
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contrast, appropriate restrictions on an owner's use of her propert, 94
would trigger other forms of judicial review, such as deferential,
intermediate, or activist standards of review. The policy reasons for
this categorical, permanent physical occupation rule are derived from
the long line of cases that stand for the proposition that conceptually,
a permanent physical occupation is "the most serious form of
invasion,"3' and is "qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the
use of property.
396
Somewhat ironically, perhaps, given his life experience and his
long-held values and concerns,397 Justice Marshall in Loretto adopted
a more extreme, aggressive form of judicial review to protect the
property rights of landlords than he adopted in Cleburne and Belle
Terre to protect the rights of the disadvantaged and the excluded.3 98
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,399 with Justice Scalia
writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that when land use
restrictions deprive an owner of all "economically beneficial or
productive options for [the property's] use," the government is
constitutionally required to compensate the landowner.4"0 However, if
the land use restriction does "no more than duplicate the result that
could have been achieved ... under the State's law of private
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate
[public] nuisances,"'' then no taking has occurred. Justice Scalia
articulated a new and different approach to both the takings issue and
categorical judicial review-the total regulatory takings test.
Under this new test, when a land use restriction denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of property the
394. Id.at 441.
395. Id.at 435.
396. Id. at436.
397. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 255, at 310-12 (discussing Justice Marshall's concern
for individual rights and affirmative action).
398. See supra Parts V.D. and VI.D (discussing Cleburne and Belle Terre, respectively).
399. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
400. Id. at 1018-19.
401. Id. at 1029.
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constitutional inquiry is over no matter how legitimate, important, or
compelling the governmental interest. No questions about reasonable,
direct, or necessary relationships between governmental purposes and
means are relevant. Issues concerning essential nexus and rough
proportionality are also irrelevant to the total regulatory takings
inquiry."' No presumption of validity operates; in fact, an
irrebuttable presumption of invalidity arises unless the government
can show that the regulation merely prohibits nuisances.4 3 Otherwise,
judgments and findings of non-judicial decisionmakers are displaced
automatically. The judicial finding of a total regulatory taking is
uncompromisingly lethal to the validity of land use restrictions.
Justice Scalia aligned this new approach with the permanent
physical occupation rle of Loretto.4" He asserted that there was
authority for the total regulatory takings rule in the dicta of recent
Supreme Court opinions. 5 Justice Scalia acknowledged that the
Court previously had not provided a rationale for the "belief' that a
deprivation of all economically beneficial use was a taking, but he
rationalized that in such an extreme situation a bright-line rule was
appropriate.4  In contrast to deferential judicial review, Justice Scalia
402. See supra Part VLB (discussing the essential nexus and rough proportionality tests).
403. 505 U.S. at 1029.
404. Id. at 1015.
We have, however, described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as
compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support
of the restraint. The first encompasses regulations that compel the property owner to
suffer a physical "invasion" of his property. In general (at least with regard to
permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty
the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation.
Id.
405. Id. at 1015-16.
The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate is
where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. As we
have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use
regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land. "
Id. (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (footnote and citations
omitted).
406. Id. at 1017-19.
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found reasons to dismiss legislative findings that support land use
restrictions.4"7 He attacked legislative findings that justified land use
regulations by characterizing of the restriction as one that prevents
harm.4" 8 By adopting the bright-line test, Justice Scalia closed the
door on legislative attempts to justify the regulation and avoid the
total regulatory taking rule.409 The justification of "harmful use
We have never set forth the justification for this rule. Perhaps it is simply, as
Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the
landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation. Surely, at least,
in the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use
of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the
legislature is simply "adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life," in a manner
that secures an "average reciprocity of advantage" to everyone concerned. And the
functional basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to affect property values
without compensation-that "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
the general law,"-does not apply to the relatively rare situations where the
government has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses.
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief
that when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
Id. (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) and
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), respectively) (footnote and
citations omitted).
407. Id. at 1022-24.
408. "Since such a justification can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to
a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff. We think the Takings Clause requires courts
to do more than insist upon artful harm-preventing characterizations." Id. at 1025 n.12.
409. 505 U.S. at 1026.
When it is understood that "prevention of harmful use" was merely our early
formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without
compensation) any regulatory diminution in value; and that the distinction between
regulation that "prevents harmful use" and that which "confers benefits" is difficult, if
not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis; it becomes self-evident
that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory
"takings"-which require compensation-from regulatory deprivations that do not
require compensation. A fortiori the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use
justification cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical rule that total
regulatory takings must be compensated. If it were, departure would virtually always
be allowed.
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prevention" would no longer be permitted to sustain a regulation that
"involved an allegation that the regulation wholly eliminated the
value of the claimant's land." 410
Justice Scalia effectively circumvented legislative action in an
additional way. The only exception to the categorical rule was the
case in which the state's common law of nuisance proscribed the land
owner's intended use.4 ' In that situation, a legislative proscription
would be constitutionally permissible because the land owner never
enjoyed the right to the intended use as part of her "bundle" of
property rights.1 2 Justice Scalia used a judicially created body of law,
nuisance law, as the measure of the constitutional validity of
legislatively adopted land use regulations that deprived the owner of
all economic benefit. 13
Justice Scalia boldly asserted some novel constitutional, historical,
and policy bases in support of the Lucas categorical approach to
takings jurisprudence. These included: first, "the understandings of
our citizens"; second, what "the property owner necessarily expects"
of the state's police power; third, "the historical compact recorded in
the Takings Clause;" and fourth, "our constitutional culture."' 4" As
410. Id.
411. Id.at1027.
412. "Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into
the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title
to begin with." Id.
413. This view is consistent with the position espoused by Professor Kmiec, supra note 19,
at 154, that "common law nuisance can govern the constitutional acceptability of land use
regulation."
414. 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
[This rule is in accord with] the understandings of our citizens regarding the content
of, and the State's power over, the "bundle of rights" that they acquire when they
obtain tide to property. It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the
uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly
enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers .... In the case of land,
however, we think the notion pressed by the Council that title is somehow held subject
to the "implied limitation" that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically
valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings
Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture.
ld (emphasis added) (footnote and citations omitted).
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previously suggested, more discussion, elaboration, and justification
would be helpful to fully understand Justice Scalia's jurisprudence.4 Is
B. Illustration: Categorical Judicial Review
FIGURE VII-1 CATEGORICAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
Categorical Judicial Review Irrebuttable Presumption of Invalidity
Loretto Legislative or Administrative Entity
Lucas Loses Automatically If Categorical
Perse Rule Is Deemed Violated:
* Permanent Physical Occupation
• Total Regulatory Taking
C. Conclusion: Categorical Judicial Review
Justice Marshall's categorical judicial review in Loretto and
Justice Scalia's in Lucas, stand in sharp contrast to the notions of
judicial restraint and judicial respect for legislative determinations
expressed by Justice Sutherland in Euclid, Justice Douglas in
415. Justice Blackmun emphatically disagreed with Justice Scalia's assertions of new
constitutional, historical, and policy bases for the Lucas categorical rule:
In short, I find no clear and accepted "historical compact" or "understanding of
our citizens" justifying the Court's new takings doctrine. Instead, the Court seems to
treat history as a grab bag of principles, to be adopted where they support the Court's
theory, and ignored where they do not. If the Court decided that the early common law
provides the background principles for interpreting the Takings Clause, then
regulation, as opposed to physical confiscation, would not be compensable. If the
Court decided that the law of a later period provides the background principles, then
regulation might be compensable, but the Court would have to confront the fact that
legislatures regularly determined which uses were prohibited, independent of the
common law, and independent of whether the uses were lawful when the owner
purchased. What makes the Court's analysis unworkable is its attempt to package the
law of two incompatible eras and peddle it as historical fact.
The Court makes sweeping and, in my view, misguided and unsupported changes
in our taking doctrine. While it limits these changes to the most narrow subset of
government regulation-those that eliminate all economic value from land-these
changes go far beyond what is necessary to secure petitioner Lucas' private benefit.
One hopes they do not go beyond the narrow confines the Court assigns them to today.
Id. at 1060-61 (footnote omitted).
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Berman, as well as by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens in
Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan, respectively. The policy bases supporting
legislative decisionmaking such as separation of powers, legislative
expertise, competence, familiarity with local problems, and
innovative solutions have little weight when the Court both distrusts
legislatures and gives property rights a predominate position in the
constitutional hierarchy.4t6
416. Justice Scalia's concurring and dissenting opinion in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485
U S. I (1988), presents another possible example of categorical judicial review. Justice Scalia
asserted that a provision in the San Jose rent control ordinance that allowed a hearing officer to
consider the "hardship" of the tenant in fixing a reasonable rent, renders the ordinance facially
invalid. Id. at 21. For Scalia, a bright line had been crossed by the San Jose City Council
because the landlord regulated by the "hardship" provision did not cause the problem the
provision addressed.
Since the San Jose Ordinance does not require any specification of how much
reduction in rent is attributable to each of the various factors that the hearing officer is
allowed to take into account, it is quite possible that none of the many landlords
affected by the Ordinance will ever be able to meet the Court's requirement of a
"showing in a particular case as to the consequences of [the hardship factor] in the
ultimate determination of rent." There is no reason thus to shield alleged constitutional
injustice from judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
A legislative provision of this sort is improper and unconstitutional because it effects a
taking without just compensation. This sort of regulation falls into a category of governmental
redistribution measures that are particularly objectionable to Justice Scalia:
Appellants' only claim is that a reduction of a rent increase below what would
otherwise be a "reasonable rent" under this scheme may not, consistently with the
Constitution, be based on consideration of the seventh factor-the hardship to the
tenant as defined in [the ordinance]. I think they are right.
Once the other six factors of the Ordinance have been applied to a landlord's
property, so that he is receiving only a reasonable return, he can no longer be regarded
as a "cause" of exorbitantly priced housing; nor is he any longer reaping distinctively
high profits from the housing shortage. The seventh factor, the "hardship" provision, is
invoked to meet a quite different social problem: the existence of some renters who are
too poor to afford even reasonably priced housing. But that problem is no more caused
or exploited by landlords than it is by the grocers who sell needy renters their food, or
the department stores that sell them their clothes, or the employers who pay them their
wages, or the citizens of San Jose holding the higher paying jobs from which they are
excluded....
... Here the city is not "regulating" rents in the relevant sense of preventing rents
that are excessive; rather, it is using the occasion of rent regulation (accomplished by
the rest of the Ordinance) to establish a welfare program privately funded by those
landlords who happen to have "hardship" tenants.
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VIII. SYNTHESES: ILLUSTRATIONS
A. Taxonomy and Analytical Framework
Summary Figure VIII-1 synthesizes the standards of judicial
review into one diagram. This illustration oversimplifies a very
complex and messy body of jurisprudence. Many fine points and
appropriate qualifiers are absent. The cases listed are deemed
examples of the given type of judicial review, and are not intended to
constitute an exhaustive list. However, Figure VIII-1 captures both
the taxonomy outlined in Part II and discussed in Parts IV, V, VI and
Vii as well as the analytical framework presented in Part III and
applied in Parts IV, V, VI, and VII. Figure VIII-1 can serve as a
Of course all economic regulation effects wealth transfer. When excessive rents
are forbidden, for example, landlords as a class become poorer and tenants as a class
(or at least incumbent tenants as a class) become richer. Singling out landlords to be
the transferors may be within our traditional constitutional notions of fairness, because
they can plausibly be regarded as the source or the beneficiary of the high-rent
problem.. Once such a connection is no longer required, however, there is no end to the
social transformations that can be accomplished by so-called "regulation," at great
expense to the democratic process.
Id. at 21-22. The redistributionalist tendencies of the legislature caused Scalia to express
distrust of the legislative motive:
The fact that government acts through the landlord-tenant relationship does not
magically transform general public welfare, which must be supported by all the public,
into mere "economic regulation," which can disproportionately burden particular
individuals....
The politically attractive feature of regulation is not that it permits wealth transfers
to be achieved that could not be achieved otherwise; but rather that it permits them to
be achieved "off budget," with relative invisibility and thus relative immunity from
normal democratic processes.... Subsidies for these groups may well be a good idea,
but because of the operation of the Takings Clause our governmental system has
required them to be applied, in general, through the process of taxing and spending,
where both economic effects and competing priorities are more evident.
Id. at 22-23. This cynical view of the legislative process required strong judicial medicine. If
Justice Scalia had been writing for the majority in Pennell, then a new category of Takings
Clause violation, one that automatically resulted in a finding of unconstitutionality, would
probably have been established.
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general overview of Supreme Court standards of judicial review as
well as a starting point for future studies of judicial review of land
use regulations.
B. Articulated Policy Bases for Standards ofJudicial Review and
Levels ofJudicial Scrutiny
Figure VIII-2 summarizes the policy rationales that Justices have
explicitly offered to justify their creation and use of various standards
of judicial review and levels of judicial scrutiny. As with Figure VIII-
1, this depiction is an oversimplification of a complex body of policy
reasons. However, it too captures the broad range of articulated, yet
often confusing and frequently contradictory, justifications and
rationales and can serve as an overview as well as a starting point for
future studies of judicial review.
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FIGURE VIII-1 SYNTHESIS OF STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
LEVELS OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
SUBSTANTIVE DuE PROCESS
Deferential Judicial Review Presumption of Validity-
Euclid Burden of Proof-On the Challenger
Standard of Proof-
Beyond Fair Debate
Heightened Judicial Review Presumption of Validity-
Neetow Burden of Proof-
Moore On the Challsger
Standard of Proof-
Clear and Convincing
Activist Judicial Review Rebuttable Presumption of
Inval idi -- --
Moore-
Brennan and Stevens
Concurrences
Burden ofProof-
On the Legislative or
Administrative Entit
Standard of Proof-
Not Articulated
TAXiNos/EmNENT DOMA~IN
Deferential Judicial Review Presumption of Validity-.
Berman Burden of Proof-
Agins On thu Challenger
Penn Central Standard of Proof-
Keystone Beyond Fair Debat
Heightened Judicial Review Presumption of Validity-
Pennsylvania Coal Burden of Proof-On the Challenger
Standard of Proof-
Clear and
convincing
Activist Judicial Review Rbutao Presumptionf
rrvalidy--
Nollan
Dolan
Categorical Judicial Review
Loretto
Lucas
Burden of Proof-
On thu Legislative
orAdministrative
Entity to Prove
- Essential
Nexu3
- Rough
Proportionality
Standard of Proof-
Not Articulated
Irrebuttable Presumption o
Invalidity
Legislative or
Administrative Entity
Loses Automatically If
Categorical
Persc Rule Is Deemed
Violated:
- Permanent physical
occupation
- Total Regulatory Taking
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EQUAL PROTECTION
Minimal Scrutiny
Belle Terre
Cleburne
Intermediate Scrutiny
Cleburne-
Marshall Dissent
Smct Scrutiny
Belle Terre-
Marshall Dissent
FRSsT AMENDMENT-FREEDOM OF
SPEECH/FREEDOM OF RELIGION
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Fundamental Rghts
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Protection Review--i.e..
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Goveruental Purpose
2) Rational Relationshlp
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applied in a non-
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or
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Implicated then: Intermediatc
Level of Equal Protetion
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I) Substantial
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Governmental Interes
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Classification Necessary
to Achieve Compelling
Governmental Interest?
Deferential Judicial
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Young
Renton
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Schad
- Burden of Proof is the
key
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Governmental Purpose
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Governmental Purpose
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1) Advance Substantial
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to Further Substantial
Governmental Interest
- Rebuttable Presumption
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- Burden of Proof/Burden
of Persuasion-Varies
-Standard of Proof?
Content-Based Restriction,
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FIGURE VIII-2 ARTICULATED POLICY BASES FOR STANDARDS OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LEVELS OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
*SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
* ODEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW (DJR)
Separation of Powers
*Matter of courtesy and propriety between
coordinate branches (Fletcher)
eAppropriate roles for separate branches (Mugler)
eUsurpation of another branches role is threat to
form of government (Mugler)
eCourts, out of duty and necessity, must respect
non-judicial decision-makers, re: public interest
*Exereise of discretion is legislative function
(Bloek. Moore-White)
*Exercise ofjudicial power inappropriate unless
fundamental right implicated or suspect
classification burdened (Moore-White).
Competence and Expertise of Legislative
Bodies
eFact gathering is legislative role (Radice/Euclid)
ePolicy making on issues of general welfare is
legislative role (Berman)
eCourts cannot be super-legislature (Cleburne)
Familiarity With Local Problems
eProximity of legislators to urban problems
(Gorieb)
eLegislators have information or innovative
solutions (Gorfeb)
Practicality
*Courts cannot miero-manage local matters (Dolan-
Stevens)
" OHEIGHTENED JUDICIAL REVIEW (HJR)
eLegislative classification has no foundation in
reason (Nectow)
eLegislative classification intruded on sanctity of
family (Moore-Powell)
* *ACTIVIST JUDICIAL REVIEW (AJR)
eLegislative classification burdened fundamental
right of freedom ofpersonal choice in matters of
family life (Moore-Brennan)
*Legislative classification cut too deeply into
Fundamental right associated with ownership of
property (Moore-Stevens)
* 0 CATEGORICAL JUDICIAL REVIEW (CJR)
Not Applicable
OREGULATORY TAKINGS/EMINENT
DOMAIN
* .DEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW (DJR)
Separation of Powers
*Legislative function to declare public interest
(Berman. Midkiff Keystone)
eJudiciary's role re: public interest is narrow (Berman)
*Eerpirical debates over wisdom of cxercise of
eminent domain power is for legislature (MI0l1f)
elntolerable supervision of non-judicial decision-
makers is hostile to basic principles of governnent(Nollan-Brennan)
eJudicia intervention chills problem solving, creates
severe tensions (Nollan-Stovens)
*Court's lack of self-restrint is improvident (First
English-Stevens)
@Court's intervention based on hostility, disbelief,
distrust of legislative findings, not precedent (Lucas-
Blackmun)
*Court purports to have federal courts micro-manage
state decisions (Dolan.Stevens)
eCourt's approach, similar to Lochner, embraces
potentially open-ended source ofjudicial power to
invalidate state economic legislation that members of
this Court view as unwise (Dolan-Stevens)
Expertise
eCourts should not second guess legislature (Keystone)
*Courts should not sit as super-lcgislature to weigh
wisdom of legislation (Nollan-Brennan)
eNarrow view of Court should not be substituted for
expert state agency judgreent (Nlollan-Brenan)
" OHEIGHTENED JUDICIAL REVIEW (HJR)
*Skepticism about legislative tendencies
(Pennsylvania Coal)
" OACTIVIST JUDICIAL REVIEW (AIR)
Property Rights
*Right to exclude is essential stick in bundle ofproperty
rights (Nollan)
eNon-judicial decision-makers must pay if it wants a
property interest (Nollan)
eCynicism about non-judicial decision-makers' motive3;
regulation was "out and out extortion" (Nollan)
0 *CATEGORICAL JUDICIAL REVIEW (CJR)
Regulatory Takings/Physical Invasion
oPhysical intrusions by government arn aproperty
restriction of unusnally serious character (Loretto)
Total regulatory taking
eTotal deprivation of economically beneficial use Is the
equivalent of a physical appropriation (Lucas)
*Legislative recitation of noxious use is insufficient
justification for regulation that denies all economic use(Lucas)
*"Understandings of our citizens," "owners' necessary
expectations," "or one constitutional culture," "the
historic compact" (Lucas)
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*EQUAL PROTECTION
e *DEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
Fundamental rights/suspect classifications
Legslative chssification involves no fundamental
rights suspect clasaification or procedural disparity (Belle
Terre)
Leguilative Claification deals only with social and
economic legislation (Belle Terre)
aDisparity of racial impact alone does not call for strict
scrutiny (Arlington Heights)
4Petitioners' intereat in housing does not trigger StrA
scrutiny (Arlington Heights)
Separation of Powers
ePreaumpton of vahdity (Belle Terre)
esercise ofdiscretion in legislative, not judicial.
function (Belle Terre)
*Court presumes improvident decisions will be rectified
by democratic process (Cleburne)
*Court reluctant to supervise legislative clasificatious
because of separation of powera (Cleburne)
Federalism
oWide latitude is accorded to states (Dutes)
eStates presumed to have acted within constitutional
powers (Moore-White)
Judicial Review
eNo clearly defined standards of equal praection review
(Cleburise-Stevens)
e OHEIGHTENED JUDICIAL REVIEW (H JR)
Judicial Review
*Heightened standard ofjudicial review exists since
Carolene Products (Cleburnie-Marshall)
*Judicial candor equires judge to articulate justification
for approach to judicial review (Cleburne-Marshall)
elmportance of mterest at stake plu history of
discrimination against mentally retarded justify
heightened judicial review (Cleburne-Marshall)
sHeightened judicial review is method of opproaching
certain legislative classifications skeptically with
judgment suspended until facts are in and evidence
considered (Cleburne-MarsIall)
e *ACTIVIST JUDICIAL REVIEW (AIR)
Fundamental rights/suspect classifications
*Legislative classification burdened fundamental rights
of association and privacy (Belle Terre-Marshall)
Presumpton of validity deferential appmech (Belle
Terre-Marshall)
* eCATEGORICAL JUDICIAL REVIEW (CJR)
Not Applicable
*FIRST AMENDMENT-FREEDOM OF
SPEECH/FREEDOM OF RELIGION
* ODEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW (DJR)
Legitimate Governmental Interests
ePrivacy (Emnoznik-Burger)
eTraffic safety (Metromedia-Stewart)
*Local environment (Metromedia-Stevens) (Schad-Burger)
*Pnotective community standards (FIWIPBS-Burger)
eDecent society (FWIPBS-Sealia)
*Liquor control (Larkin-Rehnquist)
eCommunities should be masters of their own environment
(Schad-Burger)
Legitimate governmental interests will control when burdens
on First Amendment activities are trivial or non-existent
(Erznoznik-Burger FW/PBS-Scalia)
* *HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL REVIEW (HJR)
Type 1-Validation of Local Regulation
important governmental Interest
*Quality of urban life (Young: Renton: Lakewood-White)
*Stable neighborhoods (Young-Powell; Frisby)
*Ehminating urban blight (Vincent)
aEsthetics (Vincent)
*Safety (Vincent)
*Secondary effects of adult theaters (Renton)
oPublic order (Barnes)
*Public Morality (Barnes)
olportant government interest will control when regulations
are content-neutral time, place, manner restrictions that are
narrowly drawn to further important governmental interest
Type 2-Invalidation of Local Regulation
Governmental Interest must yield to protect First amendment
expression
eRestrictions are not narrowly tailored and reach too far
(Metromedia; Schad: Frisby-Brennan)
*City has failed to show governmental interests are substantial
enough; city has burden of proof (Metromedia-Brencan)
e *ACTIVIST JUDICIAL REVIEW (AJR)
Separation of Powers
Normal presumption of validity carries little in review of
content-based restrictions (Schad-Blackmun; Renton-Brennan)
Fundamental Rights
Transcendent value of speech puts burden of proof on
government (Barnes-White)
sGovermmental interests will control if:
ethey are shown to be compelling (government has burden of
proof) (Erznoznilc, Vincent-Brennan; Ladue)
*they are narrowly drawn to accomplish compelling state
interest (Barnes-White)
eHevy presumption of Invalidity for prior restraints
(Lakewood: FW/PBS)
* *CATEGORICAL JUDICIAL REVIEW (CJR)
Not Applicable
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C. Three-Tiered Equal Protection Scrutiny
Figure VIH-3 is a synthesis of the various forms of equal
protection scrutiny-strict, intermediate, and minimal. It is an
approximation and an oversimplification, but it can be helpful in
sorting out equal protection cases and opinions.
FIGURE VIII-3 THREE-TIERED EQUAL PROTECTION JUDICIAL
SCRUTINY
1. Does the governmental classification treat citizens differently?
2. Does the governmental classification involve state action?
If either question is answered negatively, then there can be
no equal protection violation. If both questions are answered
affirmatively, then one of three equal protection tests may be
chosen.
3. Does the governmental classification impact fundamental rights?
4. Does the governmental classification involve a suspect
classification?
If either 3 or 4 (or both) is answered affirmatively, then strict
judicial scrutiny is deployed, and questions 5 and 6 must both be
answered affirmatively for the governmental classification to
withstand strict scrutiny and be constitutionally valid;
5. Is there a compelling governmental interest that justifies the
classification?
6. Is the classification necessary to accomplish the compelling
governmental interest?
If both questions 3 and 4 are answered negatively, then
intermediate judicial scrutiny is applied. Intermediate scrutiny
asks both questions 7 and 8.
7. Does the governmental classification impact a quasi-
fundamental right?
8. Does the governmental classification involve a quasi-suspect
classification?
If either 7 or 8 (or both) is answered affirmatively, then
intermediate judicial scrutiny is deployed, and questions 9 and
10 must both be answered affirmatively for the governmental
[Vol. 51:1
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classification to withstand intermediate scrutiny and be
constitutionally valid;
9. Is there an important governmental interest that justifies the
classification?
10. Is the classification directly related to the important
governmental interest?
If both questions 7 and 8 (as well as 3 and 4) are answered
negatively, then minimal judicial scrutiny is deployed, and
questions 11, 12, and 13 must all be answered affirmatively to
withstand minimal scrutiny and be constitutionally valid;
11. Is there a legitimate governmental interest that justifies the
classification?
12. Is the classification rationally-related to the legitimate
governmental interest?
13. Is the classification applied in a non-discriminatory way?
(Note: The minimal judicial scrutiny identified in questions
eleven, twelve, and thirteen is the equal protection variety of
deferential judicial review and is analogous to the presumption of
validity in substantive due process cases.)
IX. THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY: A MODEST
SUGGESTION FOR IMPROVEMENT
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system.
Alexander M. Bickel417
417. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16. One pair of authors has defined the "counter-majoritarian
difficulty" as follows:
The so-called "counter-majoritarian difficulty" is typical of such concern for judicial
restraint. The difficulty as generally identified is this: federal judges, who are not
elected, are able to set aside or penalize the actions of elected representatives and the
President. This seems inconsistent with the democratic principle that the will of the
majority should govern policy outcomes. Most lawyers resolve the difficulty by
concluding that the Constitution, which became law through super-majoritarian
procedures, creates this situation. In addition, the bench is tinged with electoral
accountability in that: judges must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate; Congress and the President can respond to unfavorable court decisions by
19971
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Candor requires me to acknowledge the particular factors that
justify invalidating Cleburne's zoning ordinance under the
careful scrutiny it today receives.
Thurgood Marshall4"'
The main purpose of this Article is to provide a taxonomy and an
analytical framework for one dimension of Supreme Court judicial
review of land use regulations. The standards of judicial review are
those standards that the Court creates and uses to guide its review and
disposition of particular land use cases on their merits. Additionally, I
wish to apply the taxonomy and framework to the vast number of
land use opinions (not just decisions) authored by Supreme Court
Justices. In applying the taxonomy and the framework to over 120
land use opinions, it is quite clear that' the "no set formula" label is
applicable to standards of judicial review as well as it is to the takings
issue. But the "no set formula" label is an understatement regarding
judicial review. Confusion, disarray, and inconsistency might be
more accurate descriptions. While, undoubtedly, there are several
standards of judicial review apparent in Supreme Court land use
jurisprudence, there neither is, nor has there been, a consensus on the
principles, applications, or policy bases underlying those standards.
This disarray perhaps is in some ways positive; standards of
judicial review are not frozen into some Procrustean mold. Creative
new approaches can and will be tried, although those new approaches
may sometimes lead to rigid per se rules. In this disarray, the Court
can be flexible to changing times and new demands.
However, there is a distinct downside to the confusion. It invites
the knight-errant on a crusade, whether he or she be a liberal
protecting fundamental rights or a conservative promoting property
rights. The already present "counter-majoritarian difficulty" is
changes in the budget, jurisdiction, or other aspects of the courts; Congress and the
President can also override disfavored court decisions through new legislation or (in
extreme cases) constitutional amendment.
BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY NV. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 92 (1994).
418. Cleburne,473 U.S. at460.
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exacerbated by the confusion. Judicial predilections can dominate
and be disguised at the same time. Moreover, a review of the massive
writings in the realm of constitutional theory published since
Alexander Bickel's Least Dangerous Branch4 9 in 1962, indicates
that no workable and generally accepted means of constraining
judicial discretion has emerged, or is likely to emerge soon. Thus,
liberal advocates of judicial activism praise Justice Brennan but, in so
doing, have perhaps licensed Justice Scalia's interventionist
approaches. Conversely, conservative supporters of Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist are perhaps clearing the way for the next
Justice Douglas.42° Lochnerian, activist judicial review is succeeded
by the fundamental rights-oriented Warren Court, which in turn, is
followed by the property rights-oriented Rehnquist/Scalia Court.
Whatever the revolution, the Thermidor sets in sooner or later.
Into this dialectical confusion one modest improvement suggests
itself. An "entrenched understanding" or "established expectation"
should emerge to the effect that Justices would engage in "reasoned
elaboration""42 of their selection of judicial review standards. In other
words, Justices should disclose their rationale for using deferential,
heightened, activist, or categorical judicial review and set forth their
reasoning process with regard to this dimension of the judicial
decisionmaking process.
The disclosure of reasons supporting a Justice's results, reasoned
elaboration, is a tenet of the legal process school of jurisprudence. 2
It is a technique advanced as a useful constraint on judicial
dogmatism and personal judicial predilections in a democratic
419. See supra note 2.
420. Figuratively speaking, the Justice Douglas referred to is not the same Justice who
wrote the Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) or Village Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974) opinions of the Court, but rather the Justice Douglas who authored, for example, the
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of privacy) and Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting rights) majority opinions.
421. For a discussion of "reasoned elaboration," see G. Edward White, The Evolution of
Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 286-
94(1973).
422. Id.
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society. Reasoned elaboration has its limitations,4" however, and has
been labeled obsolete by some,424 but in the welter of conflicting,
contradictory, and often unelaborated Supreme Court approaches to
judicial review, I would assert that reasoned elaboration, or truth-in-
jurisprudence (call it what you will), retains contemporary value.
The colloquy engaged in by Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall
in Cleburne is a useful example.42 In that case, there were sharp
disagreements, points and counter-points, and critical evaluations of
opposing positions regarding competing standards of judicial review.
The Justices engaging in that colloquy disclosed, informed, and
educated, while also advancing and furthering their own thinking and
analysis. When compared to the silence of Justice Sutherland in
Nectow, the mostly unformulated position of Justice Holmes in
Pennsylvania Coal, or the novel assertions of Justice Scalia in Lucas,
the combination of fully engaged opinions in Cleburne stands out in
refreshing and constructive contrast.426 If, in a democratic society, the
premise of distrust attaches to the judiciary then disclosure (reasoned
elaboration) can still operate as a modest but useful constraint on
judges as they select a standard of judicial review.
X. CONCLUSION
"Our great and sacred Constitution, serene and inviolable,
stretches its beneficent powers over our land ... like the
outstretched arm of God himself... the people of the United
States ... ordained and established one Supreme Court-the
most rational, considerate, discerning, veracious, impersonal
power-the most candid, unaffected, conscientious,
incorruptible power... 0 Marvelous Constitution!
423. Id. at298-301.
424. Id.
425. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
426. See Nectow, 277 U.S. at 183-89; Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-16; Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1003-32.
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Magic Parchment! Transforming Word! Maker, Monitor,
Guardian of Mankind!"
Henry E. Estabrook4.
Few today would subscribe to Estabrook's 1913 paean to the
Supreme Court. Today, we are all realists. That said, however,
perhaps we can agree that Supreme Court land use jurisprudence
presents an incredibly interesting mosaic. It is a mosaic that does not
readily come into focus. Contours may be glimpsed, but lines, shapes,
and shadings are certainly not well-defined or clearly understood.
Much more study and examination is needed. This Article is designed
to provide a classification system and a structure that can assist in
future examinations regardless of the author's politics. My invitation
is to commentators, teachers, lawyers, and students of land use law to
use the taxonomy and framework presented here to evaluate or
perhaps to deconstruct land use law doctrine, to critique one's
favorite or least favorite judge or group of judges, and to unpack
interesting cases past, present, or future. We have a mosaic to work
with that is fascinating, thought-provoking, and significant in its
impact on property rights, land use regulation, civil liberties, and
environmental protection. Let's have at it.
427. Quoted in R.H. GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 402
(1940) and ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 15 (1978).
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APPENDIX A
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
1. Type ofRegulation: Zoning ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether the adoption of two ordinances that
restricted development of valuable residential land to between one
and five dwelling units substantially deprived the owners of all
reasonable use of their property.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Damages for inverse condemnation and a
declaration that the ordinances were facially unconstitutional.
5. Constitutional Issue: Taking of property without just
compensation (Fifth Amendment as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: After the Agins acquired five acres of undeveloped
land in the city of Tiburon, California, for residential development,
the city, in response to state-mandated planning requirements,
adopted two ordinances that modified existing zoning requirements.
The ordinances placed the Agins' five acres in "RPD-I," a residential
planned development and open space zone, which permitted the
development of from one to five single-family residences on the
property. The Agins did not submit a development plan to the city,
but instead sued the city, seeking damages for inverse condemnation
and a declaration that the ordinances were facially unconstitutional.
The California Supreme Court found that the city's zoning
ordinances, on their face, did not constitute a taking of the Agins'
property because the ordinance by its terms permitted construction of
one- to five-acre residences on the five-acre tract and therefore did
not prevent all use of their property. The court also ruled that inverse
condemnation was not an available remedy in cases where a party
alleges a regulatory taking; the exclusive remedies are injunctive and
declaratory relief. The Agins sought review from the U.S. Supreme
Court.
7. Decision: Zoning ordinances upheld as not constituting a
taking of property.
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8. Opinion of the Court: The ends sought to be achieved by
enactment of the ordinances discouraging the premature and
unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban uses are
legitimate state interests under the [C]onstitution. The means selected
to achieve those goals-restricting the number of dwelling units-
substantially advances those legitimate interests. Moreover, the
zoning ordinance benefited the Agins as well as the public by serving
the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly development of
residential property with provision for open-space areas. As a result,
the ordinances' provisions on their face did not constitute a taking
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the public
interest in achieving those goals outweighs the landowners' interest
in developing the land in the most profitable way possible. Because
the [C]ourt did not find a taking in this case, it declined to address the
question of whether damages for inverse condemnation are a required
remedy in regulatory takings cases.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 213-15 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
1. Type of Regulation: State public indecency law.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether the State's public indecency law,
which required dancers to wear pasties and G-strings, violated the
First Amendment.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: Facial and as applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunctive relief.
5. Constitutional Issue: Freedom of Speech (First Amendment).
6. Facts: Respondents, two establishments in South Bend,
Indiana, that wished to provide totally nude dancing as entertainment,
and individual dancers who were employed at those places, claim that
the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression prevented
the State from enforcing its public indecency law to prevent this kind
of dancing. The two establishments, the Kitty Kat Lounge and the
Glen Theatre, Inc., provided adult entertainment and wished to
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present totally nude dancing. The two individual dancers had worked
at those establishments and wished to dance nude. The State's public
indecency statute required that the dancers in these establishments
wear pasties and G-strings. The District Court originally granted
respondent's prayer for an injunction, finding that the statute was
facially overbroad. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded to the District Court in order for the plaintiffs
to pursue their claim that the statute violated the First Amendment as
applied to their dancing. The District Court then concluded that the
type of dancing the respondents wished to perform was not
expressive activity protected by the Constitution and rendered
judgment for the petitioners. The case was again appealed to the
Seventh Circuit and the court reversed, holding that the nude dancing
involved here was expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment.
7. Decision: The Indiana statutory requirement that the dancers
in the establishments involved in this case wear pasties and G-strings
did not violate the First Amendment.
8. Opinion of the Court: The Court applied the four-part
O'Brien test in determining whether or not the State's public
indecency statute violated the First Amendment. "'[A] government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest."' 501 U.S. at 567 (quoting United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). The Court ruled that
the statute was clearly within the power of the State and that it
furthered a substantial government interest by protecting order and
morality. The Court further concluded that this interest is unrelated to
the suppression of the freedom of expression. Respondents argued
that prohibiting nude dancing is related to expression because the
State sought to prevent its erotic message. The Court disagreed,
concluding that the requirement of wearing pasties and G-strings did
not deprive the dance of the erotic message it conveys; rather it
simply makes the message less graphic. Public nudity is the evil that
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the statute addressed, not erotic dancing. The statute's requirement is
the bare minimum necessary to achieve this goal.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
1. Type of Regulation: Legislation for urban redevelopment that
authorize[d] condemnation (District of Columbia Redevelopment Act
of 1945).
2. Land Use Issue: Whether property condemned and
compensated for by government action must actually be intended for
a public use, or may condemnation achieve more general public
purposes.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: Both facial and as applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunction to prevent condemnation and
declaratory judgment that the legislation was unconstitutional.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Use of eminent domain under the Fifth Amendment.
b. Due process limitations (Fourteenth Amendment) on
the police power.
c. Role of legislative bodies and courts.
6. Facts: Congress, acting as the local governing and legislative
body of the District of Columbia, adopted a plan for the
redevelopment and beautification of the national capital area pursuant
to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act. The plan called for
the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency to acquire
property by eminent domain and then to transfer that property to
public agencies and private developers, who would carry out the
redevelopment plan. The government planned to design development
for the project to prevent blighting influences and improve the area
aesthetically. The owners of a department store that was in sound
condition objected to the appropriation of their property for re-
development, contending that it was an unconstitutional exercise of
the power of eminent domain, since their property would be
redeveloped by private parties for private, not public use. They also
contended that the purpose of the exercise of eminent domain under
the act was to rid the area of slums, not to condemn property to
develop a better balanced, more attractive community.
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7. Decision: Redevelopment act upheld as constitutional
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
8. Opinion of the Court. The use of the power of condemnation
and the police power of government is a matter primarily for
determination by legislative bodies, not the courts. The concept of the
public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. When a
legislative body determines that the public interest will be served by
certain purposes, such determinations are "well-nigh conclusive."
The role of the judiciary in determining whether eminent domain is
being exercised for a public purpose is narrow. "The rights of these
property owners are satisfied when they receive that just
compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts as the price of the
taking." The legislative body may determine where, when, how
much, and why the power of eminent domain will be used.
Here, Congress decided that the redevelopment plan should
include aesthetic considerations as well as considerations of health.
Such a determination---"that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled"--is within the power of the legislature. Further,
since the means for accomplishing a public purpose are for Congress
alone to choose, Congress may conclude that the end of achieving a
redevelopment plan is better served by using private developers than
public agencies. Similarly, the choice of the size and scope of the
plan, and the decision to redevelop the area as a whole-including
existing sound structures-rather than to adopt a piecemeal approach
targeted at blighted structures, is to be made by Congress. "Once the
question of [the] public purpose has been decided, the amount and
character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a
particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion
of the legislative branch."
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 211-12 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
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Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
1. Type of Regulation: Rent control.
2. Land Use Issue: Reasonableness of legislative imposition of
emergency two-year rent-control statute which allowed tenants to
hold over but also provided a mechanism for rent adjustment.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Recovery of possession of the housing unit
by the owner of the building.
5. Constitutional Issue: Substantive due process (a taking of
property without just compensation under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
6. Facts: A housing emergency caused by this country's entry
into World War I resulted in the rent law of 1919 in Washington,
D.C. The act provided that a tenant could continue to occupy rental
property, despite the expiration of his lease, so long as that tenant
continued to pay his rent and performed whatever other conditions
were set out in the lease. The same law provided a mechanism for
rent adjustment and allowed the owner to oust the tenant, after 30
days' notice, and have possession for himself and for his family. Mr.
Hirsh wanted the apartment that he had rented to Mr. Block for his
own use, but he did not comply with the 30 days' notice requirement.
He challenged the law's validity, contending that such rent control
inhibited his right to fiee-market enterprise.
7. Decision: Rent control statute upheld as valid temporary
measure.
8. Opinion of the Court: The emergency declared by the statute
is assumed to exist since legislative findings are entitled to a
considerable degree of judicial deference. Because housing is a
necessity of life, and because the public interest in the availability of
housing during the state of emergency justifies some degree of public
control, the statute is a valid temporary measure to achieve the goal
of public health and welfare. This was so, despite the inevitable
deprivation of a profit on high rent that the owners of apartments in
Washington would otherwise have made. The emergency, the two-
year (or less) duration of the act, and the rent adjustment feature
make the act reasonable under the circumstances.
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"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN XV. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 215-16 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984).
1. Type ofRegulation: Municipal sign ordinance.
2. Land Use Issues: Whether a city's advancement of aesthetic
values is an interest sufficiently substantial to justify a city's
ordinance forbidding the posting of all signs on public property, and
whether utility poles are a traditional public forum for First
Amendment purposes.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunction against enforcement of the
ordinance to prohibit plaintiffs' political campaigning efforts, and for
compensatory and punitive damages.
5. Constitutional Issue:
a. Freedom of speech/expression (First Amendment).
b. Substantive due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: A candidate support organization entered into a
contract with a political sign service to make and post signs bearing
[the] candidate's name. City employees removed the signs attached to
public property.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under First Amendment as not
violative of freedom of speech.
8. Opinion of the Court: The plaintiffs' freedom of speech was
not unconstitutionally violated. The ordinance [was] neutral
concerning any speaker's point of view, and the state's interest in
advancing aesthetic values [was] sufficiently substantial to justify the
effect of the ordinance on plaintiffs' freedom of expression because
the effect [was] no greater than necessary to accomplish the city's
purpose. Utility poles are not a "traditional public forum," and their
use may be restricted... to their primary purpose.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER Er AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 236-37 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
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City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410
(1993).
1. Type of Regulation: City ordinance prohibiting distribution
of "commercial handbills" on public property.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether the City of Cincinnati's refusal to
allow respondents to distribute their commercial publications through
freestanding newsracks located on public property violated the First
Amendment.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaratory and injunctive relief.
5. Constitutional Issue: Freedom of Speech (First Amendment).
6. Facts: Respondents, Discovery Network, Inc., and Harmon
Publishing Company, Inc., provided free magazines that were
distributed, among other places, on newsracks throughout the city.
Discovery Network provided adult educational, recreational, and
social programs to individuals in the Cincinnati area. It advertised
those programs in a free magazine that it published nine times a year.
Harmon Publishing Company published and distributed a free
magazine that advertised real estate for sale at various locations
throughout the United States. The city's Director of Public Works
notified respondents that their respective permits to use dispensing
devices on public property was revoked and ordered the newsracks
removed within 30 days. The city considered the publications
"commercial handbills," because they contained advertising, and
therefore, respondents were prohibited from distributing them on
public property. The City Manager determined that publications that
qualify as newspapers are those that are published daily and or
weekly and "primarily present coverage of, and commentary on,
current events." Respondents were granted administrative hearings
and review by the Sidewalk Appeals Committee. While the
Committee did not modify the city's position, it agreed to allow the
dispensing devices to remain in place pending a judicial
determination of the constitutionality of its prohibition. Respondents
then filed suit in district court. The district court found that the
prohibition of the distribution of these commercial handbills on
public property violated the First Amendment, and the court of
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appeals affirmed.
7. Decision: The ban on newsracks containing "commercial
handbills," which did not apply to newsracks containing
"newspapers" was not a "reasonable fit" between the city's legitimate
interest in safety and aesthetics and means chosen to serve that
interest; and its enforcement did not constitute a valid time, place,
and manner restriction of protected speech as it was not content-
neutral.
8. Opinion of the Court: A city "may regulate publication
dispensing devices pursuant to its substantial interest in promoting
safety and aesthetics on or about the public right of way," but the city
has the burden of establishing "a reasonable 'fit' between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends." In
this case, the Court concluded that the city did not meet the
reasonable fit that it required. First, the ordinance on which the city
relied was an outdated prohibition against the distribution of any
commercial handbills on public property. Its purpose was to prevent
the kind of visual blight caused by littering rather than any harm
associated with freestanding, permanent dispensing devices. The
benefit of the removal of approximately 62 newsracks, while 1,500-
2,000 remained in place, was considered "minute" by the district
court and "paltry" by the court of appeals. The Court shared their
evaluation of the "fit" between the city's goal and its method of
achieving it. The city argued that there was a close fit between its ban
on newsracks dispensing "commercial handbills" and its interest in
safety and esthetics because every decrease in the number of such
dispensing devices necessarily effects an increase in safety and an
improvement in the attractiveness of the cityscape. The Court found
this to be an insignificant justification for the discrimination against
respondents' use of newsracks that were no more harmful than the
permitted newsracks, and had only a minimal impact on the overall
number of newsracks on the city's sidewalks. The premise of the
city's argument was that commercial speech has only a low value,
and therefore the fact that more valuable publications were allowed to
use newsracks did not undermine its judgment that its esthetic and
safety interests were stronger than the interest in allowing
commercial speakers to have similar access to the reading public. The
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Court disagreed with this assessment, concluding that the city's
argument attached more importance to the distinction between
commercial and non-commercial speech than the Court's cases
warrant, and seriously underestimated the value of commercial
speech. Furthermore, the distinction bore no relationship to the
interests that the city had asserted. Therefore, it was an impermissible
means of responding to the city's legitimate interest. Finally, the
Court addressed the notion of the regulation as a time, place, and
manner restriction. The Court has held that government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of engaging in
protected speech provided that they are adequately justified 'without
reference to the content of the regulated speech."' Here, the city
contended that its regulation of newsracks qualified as such a
restriction because the interests in safety and esthetics that it serves
were entirely unrelated to the content of respondents' publications.
Therefore, the justification for the regulation was content-neutral.
The Court disagreed with this contention, stating that the basis for the
regulation was, in fact, the difference in content between ordinary
newspapers and commercial speech. The city had enacted a sweeping
ban on the use of newsracks that distributed "commercial handbills,"
but not "newspapers." Under this policy, whether any particular
newsrack fell within the ban was determined by the content of the
publication resting inside the newsrack. Therefore, the regulation was
content-based. Since the ban was predicated on the content of the
publication distributed by the subject newsracks, it was not a valid
time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432
(1985).
1. Type of Regulation: Zoning ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether requiring a special use permit for a
proposed group home for mentally retarded persons was rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: Facial and as applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent
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the special use permit requirement from applying to the proposed
home.
5. Constitutional Issue: Equal protection (Fourteenth
Amendment).
6. Facts: Plaintiff purchased a building in the city of Clebume,
Texas, with plans to lease it to the Cleburne Living Center, which
would operate the building as a group home for the mentally retarded.
The building was located in an area zoned as an apartment house
district, which included, among other uses: fraternity houses,
hospitals, sanitariums and nursing homes; however, the ordinance
specifically excluded uses for the care of the feeble minded. The city
classified the proposed home as a hospital for the feeble minded and
informed the center that a special use permit would be required. The
city based its requirement of a special use permit upon factors such as
the negative attitudes and fears of neighborhood residents, the
location of the proposed home across from a junior high school
whose students might harass the occupants, its location near a 500-
year floodplain, and the number of people who would occupy the
home. The application for the special use permit was subsequently
denied by the city council.
7. Decision: Special use permit requirement invalid as applied
to group home.
8. Opinion of the Court: The ordinance [was] invalid as applied
because it violate[d] the center's right to equal protection of the law.
Although the mentally retarded are not a suspect class, such as racial
or religious minorities, and thus the zoning ordinance [was] not
subject to the strict scrutiny standard, the ordinance [could not]
survive even the normal rational relationship test under equal
protection analysis. The record [did] not reveal any rational basis to
believe that the group home would pose a special threat to the city's
legitimate interests different from other uses permitted under the
zoning district; the special use permit requirement appear[ed] to rest
solely on an irrational prejudice against mentally retarded persons.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN V. BLAESSER Er AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 216-17 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
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City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S.
668 (1976).
1. Type of Regulation: Zoning change referendum.
2. Land Use Issue: Legality of a city charter provision that
requires zoning changes approved by the city council to be ratified in
a referendum by 55 percent of the voters.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaratory judgment to invalidate the
referendum as an unauthorized delegation of legislative authority.
5. Constitutional Issue: Due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: A developer's request for a zoning change was
approved by the plan commission and the city council, but was not
ratified by a favorable vote of the citizens at the referendum required
by the city charter. The developer then sought to have the charter
provision requiring the referendum declared unconstitutional. The
primary contention was that the provision constituted an unauthorized
delegation of legislative authority and that the provision had no
standards to guide the decisions of the voters. The Ohio Constitution
specifically reserves the referendum power to the people, and it has
been frequently exercised in matters of local government within the
history of the state.
7. Decision: Zoning referendum charter provision upheld as
constitutional.
8. Opinion of the Court: A referendum cannot be characterized
as a delegation of legislative power. The referendum power is, in fact,
reserved by the people to deal directly with matters that they might
otherwise assign to the legislature, and such direct legislation by the
people is subject to the same constitutional standards of substantive
due process as are regular legislative decisions. Since legislators are
not required to have standards to guide their decisions, the same is
true when the people exercise their reserved legislative power
through a referendum.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago EL 60603-
6107," BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 217 (Brian W. Blaesser
& Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
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City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
1. Type of Regulation: Municipal ordinance regulating display
of signs.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether an ordinance that bans all
residential signs except those that fall within one of ten exemptions
violated a resident's right to free speech.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunctive relief.
5. Constitutional Issue: Freedom of Speech (First Amendment).
6. Facts: Respondent placed a 24x36 inch sign in her front yard
protesting the conflict in the Persian Gulf. The sign disappeared soon
after, and a subsequent sign was knocked down. When respondent
reported these two incidents to the police, they informed her that the
city prohibited such signs. The city council denied her petition for a
variance. She filed suit, and the district court issued a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the ordinance. Respondent then
placed a smaller sign in her window. The city council responded to
the injunction by repealing the ordinance and enacting a new one.
This ordinance contained a general prohibition of signs, and
prohibited all signs except those falling within one of ten exemptions.
Respondent's sign did not meet one of the exemptions. She amended
her complaint to challenge the new ordinance. The district court held
that the ordinance was unconstitutional and the court of appeals
affirmed.
7. Decision: The ordinance violated respondent's free speech
rights.
8. Opinion of the Court: In determining whether the ordinance's
restrictions on free speech impermissibly prohibited too much
speech, the court assumed, arguendo, that the exemptions were valid.
A "time, place, and manner" restriction can still violate one's
freedom of speech if there are not adequate alternatives available.
Residential signs carry a distinct message, by providing information
as to the identity of the speaker. They are also a cheap and convenient
form for conveying one's ideas. Carrying hand-held signs or handing
out handbills does not garner the same effect. In this case, the Court
ruled that even if the city's ordinance was content-neutral and was
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narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, the
ordinance infringed on respondent's freedom of speech. The Court
was confident that more temperate measures could satisfy the city's
regulatory needs without injuring the First Amendment rights of its
citizens.
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S.
750 (1988).
1. Type of Regulation: Municipal permit ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Placement of newsracks on public property.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Judgment that the ordinance is
unconstitutional and injunction against its enforcement.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Whether the newspaper could bring a facial challenge
to the ordinance under the First Amendment without first
applying for, and being denied, a permit.
b. Whether the standards for granting or denying a permit
are sufficiently definite to avoid constituting a prior restraint
on freedom of expression.
c. Whether the ordinance violates the First Amendment
because it places financial requirements on the owners of
newsracks located on public property that are not placed on
the owners of other structures on public property.
6. Facts: Prior to 1983, the city of Lakewood, Ohio prohibited
the placement of any privately owned structure on public property.
After the Plain Dealer successfully challenged this prohibition in
federal court, the city adopted an ordinance that allowed newsracks to
be located on public property in commercial districts, while still
banning them in residential districts. The ordinance gave the mayor
the authority to approve or deny applications for annual newsrack
permits. If the mayor denied an application, he was required to "state
the reasons for such denial." If the mayor granted an application, the
city issued an annual permit subject to several terms and conditions,
including: approval of the newsrack's design by the city's
architectural review board; an agreement by the newsrack owner to
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indemnify the city against any liability arising from the newsrack,
guaranteed by a $100,000 insurance policy; and any "other terms and
conditions deemed necessary and reasonable by the mayor."
The Plain Dealer elected to challenge the ordinance rather than
seek a permit. The federal district court declared the ordinance
constitutional in its entirety. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed, finding that the ordinance was unconstitutional for
three reasons. First, it gave the mayor unbounded discretion to grant
or deny a permit application and to place unlimited additional terms
and conditions on any permit. Second, the architectural review board
had unbridled discretion to deny applications. Third, the indemnity
and insurance requirements violated the First Amendment because no
similar requirements were placed on owners of other structures on
public property. However, the court of appeals did decide that the
absolute ban on newsracks in residential districts was constitutional
and that this portion of the ordinance was severable from the portions
regulating placement of newsracks in commercial districts.
7. Decision: Portions of the ordinance invalidated as
constituting prior restraint on expression, in violation of First
Amendment.
8. Opinion of the Court: Where First Amendment guarantees
are involved, a licensing statute that allegedly gives a government
official unbridled discretion over whether to permit or deny any
expressive activity may be challenged facially by one who is subject
to the law, without the necessity of first applying for and being
denied a permit. This recognizes that such unbridled discretion can
constitute a prior restraint on expression and may result in
censorship. The prior restraint problem [was] particularly acute under
[the Lakewood] ordinance because it [was] directed specifically at
expressive conduct: the circulation of newspapers. Those portions of
the ordinance that [gave] the mayor unbridled discretion to deny a
permit application and unbridled authority to condition the permit on
any additional terms he deem[ed] necessary and reasonable [were]
unconstitutional. Since the ordinance contain[ed] no real constraints
on the mayor's discretion, his licensing decisions [could not] be
measured against any constitutionally sufficient standard to
determine the boundaries of that discretion, and thus the ordinance
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... render[ed] the First Amendment's guaranty against censorship
little more than a high-sounding ideal.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 219-20 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds.. 1989).
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
1. Type of Regulation: Pushcart vendor permit ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether an ordinance prohibiting pushcart
vending, but excepting vendors who had continuously operated in the
area for eight or more years, denied equal protection of the laws to all
pushcart vendors.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaration that the ordinance was invalid
and an injunction against its enforcement.
5. Constitutional Issue: Equal protection (Fourteenth
Amendment).
6. Facts: In order to preserve the charm and character of the
French Quarter, the city of New Orleans passed an ordinance
prohibiting pushcart vending in that area. However, the ordinance
made an exception for pushcart vendors who had continuously
operated eight years or longer in the French Quarter. This provision
permitted two vendors to maintain their operations. A pushcart
vendor who had been in business for two years was barred from
vending by the ordinance and brought suit to have the ordinance
declared invalid for failing to provide equal protection of the laws to
all pushcart vendors.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under Fourteenth Amendment
(equal protection).
8. Opinion of the Court: Regulating vendors is merely
regulating economic activity. When government regulates economic
activity, its enactments need only be rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose. Preserving the charm and character of the French
Quarter [was] a legitimate government purpose, and prohibiting street
vendors rationally further[ed] that purpose, since vendors tend[ed] to
disrupt the charm of a historic area. As for the exception for vendors
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who had worked in the area for eight years, the government [could]
rationally determine to eliminate vendors gradually and [could] even
rationally decide that vendors who had been in the French Quarter for
over eight years [had] become a part of the charm of the area.
Therefore, the regulation [did] not violate equal protection of the law.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTrrrION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN V. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 220-21 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986).
1. Type of Regulation: Zoning ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether an ordinance that has the effect of
concentrating all theaters in a 400-acre area in one comer of the city
serves a substantial governmental interest and is thereby
constitutional, and whether it is constitutionally permissible for one
city to rely on the experience and studies done in other cities to
support enacting an ordinance that regulates adult theaters.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
to prevent enforcement of ordinance.
5. Constitutional Issue: Freedom of speech (First Amendment).
6. Facts: Playtime Theatres, Inc. purchased two theaters in
down-town Renton, Washington, to exhibit adult films. At about the
same time, Playtime filed suit against the city of Renton on First
Amendment grounds to invalidate the city's ordinance that restricted
theaters that exhibit adult films to a 400-acre area on the edge of the
city.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under First Amendment.
8. Opinion of the Court: The ordinance serv[ed] a substantial
governmental interest in protecting the quality of urban life by
preventing the serious secondary effects of adult theaters on the
surrounding community. Renton could reasonably rely on the
experience and studies produced by other cities to find that it was
also likely to experience these secondary effects. The First
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Amendment does not require a city to conduct new studies or to
produce its own independent evidence before enacting such an
ordinance. Since this ordinance did not ban adult theaters altogether,
it was characterized as a content neutral, time, place, and manner
regulation. And, although the ordinance had the effect of
concentrating adult theaters in an area of about 400 acres in one
comer of the city, the ordinance was found to allow reasonable access
to adult theaters.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107" BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 221-22 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
County Board of Arlington County v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5
(1977).
1. Type of Regulation: Parking permit ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Reasonableness of a residential zoning
ordinance which denied parking permits to nonresidents of a
community in order to stem traffic flow from commercial and
industrial areas into residential neighborhoods.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunction to prevent enforcement of the
ordinance.
5. Constitutional Issue: Equal protection (Fourteenth
Amendment).
6. Facts: Arlington County, Virginia passed an ordinance
directing the county manager to designate those residential areas
which were crowded with nonresidential vehicles. The stated
purposes of the ordinance included minimizing social and
environmental concerns of the residents and encouraging reliance on
alternative means of transportation to the industrial and commercial
complex. The manager issued residents, persons doing business with
residents, and some guests weekday parking permits, while denying
permits to all others. Commuters working in the large commercial
and office complex next to the designated area sued to enjoin
enforcement of the ordinance on the grounds that the ordinance was
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facially unconstitutional.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under Fourteenth Amendment
(equal protection).
8. Opinion of the Court: Because the social and environmental
goals sought to be achieved by the ordinance [were] not prohibited
under the Constitution, the county [could] select any rational means
to meet them as long as the distinction made [was] not invidious. The
distinction made between residents and nonresidents [was] not
presumed to be invidious under the Constitution, and the means
selected rationally promote[d] the regulation's objectives.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 222-23 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
1. Type of Regulation: Land dedication requirements.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether an "essential nexus" existed
between a legitimate state interest and a land use permit condition. If
one did, then it had to be decided whether the degree of exactions
demanded by the permit conditions bore the required relationship, a
"rough proportionality," to the projected impact on the proposed
development.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaration that land dedication
requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of petitioner's
property under the Fifth Amendment.
5. Constitutional Issue: Takings Clause (Fifth Amendment).
6. Facts: Dolan applied to the City of Tigard to redevelop her
store, a plumbing and electric supply store. She planned to nearly
double the size of her store and add a parking lot, as well as build an
additional structure on the northeast side of the site. The City's
Planning Committee granted her permit application, subject to
conditions imposed by the City's Community Development Code.
The Commission required that petitioner convey a 15-foot strip of
land on her property to the City to be used as a bicycle pathway and
that she dedicate the portion of her property lying within the 100-year
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old floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage along the Fanno
Creek, which runs alongside her property. Petitioner then sought
variances from these standards. She argued that her proposed
development would not conflict with the policies of the
Commission's comprehensive plan to reduce traffic congestion and
flooding. The Commission denied her request. Petitioner then
appealed to the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), alleging that
the city dedication requirements were not related to her proposed
development, and therefore, the requirements constituted an
uncompensated taking of her property under the Fifth Amendment.
LUBA ruled in favor of the City, and both the Court of Appeals and
the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the pathway
condition and the storm drainage had an essential nexus to the
development of the proposed site.
7. Decision: The City's dedication requirements constituted an
uncompensated taking of petitioner's property.
8. Opinion of the Court: A land use regulation is not a taking if
it substantially advances legitimate state interests and does not deny a
property owner economically viable use of his land. Building on
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and several state supreme
court decisions, the Court here formulated a two-part test to
determine whether or not the pennit equaled an unconstitutional
taking of petitioner's property. First, there has to be an "essential
nexus" between the legitimate interest and the permit condition
exacted by the city. The Court found a nexus between preventing
flooding along the creek and limiting the creek's 100-year old
floodplain, as well as a nexus between reducing traffic congestion
and providing for an alternative means of transportation. The second
requirement imposed by the Court was that there must be a "rough
proportionality" between the required dedication and the impact on
the proposed development. According to the Court, the city did not
satisfy this requirement. With respect to the floodplain, the Court
concluded that the city never explained why a public, as opposed to a
private, greenway is necessary in the interest of flood control. As a
result, petitioner had lost her right to exclude others from her
property. In terms of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway, the city had
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the increased number
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of automobile and bicycle trips created by the petitioner's
development was reasonably related to the city's requirement for a
dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement. The Court
asserted that the city had to make an effort to quantify its findings in
support of the easement beyond the conclusory statement that it could
offset some of the traffic demand created. Therefore, the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Oregon was reversed and the case remanded.
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
1. Type of Regulation: Ordinance that prohibited showing films
containing nudity at a drive-in movie theater when its screen was
visible from a public street or place.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether an ordinance that prohibited
showing films containing nudity at a drive-in movie theater when its
screen could be seen from a public street or place was a legitimate
exercise of the municipality's police power and whether it infringed
upon appellant's First Amendment rights.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaratory judgment that ordinance was
invalid.
5. Constitutional Issue: Freedom of Speech (First Amendment).
6. Facts: Appellant, the manager of the University Drive-In
Theatre in Jacksonville, was charged with violating Section 330.313
of the municipal code for showing a movie, visible from the public
streets, in which "female buttocks and bare breasts were shown."
Appellant moved to stay his prosecution so the validity of the
ordinance could be tested in a separate declaratory action. The trial
court upheld the ordinance as a legitimate exercise of the
municipality's police power, and ruled that it did not violate
appellant's First Amendment rights. The District Court of Appeals
for the First District of Florida affirmed and the Florida Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
7. Decision: The ordinance was facially invalid as an
infringement of First Amendment rights.
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8. Opinion of the Court: A municipality or a state may protect
individual privacy interests "by enacting reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations applicable to all speech" regardless of content.
"But when the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively
to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that
they are more offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly
limits its power." In this case, the City of Jacksonville first tried to
argue that the ordinance was a means of preventing significant
intrusions of privacy. The ordinance's purpose was to keep these
films from being seen from the public streets and places where the
offended viewer can avert his or her eyes. The Court rejected this
argument, concluding that the limited privacy interests of persons on
the public streets cannot justify the censorship of otherwise protected
speech on the basis of its content. The Court also rejected the
argument that the ordinance was an exercise of the city's police
power to protect children, finding that the ordinance was overly
broad. It forbade the display of all films containing any uncovered
buttocks or breasts. Finally, the city sought to justify the ordinance as
a traffic regulation, but the Court found nothing in the record or in
the text of the ordinance that suggested that it was aimed as a traffic
regulation. In determining whether or not the ordinance was facially
invalid, the Court looked at both the possibility of a narrowing
construction of the ordinance and whether the deterrent effect of it
was both real and substantial. The Court concluded that, by its plain
terms, the ordinance was not easily susceptible to a narrowing
construction and that the deterrent effect was both real and
substantial. Therefore, the ordinance did not satisfy the rigorous
constitutional standards that apply when the government attempts to
regulate expression.
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
1. Type of Regulation: Municipal ordinance establishing a
building line.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether the ordinance and the state statute
under which it was enacted were valid exercises of police power.
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3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaration that the ordinance and the state
statute under which the ordinance was enacted infringed the
Constitution in that they deprived plaintiff in error of his property
without due process of law and denied him the equal protection of the
laws.
5. Constitutional Issue: Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
6. Facts: Plaintiff in error applied for and received a permit to
build a detached brick building to be used for a dwelling, according
to certain plans and specifications which had been approved by the
building inspector. Two-thirds of the property owners on the side of
the square where plaintiffs lot was situated petitioned for the
establishment of a building line. A resolution was passed establishing
a building line on the line of a majority of the houses then erected.
Plaintiff was notified that all portions of his house, including the
octagon bay window, had to be set back to conform to this line. The
building conformed to the line with the exception of the window,
which was three feet over the line. The Supreme Court of Virginia
sustained the statute, stating that it was reasonable and that the court
was justified in concluding that the statute was passed by the
legislature in good faith.
7. Decision: The ordinance was unconstitutional as an attempt
to deprive non-assenting owners of their property without due
process of law.
8. Opinion of the Court: The police power of a state extends not
only to regulations which promote the public health, morals, and
safety, but also to those which promote the public convenience or the
general prosperity. Yet, it has limits and must stop when it encounters
the prohibitions of the Constitution. When a statute is assailed as
offending against the higher guarantees of the Constitution, it must
clearly do so to justify the courts in declaring it invalid. The
ordinance here left no discretion in the committee on streets as to
whether the street line should or should not be established in a given
case. The statute and the ordinance, while conferring the power on
some property holders to virtually control and dispose of the property
rights of others, created no standard by which the power given was to
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be exercised; in other words, the property holders who had the
authority and desire to establish the line could do so for their own
interest. Taste or judgment may vary in localities, or even in the same
locality. The only discretion was in the location of the line. The Court
found it hard to understand how public comfort or convenience,
much less public health, can be promoted by a line which could be so
variously disposed. There was control of the property of plaintiff in
error by other owners of property. This, the Court said, was the vice
of the ordinance and made it an unreasonable exercise of police
power.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
1. Type of Regulation: Interim flood protection ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether a landowner who was denied all
reasonable use of its property by a public safety regulation [could]
recover compensation for the loss of use prior to the time that a court
determined that the ordinance constituted a regulatory taking.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Compensation for loss of land value
between the time the regulation went into effect and the time the
court determined that the ordinance was a regulatory taking.
5. Constitutional Issue: Taking without just compensation (Fifth
Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
6. Facts: First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned and
operated Lutherglen, a campground for handicapped children, located
in a canyon along the banks of the middle fork of Mill Creek in the
Angeles National Forest. The middle fork is the natural drainage
channel for a watershed area. In 1977, a forest fire denuded the hills
upstream of Lutherglen. Seven months later, in February 1978, a rain
storm caused Mill Creek to overflow, flooding Lutherglen and
destroying its buildings. In January 1979, Los Angeles County passed
an ordinance prohibiting construction in the interim flood protection
area for health and safety reasons. The church claimed that the
regulation denied it all reasonable use of its property and a month
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later sued the county in inverse condemnation. Interpreting California
caselaw as precluding a monetary remedy for a regulatory taking, the
California state court granted a motion to strike the plea for monetary
compensation.
7. Decision: Monetary compensation held proper remedy where
government regulation has prevented all reasonable use of private
property, regardless of whether such a regulatory taking was
permanent or temporary.
8. Opinion of the Court: [Editor's note: The U.S. Supreme
Court reviewed the remedy question only. The Court accepted as true
the claim in the church's pleadings that it had been denied all
reasonable use of its property and thus that a taking had occurred.]
Where government regulation works a taking of property, as in this
case, the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment is self-
executing and requires that compensation be paid to the property
owner for the period of time that the regulation denied all reasonable
use of the property. This holding [was] limited to the facts of the case
and [did] not address "the quite different questions that arise in the
case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in
zoning ordinances, variances and the like." The case [was] remanded
to the state court for a determination on the merits of the taking
claim. If the state court on remand [were to] determine[] that this
interim flood protection ordinance effected a regulatory taking, the
county [would be] free to amend the regulation, acquire the land by
eminent domain, or abandon its regulation altogether. However, if a
taking [were to be] found to have occurred, even if the county [then]
abandons the regulation, there [would have] been a temporary taking
of property rights between the time the regulation went into effect
and the time the regulation was declared to be a regulatory taking.
Consistent with this holding, the county would be liable for the value
of the use of the land during this temporary period. A temporary
taking of the landowner's property is not different in kind from a
permanent taking of the property; both clearly require compensation
under the self-executing, express terms of the Constitution.
9. Dissenting Opinion: There is a fundamental distinction
between physical invasions-which are easily identifiable without
making any economic analyses and may constitute a taking requiring
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compensation-and regulatory programs which affect property
values in many ways and amount to a taking only when they are
extreme. The majority fail[ed] to recognize that regulatory
restrictions on property have a significant temporal element and that
the duration of the challenged restriction is a critical factor in
determining whether a taking has occurred. Just because a landowner
can prove that a regulation would constitute a taking if left in effect
does not mean that he can prove that a temporary application of the
regulation also constitutes a taking.
"'Reprnted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107.' BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 223-25 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
1. Type of Regulation: Ordinance banning certain types of
picketing.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether a ban on picketing individual
residences violates the First Amendment.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaratory and injunctive relief finding the
ordinance unconstitutional and barring its enforcement.
5. Constitutional Issue: Whether the ordinance was facially
invalid under the First Amendment as a prior restraint on freedom of
speech.
6. Facts: In 1985, persons opposed to abortion began to picket
the residence of a doctor who perform[ed] abortions at clinics in
neighboring towns. Although the picketing was peaceful and orderly,
it generated substantial controversy and numerous complaints. In
response, the town board enacted a total ban on all picketing before
or about private residences. The ordinance stated that its primary
purpose was to protect and preserve the tranquility and privacy
persons enjoy in their own homes. The board believed a ban was
necessary because such residential picketing causes emotional
distress and is, in fact, intended to harass the occupants of the
residence being picketed.
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7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under First Amendment as not
constituting prior restraint on freedom of speech.
8. Opinion of the Court: The ban on picketing must be judged
against the stringent standards used for restrictions on speech in a
traditional public forum because public streets and sidewalks, even in
residential areas, have traditionally been used for public assembly
and debate. Viewing the ban as a content-neutral time, place, and
manner regulation, the Court's inquiry focused on whether the
ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest and whether it left open ample alternative channels of
communication.
Addressing the last question first, the ordinance may be
interpreted narrowly as prohibiting picketing only when it is focused
on and taking place in front of a particular residence. Under this
narrow construction, it becomes apparent that alternative channels of
communication are available, including marches in residential areas,
door-to-door visits to distribute literature and discuss the abortion
question, and mail or telephone contact.
The state's interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of the
home is significant, given the unique nature of one's home as a "last
citadel" for escape from the tribulations of life. The ordinance [was]
narrowly tailored to serve that privacy interest because it target[ed]
picketing only when it focus[ed] on, and thus trie[d] to disrupt the
privacy and enjoyment of, an individual residence.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 225-26 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
1. Type of Regulation: Comprehensive ordinance regulating
"sexually oriented businesses."
2. Land Use Issue: Whether the ordinance's licensing scheme
violated the First Amendment and whether this scheme was a prior
restraint that failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards as
required by Freedman v. Maryland.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
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4. Remedy Sought: Preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
as well as declaratory relief that the ordinance was invalid.
5. Constitutional Issues: Freedom of Speech and the Due
Process Clause (First and Fourteenth Amendments).
6. Facts: The City Council of the City of Dallas, in 1986,
adopted an ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses. It was
aimed at eradicating the secondary effects of crime and urban blight.
The ordinance regulated sexually oriented businesses through a
scheme incorporating zoning, licensing, and inspections. The city
asserted that it required every business to obtain a certificate of
occupancy when it moved into a new location or the use of the
structure changed. The ordinance further required sexually oriented
businesses to submit to inspections whether or not they had moved or
the use of their structure had changed. The ordinance required the
chief of police to approve the issuance of a license within 30 days
after the receipt of the permit application, but it conditioned the
issuance upon the approval of other municipal inspection agencies
without setting forth a time limit for when the inspection must occur.
The ordinance included a civil disability provision, which prohibited
individuals convicted of certain crimes from obtaining a license to
operate a sexually-oriented business for a specific period of time. It
also prohibited the issuance of a license to an applicant who had
resided with an individual whose license application had been denied
or revoked within the preceding 12 months. Finally, the ordinance
stipulated that motels that rented rooms for fewer than ten hours were
sexually-oriented businesses and were, therefore, regulated under the
ordinance.
Three separate suits were filed, challenging the ordinance on
several grounds. The litigants included individuals and businesses
involved in selling, exhibiting, and distributing publications, videos,
or motion picture films; adult cabarets or establishments providing
live nude dancing or films, motion pictures, video cassettes, slides, or
other photographic reproductions depicting sexual activities and
anatomy specified in the ordinance; and adult motel owners. The
district court upheld most of the ordinance, striking four subsections.
The court struck two subsections on the grounds that they vested
overbroad discretion in the chief of police. It also struck the provision
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imposing the civil disability merely on the basis of an indictment or
information, reasoning that there were less restrictive alternatives to
achieve the city's goals. Finally, the district court held that the five
enumerated crimes on the list of those creating civil disability were
unconstitutional because they were not sufficiently related to the
purpose of the ordinance. These included striking bribery,
kidnapping, robbery, organized criminal activity, and violations of
controlled substances Acts. In response to this decision, the city
amended the ordinance, The court of appeals affirmed the decision of
the district court.
7. Decision: Petitioners failed to show standing to challenge the
ordinance's provision which prohibited the licensing of an applicant
who had resided with an individual whose license had been denied or
revoked. They also did not have standing to challenge the civil
disability provisions. Petitioners could raise a facial challenge to the
licensing scheme. The ordinance failed to minimize the suppression
of speech in the event of a license denial. Therefore, the licensing
requirement was unconstitutional insofar as it is enforced against
those businesses engaged in First Amendment activity.
8. Opinion of the Court: A scheme that places unbridled
discretion in the hands of a government official or agency constitutes
a prior restraint and may result in censorship. The ordinance in this
case provided no means by which an applicant could ensure that the
business would be inspected within the 30 day time period within
which the license was supposed to be issued if approved. This
scheme allowed for an indefinite postponement of the issuance of the
license. The Court relied on three procedural safeguards set out in
Freedman v. Maryland. These safeguards are: any restraint prior to
judicial review can be imposed only for a specific, brief period during
which the status quo must be maintained; expeditious judicial review
of that decision must be available; and the censor must bear the
burden of going to court to suppress the speech and must bear the
burden once in court. The city's scheme did not provide for an
effective time limitation within which the licensor's decision had to
be made. The city also failed to provide an avenue for prompt judicial
review so as to minimize suppressing the speech in the event of a
license denial. Citing the difference between this case and Freedman,
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specifically that the regulation of speech in Freedman was
presumptively invalid while here the licensing scheme was not, the
Court determined that the city did not bear the burden of proof.
Finally, the Court addressed the motel owner petitioner's
challenge to two aspects of the ordinance's requirement that motels
that rent rooms for fewer than ten hours are sexually-oriented
businesses and, therefore, are regulated under the ordinance. In
regard to the Due Process claim, specifically that renting rooms for
fewer than ten hours resulted in an increase in crime and other
secondary effects, the Court agreed with the court of appeals to the
effect that it was reasonable to believe that shorter rental time periods
indicated that the motels fostered prostitution and that was the type of
activity that the ordinance sought to suppress. The second challenge,
that the ordinance violated the constitutional right "to be let alone"
was not pressed or passed upon in the lower courts, so the Court
declined to consider it.
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
I. Type of Regulation: Safety ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether a police power regulation may
effectively terminate the operation of a previously existing sand and
gravel mine for safety reasons.
3. Type of Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunction to prevent continued mining in
violation of the ordinance.
5. Constitutional Issue: Taking without just compensation
(Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: Goldblatt had conducted a sand and gravel mining
operation on a 38-acre tract of land since 1927. The excavations had
reached the water table and had filled with water to a depth of 25
feet, creating a 20-acre lake. Recent population growth had brought
2,200 homes and four public schools with 4,500 pupils within a
radius of 3,500 feet of the lake. After unsuccessful attempts to
guarantee public safety through zoning, fencing and berm
requirements, the town enacted an ordinance prohibiting any new
excavation below the water table and requiring the refilling of the
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existing excavations below the water table. The ordinance completely
prohibited the use of the property as a sand and gravel mine.
Goldblatt contended that the ordinance confiscated his property
without compensation, since the remaining acreage was used in
connection with the mine.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under the Fourteenth
Amendment as a reasonable exercise of the police power.
8. Opinion of the Court: There is no set formula to determine
where valid regulation ends and a regulatory taking begins. An
exercise of the police power which deprives an owner of its most
beneficial use does not render such an ordinance unconstitutional.
Although a comparison of values before and after is relevant, it is by
no means conclusive. Since such ordinances are presumed to be
constitutional and there [was] no evidence in the record as to
reduction in value or that indicated unreasonableness, the ordinance
[was] upheld.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ETAL., LAND USEAND THE CONSTITUTION 227 (Brian W. Blaesser
& Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
1. Type of Regulation: Ordinance establishing minimum
setbacks from street.
2. Land Use Issue: Constitutionality of setback ordinances or
similar provisions within a zoning ordinance.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Order to compel the issuance by the council
of a permit to allow Mr. Gorieb to build up to the street line.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Substantive due process (alleging vagueness and a
taking under the Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: Mr. Gorieb owned several lots in the residential
district of Roandke, Virginia. He applied to the city council for a
permit to erect a brick store building on one of the lots. The council,
in rendering its decision, took into account a 1924 ordinance which
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stated that the setback line for new buildings in the city had to be at
least as far back from the street as that occupied by 60 percent of
existing houses in the block. In accord with the ordinance, the council
gave him permission to erect a brick store 34-2/3 feet back from the
street line. Gorieb then sought an order in state court to compel the
council to issue a permit allowing him to build up to the street line,
stating that those owners who had been permitted to build closer to
the street were afforded greater protection of the laws than he was,
and that the portion of the lot not allowed to be built on was in effect
taken.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under the Fourteenth
Amendment as reasonable exercise of police power.
8. Opinion of the Court: Although the ordinance compel[led]
Mr. Gorieb to set his building back from the street line of his lot, it
serve[d] as a valid means of providing for the safety, comfort, and
welfare of populations in an urban community, and therefore did not
constitute a taking under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because it [would be] impossible to anticipate in
advance what setback [would be] appropriate in given blocks, the
reservation of authority by the council to fashion setbacks by looking
at existing patterns of development and to deal in a special manner
with exceptional cases [was] valid under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 227-28 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
1. Type of Regulation: Ordinance prohibiting industrial
brickmaking within city limits.
2. Land Use Issue: Reasonableness of the prohibition given the
unique character of plaintiff's land.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Judgment declaring the municipal ordinance
invalid.
5. Constitutional Issues:
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a. Substantive due process (taking of property without
just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: Hadacheck challenged the validity of a Los Angeles
ordinance which made it unlawful to operate a brickyard or brick kiln
within certain areas of the city. He contended that the ordinance
violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights because he had purchased
and developed the land, containing valuable deposits of clay material
suitable for brickmaking, for its only commercially feasible use-as a
brickyard. The evidence indicated that Hadacheck's land, which he
had purchased and developed before the ordinance was passed, was
worth about $800,000 as a brickyard and about $60,000 when used
for any other purpose. At the time of purchase, the property was
outside the city limits and at some distance from dwellings and other
developments. The brickyard was not a nuisance per se or in fact.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under the Fourteenth
Amendment as a reasonable exercise of the police power.
8. Opinion of the Court: A municipality may, under its police
power, prohibit particular land uses if such prohibition in good faith
promotes the health, safety, and general welfare of the public. This
police power was validly exercised in that the Los Angeles ordinance
promoted these goals, although the prohibition adversely effected the
value of Hadacheck's land. The fact that the city [chose] to deal with
this area first, leaving other areas for later treatment, [did] not violate
equal protection.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago EL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER FT AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 228-29 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
1. Type ofRegulation: Eminent domain.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether a land condemnation program that
transfers title to property from lessors to lessees to reduce the
concentration of land ownership in the state serves a proper public
purpose.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
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4. Remedy Sought: Declaratory and injunctive relief.
5. Constitutional Issue: Public use requirement in the exercise
of the power of eminent domain (Fifth Amendment as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: The Hawaii legislature enacted the Land Reform Act
(1967), creating a land condemnation scheme in which title to real
property [was] taken from lessors and transferred to lessees in order
to reduce the concentration of landownership. The legislature found
there was a need for this statute because concentrated landownership
in Hawaii, a vestige of an earlier feudal land tenure system, was
skewing the state's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices
and injuring the public welfare. Under this act, lessees living on
single-family residential lots within tracts of at least five acres [were]
entitled to ask the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) to condemn the
property on which they live[d]. Following a public hearing to
determine whether acquisition of the tract [would] "effectuate the
public purposes" of the act, HHA [was] authorized to designate some
or all of the lots for acquisition. HHA then acquires[d] title to the
lots, at prices set either by negotiation or by a judicial proceeding,
and [could] then sell the land title to the lessees.
After negotiations for purchase of title to Midkiff's land failed,
Midkiff refused to comply further with the procedures of the Act and
filed suit in federal district court, asking that the Act be found
unconstitutional and its enforcement enjoined. The district court
found certain of the Act's procedures unconstitutional, but upheld the
rest of the act as being in conformance with the public use clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the Act violated the public use
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
7. Decision: Act upheld as satisfying the public use requirement
of the Fifth Amendment in the exercise of eminent domain.
8. Opinion of the Court: The public use requirement of the Fifth
Amendment is co-terminous with the scope of a state's police power,
and thus is extremely broad, while the role of the courts in reviewing
a legislature's judgment on what constitutes a public use is extremely
narrow. The Court cannot substitute its judgment for a legislature's
judgment as to what constitutes a public use unless the use is
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"palpably without reasonable foundation." In this instance, a rational
basis for the condemnation scheme [could] be found in the state's
effort to attack the perceived social and economic evils of
concentrated property ownership in Hawaii.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTrIUION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER Er AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 229-30 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
1. Type ofRegulation: Not applicable.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether the federal government must
provide compensation to the private owner of a navigable marina,
made navigable by private means, in order to require the landowner
to allow the public access to the waters.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Not applicable.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunction to prohibit landowners from
denying public access to the marina the public and requiring notice to
the public of their navigation rights in the marina.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Navigational servitude (Article I Commerce Clause).
b. Taking without just compensation (Fifth Amendment).
6. Facts: Owners of a private pond in Hawaii, with the
permission of the Army Corps of Engineers, improved and dredged
their land to make a marina. The marina connected the pond to a bay.
The landowners denied the public access to the pond and marina and
charged a fee for its use. The United States sued the landowners to
determine whether the owners must obtain permission from the corps
prior to making any further improvements to the marina and to enjoin
the landowners from denying the public access to the marina.
7. Decision: Owners of private marina that had become a
navigable water of the United States through the owners'
improvements could not be required to open marina to public access
without payment of compensation.
8. Opinion of the Court: The fact that water may be navigable
and, therefore, subject to federal regulation does not mean that at the
time it becomes navigable, the owners of that land do not have a
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property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. Here, the owner
of a private pond improved the land in such a way as to make it
include navigable waters. The owner's investment in the land
includes a reasonable expectation to profit from the improvement
itself. The United States, by seeking to physically invade the land by
requiring water accessibility for the public, must pay for that
invasion.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 231-32 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, (1987).
1. Type of Regulation: Subsidence regulations.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether a state can prohibit mining that
causes subsidence damage to preexisting public buildings, dwellings,
and cemeteries.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunction against enforcement of the
statute.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Taking without just compensation (Fifth Amendment
as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Impairment of contract in violation of the express
Constitutional prohibition of state impairment of contract
(Article 1, Section 10).
6. Facts: Pennsylvania passed a statute prohibiting mining that
caused subsidence damage to preexisting public buildings, dwellings,
and cemeteries. Regulations under the statute required 50 percent of
the coal beneath such structures to be left in place to provide surface
support. An association of coal miners sought an injunction against
enforcement of the statute. The association claimed that the state was
effectively taking without compensation approximately 27 million
tons of coal and separately recognized "support estates" which the
companies owned. The association also claimed that the statute
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impaired contracts the mining companies had entered into with
surface landowners, waiving any damages that might be caused by
subsidence.
7. Decision: Statute upheld under the Fifth Amendment as
regulation enacted to prevent public harm and which did not deny
mining companies economically viable use of their properties.
8. Opinion of the Court: A state can regulate land use without it
being a taking of property that requires compensation if the
regulation furthers a legitimate state interest and does not deny the
owner an economically viable use of his land. This statute [advanced]
a legitimate state interest since the statute was not enacted for the
private benefit of the surface owners, but was enacted to prevent
harm to the public from nuisancelike activity, to enhance the value of
the lands for taxation, and to preserve water drainage and public
water supplies. Nor [did the] statute deny the mining companies an
economically viable use of their properties, since the 27 million tons
of coal that [had] to be left unmined constituted less than 2 percent of
the total coal and the mines could still be operated profitably.
Although the statute [impaired] contracts by not allowing the mining
companies to hold the surface owners to their waiver of damages,
under the prior interpretations of the Court the state [was] justified in
doing so in light of its strong public interest in preventing
environmental harm.
9. Dissenting Opinion: The regulations have completely
extinguished the coal companies' interests, in particular coal deposits
which, under state law, are identifiable and separate property
interests. Since, for all practical purposes, "the right to coal consists
in the right to mine it," the regulations ... destroyed the companies'
interests as effectively as an actual physical appropriation and
amount[ed] to a taking.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER Er AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 232-34 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Larldn v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
1. Type of Regulation: Licensing.
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2. Land Use Issue: Whether a Massachusetts statute which
grants
churches and schools the power to veto liquor license applications
for premises located within a 500-foot radius of the church or school
violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment or the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: Facial and as applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Invalidation of the statute.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Establishment clause (First Amendment).
b. Equal protection and substantive due process
(Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: Appellee's application for a liquor license was denied
because of the objection of an adjacent church acting pursuant to a
Massachusetts statute which enabled a church or school to object to a
liquor license application for a premises located within 500 feet of
the church or school.
7. Decision: Statute held invalid under the First Amendment as
violative of the establishment clause.
8. Opinion of the Court: The statute [was] not entitled to the
deference normally due legislative zoning because it entrust[ed] a
private, nongovernmental entity with power ordinarily vested in
governmental agencies. Arming churches with such a veto power
violate[d] the nonentanglement principle of the establishment clause.
Further, while the statute ha[d] a secular goal, its primary effect [was]
to advance religion, and it [could] be used for explicitly religious
goals.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 234 (Brian W. Blaesser
& Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982).
1. Type of Regulation: State statute that prohibited interference
with installation of cable television lines.
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2. Land Use Issue: Validity of statute requiring a landlord to
permit a cable television company to install its cable facilities upon
his property.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunction to prevent enforcement of statute
and damages for the physical invasion of the landlord's property.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Substantive due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Taking without just compensation (Fifth Amendment
as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: Jean Loretto purchased a five-story apartment building
in 1971. The previous owner had granted Teleprompter permission to
install a cable on the building. Teleprompter also installed two large
boxes along the roof cables. Two years after Loretto purchased the
building, Teleprompter connected a cable serving a tenant in her
building. The state statute limited the compensation paid to building
owners by cable companies for use of their property to a one time
payment of $1. Loretto did not discover the presence of the cable
until after the purchase. She then brought a class action suit, alleging
that the cable company's installation was a trespass, and that the
statute constituted a taking without just compensation.
7. Decision: Statute invalid under Fifth Amendment as
authorizing a taking of property without just compensation.
8. Opinion of the Court: A permanent physical occupation
authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public
interests that it may serve. Constitutional protection for the rights of
private property cannot be made to depend on the size of the area
permanently occupied. Any physical invasion of property, regardless
of the extent of the occupation, gives rise to a taking. Because the
installation of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws resulted in a
direct physical occupation, the regulation work[ed] a taking of
property.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BPiAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 234-35 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992).
1. Type of Regulation: Building regulation.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether South Carolina's Beachfront
Management Act's effect on the economic value of petitioner's lots
equaled a taking of private property, requiring the payment of just
compensation.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaration that the Beachfront
Management Act's construction ban effected a taking of petitioner's
property without just compensation and damages.
5. Constitutional Issue: Takings clause (Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
6. Facts: In 1988, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront
Management Act in an effort to protect its coastline from continued
erosion. The Act directed respondent, South Carolina Coastal
Council, to establish a "baseline" connecting the landward-most
points of erosion during the past 40 years. The council fixed this
baseline landward of petitioner's parcels. Under the Act, all
construction seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of the baseline
was prohibited. A 1977 Act had required owners of coastal zone land
that qualified as a "critical area" (beaches and immediately adjacent
sand dunes) to obtain a permit from the Council prior to committing
the land to a "use other than the use the critical area was devoted to."
When petitioner bought his parcels of land in 1986 no portion of the
lots qualified as a "critical area" and therefore the building of houses
on them was permitted. The passage of the Beachfront Management
Act had the effect of preventing petitioner from building single-
family residences. Petitioner filed suit, arguing that the Act's
construction ban was a taking of his property without just
compensation. The trial court agreed, but the South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed. The court ruled that this regulation was
designed to prevent serious public harm and therefore no
compensation was owed under the Takings Clause regardless of the
regulation's impact on property value.
7. Decision: Petitioner properly alleged an injury-in-fact with
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respect to the pre-amendment deprivation and the South Carolina
Supreme Court erred in applying the "harmful or noxious uses"
principle to decide this case. The question must turn, in accord with
this Court's "takings" jurisprudence, on citizens' historic
understandings regarding the content of, and the state's power over,
the "bundle of rights" that they acquire when they take title to
property. No compensation is owed if the state's affirmative decree
simply made explicit what already inhered in the title itself under the
restrictions that background principles of the state's law of property
and nuisance already placed upon land ownership.
8. Opinion of the Court: When a property owner has been
called upon to give up all economically beneficial use of his land for
the common good, he has suffered a taking. A state seeking to sustain
a regulation that deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial
use of his land can resist compensation only by showing that the
proscribed use of the owner's estate was not part of his title in the
first place. Anything the background principles of state law would
recognize as a private or public nuisance may be barred by regulation
without the need to compensate the landowner. In this case, the Court
emphasized that, for South Carolina to win its case, it had to identify
background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the
uses petitioner intended in the circumstances in which the land was
then found. The case was remanded to the South Carolina courts to
determine if South Carolina had, under the background principles of
the state's law of property and nuisance, the right to prevent the
desired use by petitioner.
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340
(1986).
1. Type ofRegulation: Subdivision regulation.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether a denial of subdivision approval
that is alleged to be a taking can be the basis of a claim for
compensation when the developer has not attempted to obtain
permission for other types of development.
3. Type of Challenge: As applied.
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4. Remedy Sought: Declaratory judgment and compensation for
inverse condemnation.
5. Constitutional Issue: Taking without just compensation (Fifth
Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
6. Facts: Approval of the tentative subdivision plat was rejected
for inadequate street access, no public sewer services, inadequate
police protection for the area and no provision of water service. The
property owner accused Yolo County and the City of Davis of
restricting the property to use for a "public, open space buffer" and
did not seek approval of any other use for the property permitted
under the zoning ordinances before instituting suit.
7. Decision: Case dismissed for lack of ripeness.
8. Opinion of the Court: The issue of compensation for a
regulatory taking [could not] be reached because it [was] impossible
to determine if there ha[d] been a taking at all since the developer,
after being denied approval for the subdivision, declined to present
other proposals for review by the zoning authorities. In order to make
a determination of fact on [a] taking question, there must be a final
and authoritative decision establishing what development is permitted
and what is prohibited; such a decision has not been made in this case
because the developer refused to submit any further proposals for
zoning approval. Therefore, the case was not ripe for consideration
on the merits.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 235-36 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
1. Type ofRegulation: Sign and billboard ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether San Diego's ordinance prohibiting
most types of signs could withstand a constitutional challenge in light
of the restrictions it placed on the petitioner's right to freedom of
expression under the First Amendment.
3. Type of Challenge: Facial.
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4. Remedy Sought: An injunction banning enforcement of the
ordinance.
5. Constitutional Issue:
a. Freedom of expression (First Amendment).
b. Substantive due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: In 1972, San Diego enacted a comprehensive zoning
scheme which prohibited a substantial number of signs and billboards
throughout the city. The ordinance created two categories of
exceptions to the general prohibition. First, it permitted certain onsite
advertising-those "signs designating the name of the owner or
occupant of the premises upon which such signs are placed or
identifying such premises; or signs advertising goods manufactured
or produced or services rendered on the premises upon which such
signs are placed." Second, the ordinance permitted all signs which
fell into 12 express exemptions, including, for example:
governmental regulations, historical plaques, religious symbols, for
sale/rent signs, and temporary political signs. The purpose of the
ordinance was to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists
brought about by distracting sign displays and to preserve and
improve the appearance of the city.
Outdoor advertising companies challenged the ordinance on its
face, alleging that it destroyed their outdoor advertising businesses.
They grounded their claim in the First Amendment's freedom of
expression. The trial court held the ordinance unconstitutional on two
grounds. First, San Diego had exceeded its police power, and second,
the ordinance was an abridgment of the companies' First Amendment
rights. The California Court of Appeal affirmed solely on the first
ground. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
ordinance was within the city's police power because the city's
interests in enacting the ordinance were legitimate.
7. Decision: Ordinance held invalid on its face under First
Amendment because it afforded more protection to commercial
speech than noncommercial speech.
8. Plurality Opinion of the Court: [Editors' note: A sharply
divided Court rendered five separate opinions, with Justice White
writing the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan (joined by Justice
Blackmun) writing a concurring opinion, and Justices Stevens and
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Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger each writing separate dissenting
opinions.]
The ordinance affects two type[s] of speech-commercial and
noncommercial speech. Commercial speech is protected by the First
Amendment if (1) it concerns lawful activity and (2) it is not false or
misleading. Government regulation of such protected commercial
speech is evaluated under a test enunciated in the Central Hudson
decision. Under that decision, regulation of commercial speech is
constitutional if it: (1) serves a substantial governmental interest; (2)
directly advances the interest; and (3) reaches no further than
necessary to accomplish the given objective. The city's safety and
aesthetic goals [were] substantially legitimate, and the ordinance
reache[d] no further than necessary because certain types of com-
mercial signs [were] permitted. Also, the ordinance directly
advance[d] this substantial governmental interest, which [was] based
on the accumulated common-sense judgments of local lawmakers.
The distinction between permissible on-site advertising and
prohibited off-site advertising [was] justifiable because the
municipality could reasonably conclude that there [was] a stronger
interest in identifying business locations and the products or services
available there, than in allowing off-site advertising.
However, the ordinance [was] unconstitutional in its treatment of
noncommercial speech because it provide[d] more protection for
commercial than noncommercial speech. The ordinance
unconstitutionally restrain[ed] the more highly protected speech by
allowing on-site commercial signs while prohibiting on-site
noncommercial signs. For example, a store could have a sign
advertising items for sale, but was barred from exhibiting a sign that
contained a political message. The ordinance [was] not a valid time,
place, and manner restriction because it unconstitutionally
suppresse[d] noncommercial speech, and it prohibit[ed] all off-site
advertising.
9. Concurring Opinion: The entire ordinance [was]
unconstitutional on its face because the practical effect of the
ordinance [was] a virtual total ban on all billboards.
10. Dissenting Opinions: Justice Stevens: The issue [was]
whether the entire billboard medium [could] be eliminated. This
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medium [could] be eliminated, and thus the ordinance [was]
constitutional because: (1) the legitimate city interests [were]
substantial; (2) the regulation [was] impartial and thereby does not
favor one viewpoint over another; and (3) there [were] other ample
modes or channels of advertising to the public.
Chief Justice Burger: The plurality's decision leaves the
municipality "between two unsatisfactory options: (a) allowing all
'noncommercial' signs, no matter how many, how dangerous, or how
damaging to the environment or (b) forbidding signs altogether." The
distinction between different types of speech [was] constitutional
because "[t]he means chosen to effectuate legitimate governmental
interests are not for the court to select." Therefore, a governmental
entity can ban a given medium so long as the legislature's approach is
content neutral-it does not favor one type of speech over another-
and does not suppress a protected form of expression by foreclosing
adequate channels of communication.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 237-39 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
1. Type of Regulation: An act authorizing the destruction of
infectious red cedar trees to prevent communication of plant diseases
to other valuable species.
2. Land Use Issue: Reasonableness of an uncompensated
destruction of one type of property to benefit another type of
property.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Compensation for the value of standing
cedar
trees and for the decrease in the market value of the realty caused
by their destruction.
5. Constitutional Issue: Substantive due process (taking without
just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: The Virginia Cedar Rust Act (1924) provided for the
destruction of cedar trees to prevent communication of plant disease
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to nearby apple orchards. In passing the act, the legislature
determined that the apple orchards were of significantly greater value
to the public than the cedar trees. Pursuant to the act, the defendant
state entomologist ordered Ms. Miller and some of her neighbors to
cut down a number of ornamental red cedar trees on their property.
Ms. Miller and her neighbors were allowed $100 to cover the
exp[e]nse of removal of the cedars, as well as the privilege of using
the trees (presumably for firewood) when felled. The statute did not
provide compensation for the value of the standing cedars, nor for the
decrease in the market value of the plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs
argued this was an unconstitutional taking of their property under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
7. Decision: Act upheld under Fourteenth Amendment as
reasonable exercise of the police power.
8. Opinion of the Court: Although the plaintiffs' property
values were diminished by the destruction of the cedars, where a
major agriculture interest (though private) was threatened, the statute
validly protect[ed] public health, safety, and general welfare. The
legislative balancing of competing interests and its preference of one
interest over another is at the heart of every exercise of police power.
If reasonable, as [it was] in this case, it will be sustained. Therefore,
the plaintiffs [were] not entitled to compensation for their loss.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 239-40 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, (1977).
1. Type of Regulation: Housing code.
2 Land Use Issue: Whether an ordinance limiting occupancy of
a dwelling unit to members of a single family, but recognizing as a
family only a few categories of related individuals, rationally
promoted any legitimate government purpose.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Reversal of conviction under ordinance and
a declaration that the ordinance was invalid.
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5. Constitutional Issue: Substantive due process (Fourteenth
Amendment).
6. Facts: Mrs. Moore lived with her son and two grandsons who
were cousins rather than brothers. An East Cleveland housing
ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a
single family. Because the ordinance defined family in a narrow way,
Mrs. Moore violated the ordinance by having grandsons living with
her who were not brothers. Mrs. Moore was convicted and sentenced
to five days in jail and a $25 fine. She sought to have the ordinance
declared invalid for failing to rationally further a legitimate
government purpose.
7. Decision: Ordinance invalid under Fourteenth Amendment as
violative of substantive due process.
8. Opinion of the Court: East Cleveland's stated purpose in
limiting occupancy to a single family [was] to prevent overcrowding,
traffic congestion, and a financial burden on the school system. While
this [was] a legitimate goal, the ordinance only marginally serve[d]
the goal. Large families which fit within the ordinance's definition of
family [could] live together, but smaller numbers of related
individuals who [did] not meet the definition of family [could not]
live together even if they cause[d] less overcrowding and traffic than
the large traditional families. The family receives special protection
under the Constitution, and the city's failure to show why only
allowing such a limited range of related people to live together
further[ed] its legitimate purposes render[ed] the ordinance invalid.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 241-42 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
1. Type ofRegulation: Prohibition on brewing of beer.
2. Land Use Issue: Reasonableness of state legislation
prohibiting the use of an existing brewery to manufacture beer to be
sold for other than medicinal purposes.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
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4. Remedy Sought: Compensation for the application of state
regulatory legislation to the plaintiffs brewery.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Substantive due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Privileges and immunities clause.
c. An implicit taking argument.
6. Facts: Peter Mugler erected and furnished a brewery in
Salina, Kansas, in 1877, which he operated for the manufacture of
malt liquor. On May 1, 1881, the Kansas legislature enacted a state
constitutional article, which stated that the manufacture and sale of
intoxicating liquors would be prohibited, except those sold for
medicinal, scientific, and mechanical purposes. Mr. Mugler's
property, worth $10,000 as a brewery, was worth no more than
$2,500 when used for any other purpose. Mr. Mugler continued to
manufacture and sell beer after legislation implementing the
constitutional provision was enacted and was indicted for offenses
against the statute. He then sued the state, claiming a violation of due
process, stating that the amendment violated the privileges and
immunities clause and that he had to be compensated for the
diminution in the value of his property.
7. Decision: State legislation upheld under Fourteenth
Amendment and privileges and immunities clause.
8. Opinion of the Court: Because the legislative prohibition on
the manufacture and sale of liquor for general public consumption
may be considered to be fairly adopted to the end of protecting the
public's health, welfare, and morals, such state legislation violated
neither the privileges and immunities clause nor the (substantive) due
process clause of the constitution; nor [did] it effectuate a taking of
property. The owner ha[d] full control of the property and [could] use
it for any lawful purpose. Therefore, the act [could] be enforced
against persons who, at the time, happen[ed] to own property whose
chief value consist[ed of] its fitness for manufacturing alcohol,
without compensating them for the diminution in the value of the
property resulting from the legislation. "If the public safety or the
public morals require the discontinuance of any manufacture or
traffic, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for
its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which individuals
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or corporations may suffer."
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 242-43 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
1. Type of Regulation: Zoning ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Reasonableness of residential zoning
classification applied to a portion of plaintiffs property when the
whole of the property is located in close proximity to land zoned for,
and actually being used for business, industrial, and railroad
purposes.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunction to prevent the application of the
zoning district restrictions to plaintiff's property.
5. Constitutional Issue: Substantive due process (taking without
just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: Saul Nectow owned a 140,000 square foot parcel of
land in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The [C]ity of Cambridge adopted
a zoning ordinance dividing the city into three districts: residential,
business, and unrestricted. Prior to the passage of the ordinance, Mr.
Nectow had entered into a contract for the sale of most of the parcel.
The ordinance placed most of his parcel in the unrestricted zone,
while classifying a 100-foot strip on the west side of his property in
the restricted residential district. The property to the south of the strip
was devoted to industrial use. Immediately to the east were railroad
tracks. Because of the new zoning restrictions, the contract purchaser
refused to complete the transaction. Mr. Nectow then sued the city,
challenging the reasonableness of the zoning classification as applied
to his property.
7. Decision: Ordinance invalid under Fourteenth Amendment as
applied.
8. Opinion of the Court: The facts in this case prove[d] that no
practical use [could] be made of the property in question for
residential purposes because of its proximity to land zoned for
industrial and railroad uses. Judges should not lightly set aside the
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determinations of zoning officials. Here, however, the zoning
classification ha[d] no foundation in reason and [was] a mere
arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation
to the public welfare. Therefore, the necessary basis for an exercise of
the zoning power [was] lacking. A zoning classification, or any other
action of a zoning authority, will be found to violate the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it does not bear a substantial
relation to the public health, safety, and welfare.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER El AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 243-44 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825,
(1987).
1. Type of Regulation: Beach access condition on approval of
building permit.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether the grant of a building permit can
be conditioned on the owner's granting an easement to the public
without receiving compensation.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Invalidation of the requirement that the
receipt of a building permit is conditioned on granting an easement to
the public.
5. Constitutional Issue:
a. Taking without just compensation (Fifth Amendment
as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Substantive due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: The Nollans leased a bungalow on a beachfront lot in
Ventura, California, with an option to purchase conditioned on their
promise to demolish the bungalow and replace it. Public beaches
[were] located, respectively, a quarter of a mile north and 1,800 feet
south of the lot. The beach portion of the property [was] separated
from the rest of the lot by a concrete seawall approximately eight feet
high. The historic mean high tide line determine[d] the lot's
oceanside boundary. The Nollans submitted a permit application to
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the California Coastal Commission to demolish the existing structure
and to replace it with a three-bedroom house. The commission
approved the permit conditioned on the Nollans granting an easement
across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line
on one side, and their seawall on the other side, to make it easier for
the public to get to the public beaches located north and south of the
Nollans' property.
The Nollans filed an action in the California Superior Court to
invalidate the access condition and the court remanded the case to the
Coastal Commission for a public hearing. At the hearing the
commission reaffirmed its imposition of the condition, finding that
the new house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean, thus
adding to "a 'wall' of residential structures" that would prevent the
public "psychologically... from realizing a stretch of coastline exists
nearby that they have every right to visit; that the new home would
increase private use of the shorefront; that these effects of the new
house when constructed would cumulatively 'burden the public's
ability to traverse to and along the shorefront."'
The Nollans again sought administrative review in the California
Superior Court, which concluded that the administrative record did
not adequately support the commission's conclusion that the
replacement of the bungalow would create a direct or cumulative
burden on public access to the sea. The court ordered the permit
condition be struck. The commission appealed, and while the appeal
was pending, the Nollans, without notifying the commission, tore
down the bungalow, built the new house, and bought the property.
The California Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court, holding
that the permit condition was sufficiently related to the burdens
created by the new house and did not constitute a taking because it
did not deprive the Nollans of all reasonable use of their property.
The Nollans appealed the taking question to the U.S. Supreme Court.
7. Decision: Public access condition on permit approval
invalidated under the Fifth Amendment as a taking without just
compensation.
8. Opinion of the Court: The right to exclude others is one of
the essential sticks in the bundle of rights commonly characterized as
property. Where government action results in a permanent physical
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occupation, the Court's prior decisions have found a taking to the
extent of the occupation, regardless of whether the action achieves an
important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
owner. Where, as here, the commission required that, as a condition
of permit approval, the landowners grant an easement [giving] the
public a permanent and continuous right to pass across their property,
a permanent physical occupation has occurred. Had the commission
simply required the conveyance of an easement for public access to
the beach outright, without making the requirement a condition of
permit approval, the result would have been a taking of a property
interest.
The outcome is no different when the conveyance of the easement
is made a condition of permit approval. Contrary to the dissenting
opinion, the requirement of such an access easement [was] not a mere
restriction on the use of the property. The Court has previously
recognized that "a use restriction may constitute a taking if not
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government
purpose." The standards applied to a takings claim are not the same
as those applied to due process or equal protection claims. In
assessing the latter claims, the Court has required that "the State
could rationally have decided the measure adopted might achieve the
State's objective." In assessing a taking claim, the Court requires that
the regulation "substantially advance" the "legitimate state interest"
sought to be achieved. Even though prior cases have not elaborated
on the standards for determining what constitutes a "legitimate state
interest" or what type of connection (nexus) between the regulation
and the state interest satisfies the requirement that the regulation
"substantially advance" the legitimate state interest, they have
indicated that a broad range of governmental purposes and
regulations satisfies these requirements.
Even assuming that the state has legitimate interests in the
public's being able to see the beach so as to avoid psychological
barriers to its access and in preventing congestion on the beaches, this
easement [did] not substantially advance those interests. Being able
to walk across the Nollan's property would not reduce the obstacle to
seeing the beach created by the new house. Nor would being able to
walk across the property lower psychological barriers to use of the
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public beaches or remedy congestion caused by the Nollans' activity.
Since the condition [did] not remedy the problems caused by the new
house, it fail[ed] to substantially advance a legitimate state interest
and thus the condition was a regulatory taking, requiring the payment
of just compensation.
9. Dissenting Opinion: The majority's demand for a precise fit
between development restrictions and the public program to be
advanced by those restrictions creates an overly narrow conception of
rationality for governmental exactions. Such a narrow conception of
rationality is an unwarranted judicial usurpation of legislative
authority.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN V. BLAESSER Er AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 24446 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978).
1. Type ofRegulation: Historic landmarks zoning regulation.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether the application of a landmark
preservation law to property located in a valuable development area
constitutes a taking of that property when the regulation prevents
development of the property in the most lucrative manner possible
and imposes an affirmative duty on the owner to keep the property in
good repair.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent
application of the law to owner's land, and damages for the
temporary taking that occurred between imposition of the regulation
to the land and [the] time when such application would be lifted.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Substantive due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Taking without just compensation (Fifth Amendment
as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: The [C]ity of New York passed the Landmark
Preservation Law as part of a comprehensive measure to preserve
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existing historic buildings. The law places an affirmative duty on
owners of those buildings designated landmarks under the law to
keep the buildings in good repair. The owners of Grand Central
Terminal in Manhattan sought to build a multistory office building
over the terminal. The building plan was denied by the Landmark
Preservation Commission on [the] grounds that such a building
would destroy the historic and aesthetic features of the building. The
terminal's owners sued the city, alleging that the law, as applied to
their property, constituted an unconstitutional taking without just
compensation and deprived them of their property without due
process of law.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld as not violative of Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
8. Opinion of the Court: Although the landmarks law
effectively prevent[ed] the owners from exploiting the valuable air
rights above the terminal, the right to develop land [was] only one
property right held by the owners. The character of the regulation
[was] not a singling out of certain property owners for restrictive
treatment, but rather [was] part of a comprehensive plan which
affect[ed] others in positions similar to that of the terminal's owners.
Other owners of buildings designated as landmarks [were] similarly
burdened and benefited by the ordinance and, therefore, the law [was]
not discriminatory, nor [was] it arbitrarily applied to the terminal.
Finally, the owners of the property [were] not restricted from
carrying on their already prosperous business in the terminal, but
instead [could] receive a reasonable economic return from their
investment.
9. Dissenting Opinion: The regulation applied to the terminal
uniquely burden[ed] the owners because they receive[d] no
reciprocity of advantage from similarly situated owners in their
vicinity. Land use regulation[s] may be used to prevent a harm, not
confer a benefit as the landmark law [did]. Therefore, New York City
should [have to] pay the terminal's owners compensation for the
restrictions place[d] on their right to exploit the air space overhead.
The ability of the owners to transfer their development rights [did]
not afford them just compensation because the relief [was] not a
perfect equivalent of the property taken: other land does not have the
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same attributes as the Terminal.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN V. BLAESSER ET AL, LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 247-49 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
1. Type ofRegulation: Rent control.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether a provision in a rent control
ordinance that [permits] a hearing officer [to] consider the hardship
of the tenant in fixing a reasonable rent renders the ordinance facially
invalid.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaration that the provision of the rent
control ordinance allowing the hearing officer to consider the
hardship of the tenant was facially invalid.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment).
c. Taking without just compensation (Fifth Amendment
as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: The [C]ity of San Jose passed a rent control ordinance
that allowed a landlord to raise the rent of a tenant in possession by as
much as 8 percent. If the landlord wished to raise the rent by more
than 8 percent in a given year and the tenant objected, a hearing
officer would determine whether the increase was reasonable. The
ordinance set forth six objective factors for determining
reasonableness, such as the landlord's actual costs and the condition
of the rental market. The hardship which would be caused to the
tenant was the only subjective factor. A landlord association sought
to have the tenant hardship provision declared invalid insofar as it
forced landlords to subsidize apartments below objectively
reasonable rates.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under Fourteenth Amendment as
not violative of substantive due process and equal protection.
8. Opinion of the Court: Because the ordinance ha[d] not ...
been used to reduce rent on the basis of tenant hardship, and the
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ordinance only required that hardship be considered, not that it be
determinative, the taking claim [was] premature.
With respect to the due process and equal protection challenges,
price control is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or
irrelevant to a legitimate government purpose. Under the deferential
due process standard for reviewing economic regulation, rent control
may reasonably be said to promote the government purpose of
"protecting consumer welfare." Furthermore, it is not irrational to
treat landlords differently based on whether they have hardship
tenants, since this ensures that only legitimate hardship cases are
redressed. Since the classification neither implicate[d] a suspect
classification[,] like race[,] nor a fundamental right, the [C]ourt must
defer to the legislature on the reasonableness of the distinctions made
in the legislation.
9. Dissenting Opinion: The ordinance [was] facially a taking
because the subjective hardship factor placed a burden on an
individual landlord, which should [have been] borne by the public
generally through the tax system. The key to avoiding a taking
challenge is to show a "cause-and-effect relationship between the
property use restricted by the regulation and the social evil that the
regulation seeks to remedy."
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 249-50 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
1. Type of Regulation: Statute limiting the exercise of mineral
rights.
2. Land Use Issue: Validity of Pennsylvania's Kohler Act,
which prohibited coal mining in such a way as to cause the
subsidence of houses, industrial structures, streets, or public facilities.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaration of invalidity of the Kohler Act
so that the Pennsylvania Coal Company could exercise its mining
rights without the constraints imposed.
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5. Constitutional Issue: Substantive due process (taking without
just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: In 1878 the Pennsylvania Coal Company transferred
property to Mr. Mahon, reserving in the deed the right to mine coal
on the property. Mr. Mahon waived all of his rights to object to or be
paid for any possible resulting damages. In 1921, the Pennsylvania
legislature passed the Kohler Act, which forbade the mining of coal
in such a way as to cause the subsidence of any human habitation,
industrial structures, streets, and public facilities. When the
Pennsylvania Coal Company decided to mine coal under his property,
Mahon sought an injunction under the Kohler Act to prevent mining
that would cause the subsidence of his home. The Pennsylvania Coal
Company argued that the Kohler Act's requirement (that pillars of
coal be left in place to provide support) violated the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution in that it took their property
(unmined coal) from them without due process of law.
7. Decision: Act held invalid under Fourteenth Amendment as
authorizing taking of property without due process.
8. Opinion of the Court: Although the value of private property
may be diminished by valid governmental regulations, a regulation
may be so extensive as to constitute a regulatory taking. The public
interest (promotion of health, safety, and welfare) in protecting
surface rights does not justify the significant destruction of mineral
rights which the Pennsylvania Coal Company had reserved in the
deed to Mr. Mahon. The act ... also [was] violative of preexisting
contract rights between the coal company and Mahon.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 250-51 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
1. Type of Regulation: Not applicable.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether California state constitutional
provisions permitting individuals to exercise free speech rights on
private property on which the public is invited violate[d] the property
owner's right to exclude others from his property under the Fifth and
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Fourteenth Amendments or his free speech rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunctive relief to prevent owner of
property from denying individuals access to his property for the
purpose of exercising their free speech rights.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Free speech (First and Fourteenth Amendments).
b. Taking without just compensation (Fifth Amendment
as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: High school students entered the Pruneyard shopping
center and set up a booth to solicit support for their opposition to a
UN resolution. The students' activities included handing out
literature and soliciting signatures of visitors to the shopping center.
The students were asked to leave the premises because they were in
violation of a Pruneyard policy that prohibited solicitation activities
on its premises. Subsequently, the students filed suit, seeking to
enjoin Pruneyard from denying them access to the shopping center
for solicitation purposes.
7. Decision: Solicitation in a private shopping center held not
violative of property owner's Fifth, Fourteenth, and First Amendment
rights under the California state constitution.
8. Opinion of the Court: Pursuant to its police power, a state has
the power to adopt guarantees of individual liberties more expansive
than those permitted under the federal [C]onstitution. California has
interpreted its constitution to permit citizens to exercise free petition
and expression rights in a private shopping center open to the public.
Although this interpretation of the California constitution essentially
destroy[ed] Pruneyard's right to exclude persons from its property,
the destruction of that right [did] not unreasonably impair the value
or use of Pruneyard's land as a shopping center. Therefore, there
[was] no taking of Pruneyard's property; Pruneyard [could] still
regulate the time, place, and manner of such exercises of rights to
minimize their interference with its commercial functions. Fur-
thermore, Pruneyard [did] not adequately showl that the demands
made by the California constitution-permitting access to citizens for
solicitation purposes-[were] unreasonable.
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Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
1. Type ofRegulation: Ordinance regulating livery stables.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether it was within the police power of
the State to regulate the business of a livery stable that was already
established within a district.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunctive Relief.
5. Constitutional Issue: Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: The ordinance passed by the city made it unlawful to
conduct or carry on the business of livery stables within certain areas
of the city. It stated that the conducting of a livery stable was
detrimental to the prosperity, health, and interest of the city. Plaintiffs
in error included a firm that ran a sale and livery stable business, and
a corporation that conducted a general livery stable business within
the area defined in the ordinance. The plaintiffs argued that the
businesses had been conducted for many years in brick buildings in a
careful and proper manner without complaint with regard to sanitary
conditions. The plaintiffs had entered into leases for improvements
and the money for this would be lost if they were not permitted to
continue doing business there. There had been encouragement in the
city for this type of business, and plaintiffs relied on this
encouragement in constructing the buildings. Plaintiffs had tried to
obtain another location, but could not do so without great expense.
Defendants demurred, but the trial court overruled the demurrer and
granted a temporary restraining order. Defendant answered and
plaintiffs excepted and demurred. The trial court sustained the
demurrer and made the temporary restraining order perpetual. The
Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed and remanded the case with
directions to dismiss the complaint for want of equity.
7. Decision: The ordinance of the City of Little Rock was not
unconstitutional as depriving an owner of a livery stable established
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within that district of his property without due process of law or as
denying him equal protection of the law.
8. Opinion of the Court: The Court found that it was clearly
within the police power of the state to regulate the livery stables and
to declare that in certain areas and certain circumstances a livery
stable shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law, provided this
power was not exercised arbitrarily, or with unjust discrimination, so
as to infringe upon the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was well within the range of power of the state to
legislate for the health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens.
San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
U.S. 621 (1981).
1. Type of Regulation: Downzoning; open space zoning.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether the U.S. Supreme Court can
determine that a taking has occurred before the petitioner obtains a
final judgment in the state courts, and whether monetary damages are
available for inverse condemnation.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Damages for taking of private property
without just compensation and injunctive and declaratory relief.
5. Issues:
a. Taking without just compensation (Fifth Amendment
as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Substantive due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
c. Ripeness.
6. Facts: In 1966, San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) acquired
412 acres in northwest San Diego with the intent of constructing a
nuclear power plant in the 1980s. In 1967, the [C]ity of San Diego
adopted its master plan under which the parcel was zoned industrial.
In 1973, part of this property was downzoned to agricultural use with
a minimum lot size of one to ten acres. At the same time, pursuant to
a state mandate, the city established an open space plan which
included SDG&E's parcel. Subsequently, the voters rejected a bond
proposition that would have provided funds to purchase the SDG&E
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parcel, and the city made no further attempt to acquire the property,
leaving SDG&E's parcel in an open space zone with little or no
potential use.
Rather than attempting to seek approval for any kind of
development plan, SDG&E filed suit in superior court alleging that
the zoning scheme deprived it of its entire beneficial and economic
use, thereby violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by
taking the property without just compensation. SDG&E asserted that
the parcel's only beneficial use was as an industrial park, which was
prohibited by the zoning scheme. SDG&E sought damages,
mandamus, and declaratory relief as a result of the alleged taking.
The superior court found that a taking had occurred as a result of
the zoning scheme because SDG&E was deprived of all beneficial
and economic viable uses. Further, the submission of any
development plan would [have been] futile because of the open space
zone. The court of appeal[s] affirmed, holding that SDG&E's failure
to seek approval of a development plan did not preclude an award of
damages. On appeal, the California Supreme Court vacated the
damage award when the city's petition for a hearing was granted,
then transferred the case back to the court of appeals for
reconsideration in light of its decision in Agins v. Tiburon, 598 P.2d
25 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), which held that a plaintiff's
only remedy for inverse condemnation is invalidation of the
regulation.
On reconsideration, the court of appeal reversed, although it did
not invalidate the regulation. Rather, the court avoided the takings
issue, because factual disputes precluded monetary relief on the
existing record. It stated further that plaintiff's exclusive remedy was
mandamus and declaratory relief. The California Supreme Court
denied review, and SDG&E's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was
granted.
7. Decision: Appeal dismissed for lack of ripeness.
8. Opinion of the Court: The appeal [was] dismissed because
the California courts had not rendered a final judgment. The
judgment of the California Supreme Court to vacate SDG&E's
damages award was not final, because it did not address the taking
issue; rather, it dealt only with mandamus and declaratory relief.
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Thus, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because there was no
final judgment or decree rendered by the highest court of the state in
which a decision could be rendered.
9. Dissenting Opinion: Since the taking issue was addressed in
the superior court, the judgment was final and therefore ripe for
consideration on the merits, even though it was reconsidered after
Agins and was then reversed on the issue of proper remedy. Inverse
condemnation is equivalent to eminent domain because "[p]olice
power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-use
restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to
promote the public good just as effectively as formal condemnation
or physical invasion of property."
There is nothing within the just compensation clause of the Fifth
Amendment that prohibits the granting of temporary damages. Once
private property has been taken for public use, whether by eminent
domain or inverse condemnation, just compensation is required for
the period commencing on the date the regulation first affected the
property and ending on the date the government entity chooses to
rescind or otherwise amend the regulation. Invalidation of the
offending regulation is not the appropriate remedy for two reasons.
First, invalidation does not compensate the aggrieved party for
injuries sustained as a result of the taking. Second, invalidation
merely tells legislators to enact a new regulation without the fear of
having to pay damages for taking the property by inverse
condemnation. Thus, the imposition of temporary damages puts
legislators on notice to be much more cautious when implementing
land use regulations in order to prevent infringing the rights of the
landowner.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 254-55 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
1. Type of Regulation: Commercial use zoning.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether a commercial zoning ordinance
construed to prohibit all live entertainment, including nonobscene
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nude dancing, violated the rights of free expression guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Reversal of criminal conviction resulting
from conduct held violative of the Borough Ordinance.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Right of free expression (First Amendment).
b. Substantive due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: Appellants operated an adult bookstore in a
commercial zone which sold adult books, magazines, and films.
Subsequently, a permit was obtained permitting the installation of
coin-operated adult film viewing booths. Thereafter, the store
introduced a coin-operated device which enabled a customer to view
a live, usually nude, dancer perform behind a glass panel. Appellant's
conduct was found violative of a use ordinance which, while not
explicitly prohibiting live nude dancing, excluded all uses not
expressly pernitted by the ordinance. Appellants claimed the
ordinance, as applied, violated their rights of free expression
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
7. Decision: Ordinance held invalid under First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
8. Opinion of the Court: The ordinance, as applied, effectively
ban[ned] all live entertainment, thus prohibiting a wide range of
expression long held within the protections of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Where protected First Amendment interests
are at stake, zoning regulations do not receive minimal scrutiny under
the rational relationship test, but can be upheld only if shown to be
narrowly drawn and in furtherance of a sufficiently substantial
government interest. The town failed to satisfy these tests. The
argument that the ordinance was reasonable because nude dancing
was permitted in nearby communities [was] without validity because
freedom of expression cannot be limited merely because it may be
available in another nearby community. Young v. American Mini-
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) [was] not controlling as that case
upheld an ordinance which merely dispersed communicative activity,
whereas the Mount Ephraim ordinance ... resulted in a total ban of
all live entertainment.
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"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITLION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER Er AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 256-57 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
1. Type of Regulation: Ordinance governing the erection and
maintenance of billboards.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether the ordinance, if enforced, would
work "a denial to the plaintiff in error of the equal protection of the
laws" or would "deprive it of its property without due process of
law."
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaration that the ordinance offends the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.
5. Constitutional Issue: Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
(Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
6. Facts: Plaintiff in error, a corporation engaged in outdoor
advertising, argued that a section of a city ordinance was an arbitrary,
unrestrained exercise of power which could be used without regard
"to the safety, morals, health, comfort, or welfare of the public." The
city ordinance section required that, before any billboard or signboard
over 12 square feet in area could be erected in any block in which
one-half of the buildings were used exclusively for residential
purposes, the owners of a majority of the frontage of the property on
both sides of the street on such a block consent to the signboard in
writing. Plaintiff in error claimed that this was not an exercise by the
city of the power to regulate or control the construction and
maintenance of billboards, but rather was a delegation of legislative
power to the owners of a majority of the frontage of the property in
the block "to subject the use to be made of their property by the
minority owners of property in such a block to the whims and
caprices of their neighbors." The Supreme Court of Illinois sustained
the validity of the ordinance, declaring that the act of the legislature
was a clear legislative declaration that the subject of billboard
advertising shall be subject to municipal control.
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7. Decision: The ordinance was valid and the record did not show
it to be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary.
8. Opinion of the Court: The Court found that there was sufficient
evidence to show the propriety of putting billboards, as distinguished
from buildings and fences, in a class by themselves, and to justify the
prohibition against their erection in residence districts of a city in the
interest of the safety, health, morality, and decency of the
community. In determining the question of reasonableness, the lower
courts found that fires had been started in the accumulation of
combustible material which had gathered around the billboards; that
they afford a convenient concealment and shield for immoral
practices, and for loiterers and criminals; and that offensive and
unsanitary accumulations were habitually found about them. The
Court further stated that while it had refrained from any attempt to
define with precision the limits of the police power, its disposition
was to favor the validity of laws relating to matters completely within
the territory of the state enacting them; and it would interfere only
when it was clear that the restriction had no real or substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or to the general welfare.
In this case, the Court concluded that this could not be said of this
city ordinance. The plaintiff in error also contended that the validity
of the city ordinance was impaired by the provision that such
billboards could be erected in such districts as were described if the
consent in writing was obtained from the owners of a majority of the
frontage on both sides of the street in any block in which such
billboard was to be erected. The Court disagreed, stating that the
plaintiff could not be injured, but rather could benefit by this
provision and therefore could not be said to have been deprived of his
constitutional rights. Finally, the Court distinguished this case from
Eubank v. City of Richmond, the case upon which plaintiff in error
chiefly relied. In Eubank, the ordinance left the establishment of the
building line in place until the other lot owners objected, and then
made the street committee the mere automatic register of that action,
giving it the effect of law. Here, the ordinance prohibited the erection
of billboards in the blocks designated, but allowed this prohibition to
be modified with the consent of those who were to be most affected
by the modification. The ordinance in Eubank allowed two-thirds of
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the property owners to impose restrictions on the other property on
the block, while here the ordinance permitted one-half of the lot
owners to remove a restriction from the other property owners.
Therefore, the Court found that this was not a delegation of
legislative power, but rather it was a familiar provision effectuating
the enforcement of laws and ordinance.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
1. Type of Regulation: Denial of rezoning.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether proof of a racially discriminatory
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunctive and declaratory relief.
5. Constitutional Issue: Equal protection (Fourteenth
Amendment).
6. Facts: Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
(MHDC) applied to the village for a rezoning of a 15-acre parcel
from single-family to multifamily residential, to permit construction
of 190 federally subsidized housing units for low- and moderate-
income tenants. After the village denied the rezoning request, MIIHDC
and other plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court, alleging that
the denial was racially discriminatory and violated both the
Fourteenth Amendment and the federal Fair Housing Act. The district
court ruled for the village, but the court of appeals reversed, finding
that the ultimate effect of the denial was racially discriminatory and
thus in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause.
7. Decision: Petitioners failed to prove racially discriminatory
intent or purpose as required in challenging denial of rezoning as
racially discriminatory under equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
8. Opinion of the Court: Official action is not unconstitutional
solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. To
show a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
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Amendment, it is necessary to prove that racially discriminatory
intent or purpose was a motivating factor in the village's rezoning
decision. Such a racially discriminatory intent could be shown by
evidence of a number of factors. Disproportionate impact, while not
conclusive on its own, may be one of the factors; others include: the
historical background of the challenged decision, particularly if it
reveals "a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes;"
departures from the normal procedural sequence or from substantive
considerations normally considered important; and the legislative or
administrative history, "especially where there are contemporary
statements by members of the decisionmaking body." In this case, an
examination of these factors fails to show that racial discrimination
was a motivating factor in the denial of the rezoning. The case is
remanded to the federal district court for a ruling on the Fair Housing
Act claim.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 263-64 (Brian w.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Village of Belie Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
1. Type ofRegulation: Zoning ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether an ordinance restricting land use to
single-family dwellings and definingfamily as any number of related
people or not more than two unrelated people living together
rationally promoted any legitimate government purpose.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaration that the ordinance was
unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Freedom of association (First Amendment).
c. Privacy (the penumbras and emanations of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
6. Facts: Belle Terre restricted land use within the village to
single-family dwellings. The ordinance defined family as any number
of related individuals or not more than two unrelated individuals
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living together. The Dickmans owned a house in the village and
leased it to six unrelated students at a local university. When the
village ordered the Dickmans to remedy the violation, the Dickmans
brought suit to have the ordinance declared unconstitutional.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under Fourteenth Amendment as
rationally furthering a legitimate governmental purpose.
8. Opinion of the Court: Protecting a neighborhood's peace and
quiet to help promote family values is a legitimate purpose in zoning.
"A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed to
family needs." This legitimate purpose [was] rationally served by
prohibiting more than two unrelated persons from living together,
since boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like tend to increase
urban problems such as proliferation of crowds and noise. Freedom
to associate with people as one pleases and the right to privacy [were]
not violated, since unmarried couples [were] not prohibited from
living together and a family [could] still entertain guests. Since the
ordinance rationally further[ed] a legitimate government purpose, it
[was] held valid.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITuTION 264-65 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
1. Type of Regulation: Zoning ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Constitutional validity of zoning ordinances
dividing a village into residential, commercial, and industrial areas.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Injunction to prevent enforcement of the
ordinance.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Substantive due process (taking without just
compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: Ambler Realty owned 68 acres of land in the village
of Euclid. Euclid instituted zoning ordinances including restrictions
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on use, height, and area, which affected Ambler Realty's property. As
a result of this zoning, the value of Ambler Realty's property
declined from $10,000 per acre if used for industrial purposes to
$2,500 per acre if restricted (as per the ordinance) to residential use.
Ambler Realty then brought suit, seeking an injunction to prevent the
village of Euclid from enforcing the ordinance. Ambler argued that
the zoning regulations diminished the value of their property, which
in their view constituted a taking of property without compensation
or due process of law. After the lower court ruled in favor of Ambler
Realty, the village appealed, contending that zoning was a valid
means of promoting public health, safety, welfare, and morals.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under Fourteenth Amendment as
having a rational relation to the public health, safety, morals, and
general welfare.
8. Opinion of the Court: An ordinance is only unconstitutional
when it is clearly arbitrary, where its provisions bear no rational
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
Property rights are not absolute. Modem urban life necessitates the
placing of new and increased restrictions on development to ensure
the comfort and safety of urban dwellers. The desired end of public
welfare and safety [was] sufficient to justify the ordinance as a valid
exercise of police power. Therefore, Ambler Realty's request for an
injunction [was] denied. [Editor's note: The Court also noted with
approval the increased national use of zoning as a tool for dealing
with a range of urban safety and quality of life problems.]
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSEP, ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 265-66 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
I. Type ofRegulation: Zoning ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether the city's zoning ordinance, by its
terms and as enforced, effectively excluded persons of low and
moderate income from living in the town, in violation of petitioners'
constitutional rights and of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981, 1982, and 1983.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial and as applied.
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4. Remedy Sought: Declaratory and injunctive relief and
$750,000 in damages.
5. Constitutional Issue: First, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
6. Facts: Petitioners included various organizations and
individual residents in the Rochester, New York, metropolitan area.
They brought this action against the Town of Penfield, an
incorporated municipality adjacent to Rochester, and against
members of Penfield's Zoning, Planning and Town Boards.
Petitioners Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc., and eight individual
plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
alleged that Penfield's zoning ordinance had the purpose and effect of
excluding persons of low and moderate income from residing in the
town. The ordinance allocated 98% of the town's vacant land to
single-family detached housing and, allegedly, by imposing
unreasonable requirements relating to lot size, setback, floor area, and
habitable space, the ordinance increased the cost of single-family
detached housing beyond the means of persons of low and moderate
income. The town and its officials had made "practically and
economically impossible the construction of sufficient numbers of
low and moderate income ... housing in the Town of Penfield to
satisfy the minimum housing requirements of both the Town of
Penfield and the metropolitan Rochester area." By precluding low-
and moderate-cost housing, the town's zoning practices also had the
effect of excluding persons of minority racial and ethnic groups,
since most such persons only have low or moderate incomes.
The individual petitioners further alleged injuries to themselves.
The Rochester property owners and taxpayers claimed that because of
Penfield's exclusionary practices, the city of Rochester had been
forced to impose higher tax rates on them and others similarly
situated than would otherwise have been necessary. The low-and
moderate-income minority plaintiffs argued that Penfield's zoning
practices had prevented them from acquiring, by lease or purchase,
residential property in the town, and thus had forced them and their
families to reside in less attractive environments. Petitioner Rochester
Home Builders Association, an association of firms engaged in
residential construction in the Rochester metropolitan area, moved
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the District Court for leave to intervene as a party-plaintiff. It claimed
that these practices arbitrarily and capriciously had prevented its
member firms from building low-and moderate-cost housing in
Penfield, and thereby had deprived them of potential profits. Metro-
Act and the other original plaintiffs moved to join petitioner Housing
Council in the Monroe County Area, Inc., as a party-plaintiff.
Housing Council was a not-for-profit New York corporation, its
membership comprising some 71 public and private organizations
interested in housing problems.
The District Court held that: 1) the original plaintiffs, Home
Builders and Housing Council lacked standing to prosecute the
action; 2) the original complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted; 3) the suit should not proceed as a class
action; and 4) in the exercise of discretion, Home Builders should not
be permitted to intervene. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reaching
only the standing questions.
7. Decision: None of the petitioners met the threshold requirement
that to have standing a complainant must clearly allege facts
demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution
of the dispute and the exercise of the court's remedial powers.
8. Opinion of the Court: The question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or
of particular issues. This inquiry involves both constitutional
limitations in federal-court jurisdiction and the prudential limitations
on its exercise. As an aspect of justiciability, the standing question is
whether the plaintiff has "alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy" as to warrant his invocation of federal-
court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial
powers on his behalf. Even when the plaintiff has alleged an injury
sufficient to meet the "case or controversy" requirement, this Court
has held that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties.
In this case, the Court determined that none of the petitioners had
standing. The petitioners who were persons of low or moderate
income failed to show that they personally had been injured by the
zoning ordinance. The taxpayer petitioners did not assert any
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personal right under the Constitution or any statute to be free of
action by a neighboring municipality that may have some incidental,
adverse effect on Rochester. Finally, the Court concluded that Metro-
Act of Rochester, Inc., Housing Council of Monroe County Area,
Inc., and Rochester Home Builders Association, Inc., failed to allege
that their respective members were suffering immediate or threatened
injury, as a result of the challenged action, of the sort that would
make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278
U.S. 116 (1928).
1. Type of Regulation: Zoning ordinance.
2. Land use Issue: Whether the delegation of power to owners
of adjoining land to make inoperative the permission was repugnant
to the due process clause.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Judgment and writ commanding the
superintendent to issue the permit.
5. Constitutional Issue: The Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: Petitioner, Seattle Title Trust Company, owned and
maintained a philanthropic home for the aged poor. Petitioner
proposed to remove the old building and in its place, for $100,000,
erect a two and a half story fire proof home large enough for 30
people. According to the amended zoning ordinance, petitioner first
had to obtain the written consent of two-thirds of the property owners
within 100 feet of the proposed building. Petitioner applied for a
permit to build the new home without having obtained the required
consents. Respondent Roberge subsequently denied the application
solely because of petitioner's failure to secure the necessary consents.
Petitioner brought suit in the Superior Court of King County, and the
court held that the amended ordinance, construed to prevent the
erection of the proposed building, was valid. The highest court of the
state affirmed the judgment.
7. Decision: The condition requiring consent of property
owners was repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
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Amendment and petitioner was therefore entitled to a permit.
8. Opinion of the Court: Legislature may not, under the guise of
the police power, impose restrictions that are unnecessary and
unreasonable upon the use of private property or the pursuit of useful
activities. The Court found that the city ordinance violated the Due
Process Clause, concluding that it was an unwarranted delegation of
power to other property owners to arbitrarily prevent the use of land
for its proposed purpose without any standard or rule prescribed by
legislative action. The Court further noted that nothing in the record
showed that this proposed building would be a nuisance, or that its
construction or maintenance was liable to work any injury,
inconvenience, or annoyance to the community, district, or any
person. The restriction sought to be placed on the permission is
arbitrary and repugnant to Due Process and, therefore, the
superintendent must issue the permit to the petitioner.
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
1. Type ofRegulation: Building regulation.
2. Land Use Issue: Reasonableness of building height
regulations as applied in residential and commercial districts of
Boston.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Order to compel the building commissioner
to issue a building permit to the plaintiff to enable him to build above
the height limit imposed on buildings in that district.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Substantive due process (taking without just
compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: The Massachusetts legislature enacted a statute in
1904 which separated the city of Boston into "A" (business) districts
and "B" (residential) districts, imposing 125-foot height restrictions
on buildings in "A" districts and 80 to 100-foot restrictions on those
in "B" districts. Francis Welch applied for, and was denied, a permit
to erect a 124.5-foot building in a "B" district. He then sued the
building commissioner, alleging that the regulations were only
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imposed for aesthetic reasons and that he was denied equal protection
of the laws by the state's discrimination between "A" and "B" zones.
7. Decision: Regulations upheld under the Fourteenth
Amendment as reasonable.
8. Opinion of the Court: The statutes passed by the
Massachusetts legislature under an exercise of the state's police
power [had] a real, substantial relation to the objectives of fire safety,
comfort, and the convenience of the people of Boston. Although
considerations of an aesthetic nature also entered into the legislative
decisionmaking, they were not a primary motive and [did] not render
the statutes invalid. The building limitations, while discriminatory,
[were] not so unreasonable as to deprive Mr. Welch of the profitable
use of his land without justification, and, therefore, [did] not deprive
him of either due process (no taking) or the equal protection of the
laws.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 267-68 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
1. Type of Regulation: Subdivision regulation.
2. Land Use Issues:
a. Whether damages are available for an alleged
temporary taking of a landowner's property due to denial of
subdivision approval;
b. What constitutes a final administrative decision
necessary to satisfy ripeness requirements for judicial review;
and
c. Whether a claimant may seek just compensation for an
alleged taking in federal court without first utilizing the
procedures available under state law to obtain such
compensation.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
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4. Remedy Sought: Damages for a temporary taking and
injunctive relief requiring approval of the subdivision.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Taking of property without just compensation (Fifth
Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
b. Ripeness.
6. Facts: A developer received approval of a preliminary
subdivision plat for a large clustered development in 1973, with the
provision that it would seek reapproval as it phased in additional
portions of the development. Although the zoning regulations
required that land located on steep slopes not be included in
calculating permissible density for the development, no such
deduction was made.
Development continued for a number of years, during which the
zoning ordinance was amended to reduce allowable densities;
however, the commission continued to apply the 1973 ordinance to
this development and regularly renewed its approval of the
preliminary plat. In 1979, the commission reversed its position and
began to evaluate the plans submitted for approval under the
amended zoning ordinance, although still granting renewed
approvals.
In 1980, the commission asked the developer to submit a revised
preliminary plat before it sought final approval for the remaining
sections of the subdivision. The commission found this request
necessary in light of a number of changes that had occurred since the
project was first approved and because of errors and omissions in the
originally approved plat. The commission found several problems
with the revised plat and declined to approve further development.
The developer appealed the commission's decision to the county
board of zoning appeals, which determined that the commission
should apply the 1973 zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations
in evaluating the plat.
The commission declined to follow the board's decision, stating
that the board lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals from the
commission. The commission disapproved a new plat submitted by
Hamilton Bank, which had acquired the original developer's
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remaining interest in the property in a foreclosure proceeding. The
bank then filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the
commission had taken its property without just compensation. The
jury awarded the bank $350,000 in damages for a temporary taking of
its property, but this verdict was set aside by the judge on the ground
that a temporary deprivation of a property right could not, as a matter
of law, constitute a taking. The court also required the commission to
evaluate the subdivision plat using the 1973 zoning ordinance and
subdivision regulations. A federal court of appeals reinstated the
jury's verdict, finding that there had been a temporary taking of the
bank's property and that this required compensation.
7. Decision: Case dismissed for lack of ripeness:
8. Opinion of the Court: The basic question presented in this
case [was] whether government must pay money damages to a
landowner whose property allegedly has been taken by the
application of government regulations. However, this question [could
not] be answered because the bank's claim [was] premature ....
A taking claim is not ripe until a government entity has reached a
final decision regarding the application of its regulations to the
property claimed to have been taken. In this case, the bank failed to
seek variances that would have allowed it to meet several of the
regulatory requirements imposed by the commission. The
commission's decision [could not] be considered final while the bank
still had the right to request variances; without a final determination
regarding the effect of the regulations on the bank's property, it [was]
impossible to determine whether a taking had occurred.
The fact that this claim was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does
not alter the requirement that the bank seek variances from the
commission. While it is true that a plaintiff does not have to exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action,
exhaustion of administrative remedies is distinct from the
requirement that an administrative action must be final before it is
judicially reviewable. The exhaustion requirement refers to
administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may
seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy for unlawful
or otherwise improper decisions; finality requires that the
administrative agency has arrived at a definite position on the prop-
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erty in question, and that the decision causes actual injury to the
property owner.
The bank's failure to seek compensation through the inverse
condemnation procedures provided by state law [was] a second
reason why the claim was not ripe. A plaintiff cannot seek just
compensation for an alleged taking under federal law unless it can
show that it has sought and not obtained just compensation under the
state's inverse condemnation procedure, or that the procedure is
either unavailable or inadequate.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER Er AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 268-70 (Brian W.
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
1. Type ofRegulation: Rent control ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether a local rent control ordinance, when
viewed against the background of California's Mobile Home
Residency Law, amounted to a physical occupation of petitioners'
property entitling them to compensation under the Takings Clause.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: Facial.
4. Remedy Sought: Damages of $6,000,000; declaration that the
rent control ordinance is unconstitutional; and an injunction barring
the ordinance's enforcement.
5. Constitutional Issue: Takings Clause (Fifth Amendment).
6. Facts: California enacted the Mobile Home Residency Law in
1978. This law limited the bases upon which a mobile home park
owner may terminate a mobile home owner's tenancy. The legislature
concluded that, because of the high cost of moving a mobile home
and the damage that can occur, the owners should be provided with
protection from actual or constructive eviction. In 1988, after the
passage of this law, voters of Escondido approved a rent control
ordinance, setting rents back to their 1986 levels and prohibiting rent
increases without the approval of the city council. Petitioners, owners
of two mobile home parks, filed suit, complaining that the rent
control law deprived them of all use and occupancy of their real
property, and granted to the tenants of mobile homes presently in the
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park, as well as the successors in interest of such tenants, the right to
physically, permanently occupy and use the property of the
petitioners. The Superior Court sustained the city's demurrer and
dismissed the Yees' complaint. Eleven other park owners filed suit
and all were dismissed. These eleven cases were consolidated with
this case for appeal. The court of appeals affirmed and the California
Supreme Court denied review.
7. Decision: The rent control ordinance did not amount to a
physical taking of petitioners' property; whether the ordinance
violated petitioners' substantive rights and whether the ordinance
constituted a regulatory taking was not properly before the Court.
8. Opinion of the Court: The government effects a physical taking
only when it requires the landowner to submit to the physical
occupation of his or her land. The Court found that the rent control
ordinance, on its face, did not authorize this. The petitioners
voluntarily rented their land to mobile home owners; the government
did not force these tenants upon them. Instead, the laws at issue
merely regulated petitioners' use of their land by regulating the
relationship between landlord and tenant. There had been no
compelled physical occupation in this case.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
1. Type of Regulation: Zoning ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether zoning ordinance requiring adult
theaters to be geographically dispersed [was] invalid for classifying
on the basis of the content of communication protected as free
speech.
3. Type of Legal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Declaration that the ordinance was
unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement.
5. Constitutional Issues:
a. Due process (Fourteenth Amendment).
b. Prior restraint on speech (First Amendment).
c. Equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: The Detroit Common Council determined that a
concentration of adult theaters and adult bookstores in an area was
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injurious to the neighborhood and therefore adopted an ordinance
prohibiting concentration of such establishments. Two operators of
adult theaters were denied certificates of occupancy because they had
located their theaters in violation of the zoning ordinance.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld under First Amendment as not
regulating content or constituting prior restraint.
8. Opinion of the Court: The ordinance neither place[d] a total
ban on adult theaters nor so limit[ed] the number of adult theaters as
to deny the public access to adult films. The ordinance [did] not
regulate the content of the films that can be shown but merely the
location of adult theaters. Thus, the ordinance [was] not an
impermissible prior restraint, under the First Amendment. The city
ha[d] an important interest in protecting the character of its
neighborhoods, and this interest [was] rationally furthered by
requiring the dispersal of adult theaters.
"Reprinted with permission from LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION copyright 1989 by the
American Planning Association, Suite 1600, 122 South Michigan Ave., Chicago IL 60603-
6107." BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION 270-71 (Brian W.
Blaesser& Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
1. Type ofRegulation: Zoning ordinance.
2. Land Use Issue: Whether a city ordinance that divided the
city into five building zones and prescribed the kinds of buildings
that may be erected in each zone was constitutional in its general
scope and whether it was violative of due process or equal protection.
3. Type ofLegal Challenge: As applied.
4. Remedy Sought: Order compelling defendants to issue
building permit.
5. Constitutional Issue: Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses (Fourteenth Amendment).
6. Facts: Plaintiff's lot was situated in Zone "B", a zone limited
by the ordinance to buildings for residential purposes, private clubs,
churches, educational and similar purposes. All buildings for private
businesses were excluded, except for offices of persons practicing
medicine. If plaintiffs property was available for business purposes,
its market value would have increased greatly. Plaintiff applied for a
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writ of mandate compelling the Board of Public Works of the City of
Los Angeles to issue him a permit for the construction of a business
building. The district court of appeals, on an alternate writ, found in
favor of the plaintiff, holding that the city zoning ordinance was
unreasonable and discriminatory. The Supreme Court of California
reversed.
7. Decision: Ordinance upheld as being constitutionally valid as
applied to these facts.
8. Opinion of the Court: The Court relied on Euclid v. Ambler
Co. in determining that the zoning ordinance in its general scope was
constitutionally valid. The Court recognized the Common Council's
conclusion that the public welfare would be promoted by constituting
the area, including the property of plaintiff in error, a Zone "B"
district. The Court stated that it would not substitute its judgment for
that of the legislative body charged with the primary duty and
responsibility of determining the question.
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
182 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
APPENDIX B
1. Agins v. City of Tiburon
Majority-Powell
2. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
Majority-Rehnquist
Concurring-Scalia
Concurring-Souter
Dissenting-White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens
3. Berman v. Parker
Majority-Douglas
4. Block v. Hirsh
Majority-Holmes
Dissenting-McKenna, White, Van Devanter, McReynolds
5. City Council ofLos Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
Majority-Stevens, Burger, White, Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor
Dissenting-Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
6. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.
Majority-Stevens, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter.
Concurring-Blackmun
Dissenting-Rehnquist, White, Thomas
7. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
Majority-White
Concurring-Stevens, Burger
Concurring/Dissenting-Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun
8. City ofEastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.
Majority-Burger
Dissenting-Powell
Dissenting-Stevens, Brennan
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9. City of Ladue v. Gilleo
Majority-Stevens
Concurring-O'Connor
10. City ofLakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.
Majority-Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia
Dissenting-White, Stevens, O'Connor
11. City of New Orleans v. Dukes
Majority-Per Curiam
12. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
Majority-Rehnquist, Burger, White, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor
Dissenting-Brennan, Marshall
13. County Board ofArlington County v. Richards
Majority-Per Curiam
14. Dolan v. City of Tigard
Majority-Rehnquist
Dissenting-Stevens, Blackmun, Ginsburg
Dissenting-Souter
15. Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville
Majority-Powell, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, Blackmun
Concurring-Douglas
Dissenting-Burger, Rehnquist
Dissenting-White
16. Eubank v. City of Richmond
Majority-McKenna
17. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles
Majority-Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Scalia
Dissenting-Stevens (Parts I and II), Blackmun, O'Connor
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18. Frisby v. Schultz
Majority-O'Connor, Rehnquist, Blackmun, Scalia, Kennedy
Concurring-White
Dissenting-Brennan, Marshall
Dissenting-Stevens
19. FW/PBS v. City ofDallas
Majority-O'Connor, Rehnquist (Parts I, III, IV), White (Parts I,
III, IV), Stevens (Parts I, II, IV), Scalia (Parts I, III, IV),
Kennedy (Parts I, II, III, IV).
Concurring-Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
Concurring/Dissenting-White, Rehnquist
Concurring/Dissenting-Scalia
Concurring/Dissenting-Stevens
20. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead
Majority-Clark
21. Gorieb v. Fox
Majority-Sutherland
22. Hadacheck v. Sebastian
Majority-McKenna
23. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkff
Majority-O'Connor
24. Kaiser Aetna v. United States
Majority-Rehnquist
Dissenting-Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall
25. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass "n v. DeBenedictis
Majority-Stevens, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun
Dissenting-Rehnquist, Powell, O'Connor, Scalia
26. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.
Majority-Burger, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell,
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Stevens, O'Connor
Dissenting-Rehnquist
27. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.
Majority-Marshall, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens,
O'Connor
Dissenting-Blackmun, Brennan, White
28. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Majority-Scalia
Concurring-Kennedy
Dissenting-Blackmun
Dissenting-Stevens
Separate Statement-Souter
29. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County
Majority-Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmnn, O'Connor
Dissenting-White, Burger, Powell (Parts I, II, III), Rehnquist
(Parts I, II, III)
Dissenting-Rehnquist, Powell
30. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
Majority-White, Stewart, Marshall, Powell
Concurring-Brennan, Blackmun
Dissenting-Stevens
Dissenting-Burger
Dissenting-Rehnquist
31. Miller v. Schoene
Majority-Stone
32. Moore v. City of East Cleveland
Majority-Powell, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
Concurring-Brennan, Marshall
Concurring-Stevens
Dissenting-Burger
Dissenting-Stewart, Rehnquist
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Dissenting-White
33. Mugler v. Kansas
Majority-Harlan
Separate Opinion (Dissent)-Field
35. Nectow v. City of Cambridge
Majority-Sutherland
36. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
Majority-Scalia, Rehnquist, White, Powell, O'Connor
Dissenting-Brennan, Marshall
Dissenting-Blackmun
Dissenting-Stevens, Blackmun
37. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
Majority-Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell
Dissenting-Rehnquist, Burger, Stevens
38. Pennell v. City of San Jose
Majority-Rehnquist
Concurring/Dissenting-Scalia, O'Connor
39. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
Majority-Holmes
Dissenting-Brandeis
40. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins
Majority-Rehnquist, Burger, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall,
Stevens, White (Parts I, II, III, IV), Powell (Parts I, II, III, IV),
Blackmun (all but one sentence).
Concurring-Marshall
Concurring (in part and judgment)-White
Concurring (in part and judgment)-PowelI, White
41. Reinman v. City ofLittle Rock
Majority-Pitney
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42. San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego
Majority-Blackmun, Burger, White, Rehnquist, Stevens
Concurring-Rehnquist
Dissenting-Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell.
43. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim
Majority-White, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell
Concurring-Blackmun
Concurring-Powell, Stewart
Concurring-Stevens
Dissenting-Burger, Rehnquist
44. Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago
Majority-Clarke
45. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Co.
Majority-Powell, Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist
Concurring/Dissenting-Marshall, Brennan
Dissenting-White
46. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas
Majority-Douglas, Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist
Dissenting-Brennan
Dissenting-Marshall
47. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
Majority-Sutherland
48. Warth v. Seldin
Majority-Powell
Dissenting-Douglas
Dissenting-Brennan, White, Marshall
49. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge
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Majority-Butler
50. Welch v. Swasey
Majority-Peckham
51. Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank
Majority-Blackmun, Burger, Brennan,
Marshall, Rehnquist, O'Connor
Concurring-Brennan, Marshall
Concurring-Stevens
52. Yee v. City of Escondido
Majority-O'Connor
53. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.
Majority-Stevens, Burger, White, Powell (except Part III),
Rehnquist
Concurring-Powell
Dissenting-Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
Dissenting-Blackmun, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall
54. Zahn v. Board of Public Works
Majority-Sutherland
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